Sunday, July 15, 2012

Notes on The 24 Thomistic Theses (Hugon's Commentary): Thesis One


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For an introduction to this series of posts, click here.

THESIS ONE: “Potency and act divide being in such a way that whatever is, is either a pure act, or else coalesces necessarily from potency and act as from its first and intrinsic principles.” 


(Potentia et actus ita dividunt ens, ut quidquid est, vel sit actus purus, vel ex potentia et actu tamquam primis atque intrinsecis principiis necessario coalescat.)

The footnote to the thesis (in the original ecclesiastical document) refers to the following texts of St. Thomas: 

Summa theologiae Ia, Q.77, a.1: “potency and act divide being and every kind of being....” 

In Metaph. Book VII, Lect. 1: “Now essential being, which exists outside the mind, is divided in two ways, as has been stated in Book V; for it is divided, first, into the ten categories, and second, into the potential and the actual.” 

In Metaph. Book IX, Lect. 1: “the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish the truth about being as divided into potency and actuality.” 

(See also In Metaph. Book IX, Lect. 9.)


MY NOTES ON HUGON'S COMMENTARY: 

Hugon begins his discussion of Thesis One by introducing the distinction between potency and act, and then dividing the notion of potency into its kinds. 

That which is in potency can be, whereas that which has passed from what can be to what is, is in act. The good professor of metaphysics is a philosopher in act, whereas the newborn is a philosopher in potency. 

Now, ‘potency’ can be understood in two ways: objective, or merely logical potency, and subjective potency. We must be careful here not to read into this distinction our modern understanding of the terms “objective” and “subjective”; in fact, the real meaning here is practically the opposite of what our modern terminology might incline us to think.  Subjective potency is the potency that is in a real subject—meaning real a thing in the world, whereas “objective” potency refers to potency insofar as it is an object of the intellect, and thus, it does not refer to a real potency in a real thing, but to some mere possibility, to what can be the case, but is not. A horse that can fly is an objective potency, or merely logical possibility, whereas a bird’s capacity to fly is a real or subjective potency. 

Hugon then makes a further division within subjective potencies: some subjective potencies come 'out of' something, and are called active potencies, such as fire’s capacity to burn or to produce heat, whereas others are 'in something', and are called passive potency, such as water’s capacity to be heated. The first is a perfection, whereas the latter represents an imperfection. For this reason, the first is compatible with God, Who is Pure Act, whereas the latter is not. God has all active potencies (and hence we say He is omnipotent), but he has no passive potency (and hence we say he is impassible). 

Hugon then proceeds to explain motion (or ‘change’) as the passing from potency to act. In connection with this, he makes two important points. First, that which is being moved is in potency insofar as it is being moved. It does not yet possess the act towards which it is being moved; once it reaches that act, which is the goal, so to speak, it is no longer in motion. Yet that which moves, imparts act, and is thus in act—for nothing can give an act that it does not possess. Hence, the mover is in act, while the moved is in potency. Take, for instance, water in a pot being heated by fire. The fire is hot in act, whereas the water in the pot is hot in potency while it is being heated. The second important point is a corollary of the foregoing: the mover is necessarily distinct from the moved. Stated negatively, nothing can move itself. This obvious and seemingly superfluous point is the crux of Aquinas’ first way of proving God’s existence. 

Hugon then moves on to consider the notion of ‘pure act’. He explains, along the lines of the thesis, that there are two ways in which act can be limited, and thus fail to be pure act: it can be received by potency, as the soul is received by the body, or it can be modified or perfected by further act, as when an angel, though immaterial, receives its being, its faculties, and its operations, which are perfections, and hence the angel is in potency to them. In the case of God, however, ‘pure act’ means that such act neither receives nor is received; it is pure perfection without limit. In everything outside of God, there is always some admixture of potency and act; these two, potency and act, are the first and intrinsic principles of creatures. Hugon finally notes the relation between the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of potency and act to that of the ten categories. First, potency and act represent the most general division of being (ens), omne ens et omne genus entis. That is to say, the composition of potency and act is common to all categories, both substance and the accidents, such that substantial being is divided into substantial potency and substantial act, and accidental being is divided into accidental potency and accidental act. This allows us to understand the axiom, potentia et actus sunt in eodem genere, potency and act are in the same genus: substantial act can only be received by substantial potency, and accidental act can only modify accidental potency.


Friday, July 13, 2012

Should Classrooms Be Coed? (TFP Article)


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“Many of those boys who scored proficient in the [experimental] all-boys classes had previously been labeled ‘ADHD’ [Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder] or ‘ESE’ [Exceptional Student Education] in coed classes.”  

Glad someone other than the Opus Dei has come to that realization!

Link to TFP article.


Thursday, July 12, 2012

"Aristocracy and Sanctity," Exerpt from Nobility, by Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira


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Link to Nobility.org.

'via Blog this'

Wednesday, July 11, 2012

Quaeritur: Does Every Heart Transplant Involve Murder?


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QuaeriturI was considering a career as a heart surgeon, but a friend told me that it is a mortal sin for a Catholic to have a heart transplant because in taking someone's heart, you are killing him.  Is this true?


Respondeo: Excellent question.  Legally, heart donors have to be declared "brain dead" before they can remove their heart.  So the philosophical question is whether a "brain dead" patient is really dead, which means, basically, that their brains are necrotic (i.e., "rotten") and hence there is no possibility of them ever recuperating or even regaining consciousness.  (This is what it should mean, although doctors often declare, as 'brain dead', patients who only show some signs of brain dysfunction, and few ever really ensure that the whole brain is necrotic).  In any case, brain death is different from a coma (or 'Persistent Vegetative State'), because in a coma, the patient has their brain intact, but it just doesn't work; and comatose patients do sometimes regain consciousness. 

The Church has taught that one may hold the opinion that brain dead patients are really dead (i.e., their souls have left their bodies).  So if a philosopher or theologian or physician holds that opinion---and most do---they are not heretics for doing so.  But the other opinion, namely, that brain dead patients are really alive (i.e., their souls are still informing their bodies), is also perfectly admissible.  We are also allowed to hold it.  So the issue is open to debate among Catholics.

My own opinion is the latter opinion, namely, that "brain death" is not really death.  This is not a very popular opinion, in particular because it means that heart transplants involve murdering a truly living (though "brain dead") patient.  A good book that defends this position is Mattei, ed., Finis Vitae: Is Brain Death Still Life?, from which I have quoted before.  My reasoning is that there are  many biological functions going on in the body of the "brain dead" patient, which means that that patient has to have a soul.  The patient is definitely alive.  Any biologist (as opposed to  a medical doctor) would agree that there is life in that organism.  For a formal version of my argument, see this previous post.

Some Thomists would reply that indeed such a patient is alive, but it is no longer a human being, because it does not have a brain.  So it is some other kind of living organism, one that is not human, and thus it is permissible for us to kill it.

My reply: the only way that that patient is not a living human being is if, for some reason, the human soul has left the body and some other, (animal or plant) soul has come in its stead.  This is highly unlikely (why would God do such a thing?), and, therefore, we should err on the side of caution, and assume it is a human being, and not kill him just to prolong someone else's life.  The end (saving someone else) does not justify the means (probably killing someone, no matter how bad a state they're in).


The 'Heart', A Third Rational Power in the Human Soul?


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Quaeritur:  I was listening to a conference given by Fr. Gregory Hesse (now deceased).  He spoke about the image of God in man, that is, the intellect and will.  However, he said that St. Thomas Aquinas missed the boat when he said that there are only two powers in the human soul.  As there are three persons in the Blessed Trinity, it is only sensible that there are three powers of the human soul to reflect the Holy Trinity.  Fr. Hesse said that this third power is what we can call the “heart’ or “fire.”  Its object is the “beautiful,” whereas the object of the intellect is the “truth” and the object of the will is the “good.”  He basically stated that this third power is the principle/means of charity (love). Fr. Hesse seemed to be very convincing. Do you know anything about this supposed third power? 

Respondeo: Yes, this idea was first proposed by Dietrich Von Hildebrand. He was motivated by a  serious misunderstanding of St. Thomas' doctrine on the will. For Aquinas, the will does more than just choosing. It also does other acts, such as intention, fruition, command, consent, love, etc. But Von Hildebrand in his works Ethics and The Heart, appears to be under the impression that the only thing the will does in Aquinas is choose.  For this reason, he felt the need to posit a third power, the 'heart', which could do such acts as "respond to value"---everything that he thought Aquinas' 'will' could not do.  Yet Aquinas accounts for this type of activity (and lots more) with multiple powers, including the will and the passions.  In this respect, then, Fr. Hesse was not being a Thomist.

The issue is quite complicated.  I intend to publish a refutation of Von Hildebrand on this in the near future.  For now, I recommend you take a good look at ST I.81-83 and I-II.6-17.  I am also working (long term) on a book whose primary aim will be to refute the objections of the 'personalists' and 'phenomenologists' against St. Thomas and Thomism.  This topic would constitute one of the chapters of the book.


Monday, July 09, 2012

Is Theology a Science or is it Dialectical? St. Thomas' Nuanced Position


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The following is an excerpt from a paper I recently presented at a conference titled Saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses sources arabes / Aquinas and the Arabs at the Sorbonne in Paris (which is, coincidentally, the modern successor institution of the medieval University of Paris, where St. Thomas taught).  The title of the paper was: "Averroes and Aquinas on the Dialectical Nature of Revealed Theology."


Abstract

Two of the greatest Aristotelian commentators, Averroes and Aquinas, used the Aristotelian distinction between demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical discourses to assign an epistemological status to religious or theological knowledge, that is, to conclusions drawn from revelation. But their respective views on this point turned out to be very different, even opposite. Averroes considered religious knowledge to be dialectical in nature, whereas Aquinas believed revealed Christian theology to be a demonstrative science. The author shows that both of these greater Aristotelian commentators strive, although very differently, to be faithful to Aristotle concerning the epistemological status of theology. Ultimately, however, their approaches converge, particularly insofar as in both accounts, theology is dialectical in nature, at least in a qualified sense in the case of Aquinas.


As is well known, at the beginning of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas faces the objection that sacra doctrina cannot be a science, because it assumes the articles of faith as its principles:  

It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from principles known per se. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith, which are not known per se, since they are not admitted by all: “For faith does not belong to all,” as is said in 2 Thessalonians 3 [v. 2]. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science. (ST I.1.2 arg. 1)

What is at issue here is that, as Aristotle says, the demonstrative sciences “proceed from premises which are true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and causative of the conclusion” (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b20-23).  Or, as we read in the Topics,

[Reasoning] is a ‘demonstration’, when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true.... Things are ‘true’ and ‘primary’ which are believed on the strength of nothing else but themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself (Aristotle, Topics 1.1)

Therefore, it would seem that sacra doctrina falls short of being a science, because it does not proceed from primary or per se known principles, but from premises that must be accepted on faith, without any evidence.  Aquinas replies by citing the well-known Aristotelian doctrine of the subalternation of sciences: “The principles of any science are either per se known, or are reduced to the awareness of a higher science.  And such are the principles of sacred doctrine....” (ST I.1.2 ad 1).  The body of the article is more explicit:

We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of science. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are others which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of optics proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. (ST I.1.2c)

That is to say, whereas some sciences proceed from per se known principles, others ‘believe’ (credunt) or ‘presuppose’ (supponunt) their principles as having been demonstrated by more fundamental sciences, as optics accepts its principles as having been demonstrated by geometry. 

In other texts, Aquinas gives the name of ‘subaltern sciences’ to those inferior sciences that accept their principles as having been proven by others, and ‘subalterning sciences’ to the superior sciences that prove the principles of the subaltern sciences.  In the prologue to the Sentences commentary, for instance, Aquinas inserts a ‘rectification’—regarding which I shall say more below—where he tells us that:

Superior sciences proceed from per se known principles, as geometry and the like, which have per se known principles, such as ‘if you add equals to equals...’, etc.  But inferior sciences, which are subaltern to superior sciences, do not proceed from per se known principles, but presuppose conclusions proven in superior sciences and use them as principles, which in truth are not per se known principles, but are proven through per se known principles in the superior sciences: as optics, which deals with the visible line, is subaltern to geometry, from which it presupposes those things which are proven concerning the line insofar as it is a line, and through them, as through its principles, proves conclusions concerning the line insofar as it is visible (Sent., prol., q. 1, a. 3, qc. 2).

Sacra doctrina, he concludes, is like optics, in that it is subaltern to a more fundamental science, namely, the science possessed by God. 

So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God (ST I.1.2c).

Thus goes the oft-rehearsed, seldom-contested story of Aquinas’ account of the scientific nature of sacra doctrina.  [...]  Yet in order to place sacra doctrina on solid demonstrative footing, St. Thomas would have to demonstrate that the articles of faith are per se known to God, and hence demonstrate that they are true.  Yet he cannot do so; he clearly accepts their truth on faith, and not on demonstration.  Thus, he ultimately grounds his claim concerning the scientific nature of theology on a belief in the fact of revelation.  Therefore, by appealing to God’s knowledge of the articles of faith as the ultimate justification of the scientific character of sacra doctrina, Thomas never fully avoids Averroes’ view that religious knowledge is somehow dialectical, as a discipline that proceeds from probable propositions, and not from per se known truths.  And what is most surprising is that Aquinas acknowledges as much!  In his De veritate, he tells us that sacra doctrina “does not attain to the perfect ratio of science” (non perfecte attingit ad rationem sciendi). 

He who has a subaltern science does not perfectly attain to the ratio of science, except insofar as his knowledge is somehow continuous with the knowledge of him who has the subalterning science.  Nonetheless, the inferior knower is not said to have science concerning those things that he presupposes, but concerning the conclusions that are necessarily concluded from the presupposed principles.  And thus even the faithful can be said to have science concerning those things which are concluded from the articles of faith (De veritate, q. 14 a. 9 ad 3).

Thus, the practitioner of a subaltern science must believe the principles of that science, often without knowing how a higher science can prove them.  For instance, take a practitioner of optics that does not master geometry; such a person would indeed possess the science of optics, but only imperfectly.  Similarly, Aquinas teaches that, in this life, practitioners of sacra doctrina must believe or presuppose its principles; they cannot know the science that God has of Himself, and to which sacra doctrina is subaltern, and therefore, sacra doctrina in this life “does not attain to the perfect ratio of science.”  Hence, Aquinas himself is acknowledging that sacra doctrina is not quite a science, at least not quoad nos, for it is possessed by us but imperfectly.  Thus it cannot be univocally called a ‘science’, in the same sense in which this term is predicated of the other human sciences, which proceed from principles that are per se known quoad nos.  Rather, sacra doctrina is a science only equivocally—or as has been recently argued, it is a science only analogically.


Now, if I am allowed to extend the analogy a bit, note also that the practitioner of optics does not blindly believe in the geometrical principles of optics, and does not believe them simply because he wants to believe them, but believes them on the basis of a practical judgment of their credentitas (the fact that they are to be believed); that is, those principles are believed ultimately because the practical necessity of believing them can be 'seen', that is, known scientifically (as opposed to believed).  The practitioner of optics, then, believes the principles of optics, but scientifically knows their credentitas.  The optician knows that those principles are in themselves justified, but in himself they are not justified; the optician does not know how they are justified because he does not possess the science of geometry.  Similarly, Aquinas will be careful to argue that the principles of theology can be known to be justified in se, and that the imperfection of sacra doctrina is only quoad nos.  This imperfection does not imply a defect in the objective justification of sacra doctrina, just as the optician’s belief in the (geometrical) principles of optics is in itself justified, but may be unjustified subjectively in the mind of the optician, and the latter imperfection does not imply a defect in the objective justification of optics.  Only the intellect that possesses both the science of optics and that of geometry can be said to attain to the perfect scientific or demonstrative ratio of optics. Thus, we could say that, for Aquinas, theology is a science in se, but dialectical quoad nos, for in us it is only imperfectly a science: “These principles are above reason and thus human reason cannot grasp them perfectly:  And thus a certain defective knowledge occurs, not from a defect in the certitude of those things known, but from a defect on the part of the knower” (Super Sent. Prol., q. 1, art. 3, ad 3).  But Aquinas hopes that this deficiency will be remedied in the next life:

The terminus of principles naturally known are comprehensible to our intellect: therefore, the knowledge that arises from those principles is a certain vision: but it is not thus with the terminus of the articles [of faith].  Hence, in the future life, when God will be seen through His essence, the articles will be thus seen and known per se, as now the principles of demonstration [are seen and known per se] (Super Sent., lib. 3, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 2).

(Copyright of Ite ad Thomam © 2012)

Tuesday, June 26, 2012

Announcing a New Master's Program in Scholastic Philosophy (Institute Catholique de Toulouse)


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Fr. Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P. (General Secretary of the International Theological Commission) and the Dominicans over at the Institute Catholique de Toulouse are joining the efforts of the Institut Saint Thomas d'Aquin, the Revue thomiste, and the Studium du Couvent Saint-Thomas d'Aquin, in order to create what seems to be a promising new master's program in Scholastic Philosophy (in French "Master actualité de la philosophie scolastique," in Latin, Licentia docendi philosophiae scholasticae), an ecclesiastical philosophy degree granted by the Institut Catholique de Toulouse.  The program clearly aims to be faithful to the tradition of Scholastic Thomism.  The program is expected to open in September of this year.

This is very exciting news.  As many readers of Ite ad Thomam are aware, in the last fifty years or so, Thomists in general have abandoned the use of St. Thomas' own method (the scholastic method) and have turned to other, usually modern methodologies (historical, analytical, etc.) to present the doctrines of the Angelic Doctor.  Sadly, except for the few isolated attempts of a few scholars here at IAT and elsewhere, there are no traditional (or scholastic) Thomists anymore.  This program could go a long way towards the restoration of our school of thought.

Could this program at Toulouse be the first graduate degree program since the last Council that seeks to restore scholastic Thomism?  Although the site and the brochure (which I obtained privately and does not seem to be available online) do not say anything explicit on the use of the scholastic method in the classroom, the brochure does speak of the use of an orderly methodology in each discipline ("En avançant avec méthode dans chaque discipline les étudiants acquièrent une vision organisée et cohérente de la réalité").  

The coursework is two years long, and it includes courses in logic, natural philosophy, philosophical psychology, ethics, politics, metaphysics, the history of philosophy, methodology, and sacred theology (STL courses from the Institut Saint Thomas d'Aquin).

Année A - 1er Semestre


Cours
Intitulés
Métaphysique
La substance, l’acte et la puissance dans la Métaphysique d’Aristote
Philosophie
de la nature
Création & Évolution 1 : le problème des créationnismes
Philosophie
de l’homme
La vocation de la femme
Politique
La primauté du Bien commun
Logique
La dialectique aristotélicienne 1
Histoire de la philosophie
-       S. Thomas d’Aquin et la Somme de théologie.

-       La Foi et la raison
Théologie
-       1 cours bloc de l’ISTA
Méthodologie
cours du Master Éthique, cultures et humanité

[1] Groupe de recherche de l’Équipe de recherche Éthique, cultures & humanité (2007-) de l’ICT.

Année A - 2e Semestre


Cours
Intitulés
Métaphysique
Dieu, acte pur et pensée de la pensée,
le livre XII de la Métaphysique d’Aristote
Philosophie
de la nature
Création & Évolution 2 : le problème des matérialismes
Philosophie
de l’homme
Philosophie de l'homme et psychologie contemporaine
Politique
Anthropologie et théorie politique chez Suárez
Logique
La dialectique aristotélicienne 2
Histoire de la philosophie
Aux sources de la phénoménologie, « la controverse idéalisme-réalisme »
Théologie
1 cours bloc de l’ISTA
Méthodologie
[N.B. : choix du sujet du mémoire et du directeur de recherche]

Année B - 1er Semestre


Cours
Intitulés
Métaphysique
Les purs esprits, le traité De Substantiis separatis de S. Thomas d’Aquin
Philosophie
de la nature
L’univers et le temps, le traité De Æternitate mundi de S. Thomas d’Aquin
Philosophie
de l’homme
La bioéthique et le statut ontologique de l’embryon humain
Politique
Le concept de « droits de l’homme »
Logique
L’art de tromper, Réfutations sophistiques et désinformation
Histoire de la philosophie
Les thomismes
Théologie
-       1 cours bloc de l’ISTA
Méthodologie
Travail de recherche et éditions critiques, le cas de l’édition léonine

Année B - 2e Semestre

Cours
Intitulés
Métaphysique
« Dieu sans l’être » ? S. Thomas d’Aquin et l’onto-théologie
Philosophie
de la nature
La crise des sciences modernes et contemporaines
Philosophie
de l’homme
La spiritualité de l’âme humaine, les expériences de mort imminente
Politique
Laïcité ou laïcisme : la religion dans la cité
Logique
Les langages totalitaires (langue de bois et langue du Troisième Reich)
Histoire de la philosophie
Averroès
Théologie
1 cours bloc de l’ISTA
Mémoire de recherche

MASTER ACTUALITÉ

Faculté de Philosophie :
31 rue de la Fonderie
B.P. 7012
31068 TOULOUSE Cedex 7
Tél. : 05.61.36.81.00
Fax : 05.61.36.81.37


Although the program is clearly not governed exclusively by traditional Catholic principles, at the very least, it is definitely a step in the right direction.  

The program also features a few interesting names among its faculty.  Bonino is, of course, the most eminent Thomist among the professors.  And although he cannot quite be catalogued as a scholastic Thomist (he is more of a historical Thomist), Bonino is nonetheless convinced that "the massive rejection of the 'commentators' by mid-20th century Thomism" is not at all a good thing.  His historical research on some of the chief members of the tradition of scholastic Thomism has done much to promote the restoration of scholastic thought.  But it is noteworthy that, in addition to Bonino, two traditional Catholic professors are listed as faculty members, namely, Stéphane Agullo and Bruno Couillaud, both of which also teach at the seminary of the Institute of Christ the King Sovereign Priest (the latter also teaches at the FSSP seminary in Wigratzbad).  For us traditional Catholics, this is a very good sign.

Dare we hope that one such theology program be developed in the near future?



Saturday, May 26, 2012

Veni Sancte Spiritus (Pentecost Sequence)


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Tuesday, May 15, 2012

Quaeritur: Are Secondary Substances the Same as First Intentions?


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Quaeritur: Dr. Romero, are “second substance” and “first intention” in logic the same thing? 

Respondeo: They are not exactly identical; secondary substances are either first intentions or second intentions. Primary substances are real, extramental substances, whereas secondary substances are beings of reason (entia rationis), that is, the ideas or intentions that we form in the mind. For example, that horse over there eating grass on the field is a primary substance, whereas the idea of 'horseness' that I form in my mind is a secondary substance.  Now, these intentions or ideas come in two kinds: first intentions, which are ideas that directly represent reality, such as my idea of 'horseness', and second intentions, which are ideas about ideas, or ideas concerning the relationships between ideas, such as my idea of 'genus' and 'species'.  Logic is the science of second intentions.

Friday, May 11, 2012

Why We Must Reject All Postconciliar Claims to a "New Understanding" of Dogma


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The Vatican Council's Condemnation of the Evolution of Dogmas:
From the Vatican Council's Dei Filius, Ch. 4:


13. For the doctrine of the faith which God has revealed is put forward not as some philosophical discovery capable of being perfected by human intelligence, but as a divine deposit committed to the spouse of Christ to be faithfully protected and infallibly promulgated.

14. Hence, too, that meaning of the sacred dogmas is ever to be maintained which has once been declared by Holy mother Church, and there must never be any abandonment of this sense under the pretext or in the name of a more profound understanding.

May understanding, knowledge and wisdom increase as ages and centuries roll along, and greatly and vigorously flourish, in each and all, in the individual and the whole Church: but this only in its own proper kind, that is to say, in the same doctrine, the same sense, and the same understanding [n. 36: St. Vincent of Lerins, Commonitorium (Notebook), 28 (PL 50, 668)].

...

Canons:

3. If anyone says that it is possible that at some time, given the advancement of knowledge, a sense may be assigned to the dogmas propounded by the Church which is different from that which the Church has understood and understands: let him be anathema.

And so in the performance of our supreme pastoral office, we beseech for the love of Jesus Christ and we command, by the authority of him who is also our God and savior, all faithful Christians, especially those in authority or who have the duty of teaching, that they contribute their zeal and labor to the warding off and elimination of these errors from the Church and to the spreading of the light of the pure faith.

But since it is not enough to avoid the contamination of heresy unless those errors are carefully shunned which approach it in greater or less degree, we warn all of their duty to observe the constitutions and decrees in which such wrong opinions, though not expressly mentioned in this document, have been banned and forbidden by this Holy See.


Thursday, May 10, 2012

The Polemical Correspondence Between Msgr. Fellay and the SSPX Bishops


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Original French from Riposte Catholique: "Lettre de Mgr Fellay aux évêques de la Fraternité Saint-Pie X" | Riposte-catholique.

'via Blog this'

Monday, May 07, 2012

1st International Congress on Thomistic Philosophy (University of St. Thomas, Santiago, Chile)


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Tuesday, May 01, 2012

Announcing S.T.A.G.S.


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Announcing the St. Thomas Aquinas Guild of Scholars (S.T.A.G.S.)



"As the stag panteth after the fountains water, so panteth my soul after thee, O God."  (Ps. 41:2)


The St. Thomas Aquinas Guild of Scholars (STAGS) is a group of academics who embrace the traditional Catholic faith and strive for holiness through their scholarly life.  The 'STAGS' make a private, individual commitment to fulfill a set of spiritual and ascetical norms on a daily basis.  The Stags are collaborators in the Ite ad Thomam blog and feature their academic work (CV, books, articles, recorded classes, etc.) through the Ite ad Thomam site.  Anyone interested in joining the guild or wishing to receive more information should email STAGS Fellow, Dr. Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo to the email address below. 




Each member strives for holiness from his own state in life and place in the world.  STAGS is open to men and women, to laymen, clergy, and members of religious orders and congregations.  The core of their identity as members of the guild is the fact that they have chosen an academic profession and they live the norms as as a means to attain holiness.
STAGS is not a religious order; we do not live in community or follow a rule.  Members do not owe obedience to the guild fellows, and there is no celibacy requirement.  There is no vow of poverty, and membership is absolutely free.  The only requirements for membership are: (a) embracing an academic profession, and (b) fulfilling the norms, including making a monthly contribution (investment of time, work) towards the website.  There is also the possibility, for scholars who do not wish to make their membership in the guild public, to be members in pectore.

A. MEMBERSHIP comes in three levels, depending on the degree of commitment, and level these levels there are ranks.   Each rank includes the privileges and obligations of the ranks below it.

Chaplains provide spiritual direction and advise for guild members.  They are traditional Catholic priests from an ecclesiastically approved priestly fraternity or religious order (e.g., the Fraternity of St. Peter).

Guild Professors are involved in the day-to-day activities of the guild.
 - Fellows are governing members and make decisions about the direction of the guild.
 - Tutors are the mentors of the more recent members, and offer them academic and professional advice.
 - Lectors are teaching members, and offer teaching resources through the website.

Full Members live the norms of piety fully and participate in Ite ad Thomam as contributors.  Full members may be later invited to become Guild Professors.  They are ranked according to highest completed academic degree (in an accredited university, in any field):
 - Doctors may be invited to become fellows.
 - Masters may be invited to become tutors.
 - Bachellors may be invited to become lectors.
 - Inceptors are undergraduates in the process of obtaining their first college degree. 

Candidates are in the process of entering the guild, and are admitted as members-in-the-making.  They strive to incorporate the norms of piety into their lives with the help of a spiritual director (a guild chaplain) and a tutor.  For instructions as to how to request admission as a candidate, you must communicate with STAGS Fellow, Dr. Francisco Romero to the email above.

B. THE NORMS OF PIETY form our interior life and represent the core of our identity.  They are a personal commitment that the individual makes before God; the commitment is not a vow or a life-long promise, but a resolution to fulfill indefinitely, or at least as long as one belongs to the guild.  They do not bind under the pain of sin, but fulfilling them is a requirement for membership.  The norms are as follows:
Daily Norms:
 - Morning offering.
 - Recitation of Memorare.
 - Recitation of Angelus (at least once, at 6am, noon, or 6pm; genuflect at “et Verbum caro factum est”).
 - Reading the Gospel of the day (traditional Missal).
 - Mental prayer, accompanied by spiritual reading (traditional sources, 15-30 mins. minimum).
 - Prayerful reading of formative text (traditional/traditionalist sources, 15-30 mins. minimum).
 - A third of the Rosary (according to the traditional arrangement).
 - Small daily mortification (to be determined by spiritual director).
 - Examination of conscience (both general and particular).
 - Three Hail Marys for purity before bed, preferably in Latin, with holy water.
Weekly Norms:
 - Traditional Latin Mass, Communion, and Thanksgiving.
 - Visit to the Blessed Sacrament and Spiritual Communion.
 - Psalm 2 in honor of Christ the King (Tuesdays).
 - Adoro Te devote (Thursdays).
 - Follow traditional fasting/abstinence rules (Fridays, Lent, and Ember Days).
 - Marian antiphon (Saturdays).
 - Athanasian Creed (Sundays).
Monthly Norms:
 - Confession and spiritual direction.
 - Turn in monthly control (fulfilled norms sheet), provided by tutor.
 - Contribution to the website.
Yearly Norms:
 - Recitation of the Oath Against Modernism upon joining guild and on anniversary.
 - Pray the stations of the Cross at least once during Lent.
Occasional Norms (when the opportunity presents itself):
 - Salutation of the Blessed Sacrament (when passing by a church).
 - Prayer to St. Michael (when passing by a place of public sin).
 - Prayer for the holy souls (when passing by a cemetery).
 - Blessing before meals; thanksgiving after meals.
 - Reverence before sacred images.

Sancte Thoma, ora pro nobis!

Monday, March 26, 2012

White House Chitchat


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Thursday, March 15, 2012

Conference Announcement: "Aquinas and the Arabs" (Paris & Leuven, May 31 - June 5)


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Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, and ‘the Arabs’:  Paris & Leuven 30 May - 5 June 2012
Organized by J.-B. Brenet (Sorbonne), Cristina Cerami (CNRS, Paris), Isabelle Moulin (Institute Catholique de Paris) & Richard C. Taylor (Marquette University, Milwaukee, & DeWulf Mansion Centre, K. U. Leuven)

  1. 1.Thomas d’Aquin et ses souces arabes / Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’
Paris 30 May, 31 May & 2 June 2012

1.1 The Sentences of Lombard and the Commentary of Aquinas
30 May 2012
Institut Catholique de Paris
Programme provisoire Journée du 30 mai 2012 : 

Pierre Lombard en ses Traditions



1.2 “Matière, Génération, Création” and Other Topics
31 May & 2 June 2012
Université Paris-Sorbonne
(full day sessions program: planning in process)
Among the speakers will be Marta Borgo (Commissio Leonina, Paris), Silvia di Donato (CNRS, Paris), R. E. Houser (University of St. Thomas, Houston), David B. Twetten (Marquette University, Milwaukee), Fabio Gibiino (Commissio Leonina, Paris), Joel Lonfat (Blackfriars, Oxford), Richard C. Taylor (Marquette University, Milwaukee), Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo (Guadalajara, Mexico), and others.



  1. 2.             Translation and Transformation in Philosophy:
Albert, between Aquinas and ‘the Arabs’
DeWulf Mansion Centre 
for Ancient, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium 4-5 June 2012
(Plenary lecture evening 4 June, full day program 5 June)
Program forthcoming
(For the conference website, click here.)



Don Paco's Abstract:

Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo (Universidad Panamericana, Guadalajara, Mexico)
Averroes and Aquinas on the Dialectical Nature of Revealed Theology
Abstract
Two of the greatest Aristotelian commentators, Averroes and Aquinas, used the Aristotelian distinction between demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical discourses to assign an epistemological status to religious or theological knowledge, that is, to conclusions drawn from revelation. But their respective views on this point turned out to be very different, even opposite. Averroes considered religious knowledge to be dialectical in nature, whereas Aquinas believed revealed Christian theology to be a demonstrative science. The author shows that both of these greater Aristotelian commentators strive, although very differently, to be faithful to Aristotle concerning the epistemological status of theology. Ultimately, however, their approaches converge, particularly insofar as in both accounts, theology is dialectical in nature, at least in a qualified sense in the case of Aquinas.

Friday, January 20, 2012

Tax the Rich? (nobility.org)


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Link to nobility.org article.