The Parable of the Isms - a guest post by Matthew Rojansky



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The Parable of the Isms, as Applied to the Former Soviet Union
Guest post by Matthew Rojansky

My colleague Karim Sadjadpour recently published a satirical analysis of Middle East politics, "The Cynical Dairy Farmer's Guide to the New Middle East," riffing on a famous Cold War joke about communism and capitalism, known as "the parable of the isms."  As Karim noted,

 No one really knows how the two-cow joke known as "Parable of the Isms" came about, but most students of Political Science 101 have likely come across some variation of the following definitions:

Socialism: You have two cows. The government takes one of them and gives it to your neighbor.

Communism: You have two cows. The government takes them both and provides you with milk.

Nazism: You have two cows. The government shoots you and takes the cows.

Capitalism: You have two cows. You sell one and buy a bull.

Satire it may be, but the essential truth of the "cow jokes" is what makes them funny. Karim's thirteen terse metaphors for Middle Eastern regimes cut to the heart of a complex region in which increasing American interest has followed increasing investments of blood and treasure, with very little added understanding of what's really going on.

The Soviet Union suffered no dearth of American attention over nearly half a century after World War II. Yet even the keenest observers, like Kennan and Kissinger, were focused almost entirely on Moscow, and within it mostly on the Kremlin. During the Cold War, that made good sense - after all, no one in Kiev or Almaty, let alone in Chisinau or Ashgabat, was making particularly important decisions for US foreign policy and global security.

But twenty years after the collapse of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, things work a bit differently in Eurasia. To understand why drugs flow so readily from Afghanistan through Central Asia and into Russia and Western Europe requires some sense of what's going on - and what's not - in places like Dushanbe and Astana. To see why a NATO-Russia impasse over missile defense is so serious requires an understanding of how the people, and the governments, in Kyiv and Tbilisi relate to their massive neighbor.

The former Soviet republics are no longer defined so much by being formerly Soviet, as by what they have become after twenty years of independence. Yet the old categories - socialist, communist, capitalist, fascist - don't easily work to describe a region where political cultures draw on everything from Rome and Byzantium to Baghdad and Beijing. Let's see how the "parable of the isms" might offer a convenient shorthand guide to the fifteen states that once made up the USSR.

Russia
You have six cows and four bulls. Two of the bulls die from alcoholism, and the remaining two form a "tandem" to take the cows' milk and sell it to Germany and China.

Ukraine
You have four of the most productive cows on the farm, two of which allow themselves to be milked by Russia, which upsets the other two so much their milk goes sour.

Georgia
You have two cows and one prize-winning bull. The bull is so distracted winning prizes that Russia runs away with both cows.

Belarus
You have one cow which you savagely beat until it produces milk. The milk dries up after your last savage beating, so now you must sell the cow to Russia.

Moldova
You have two cows and a calf, but the cows live in Italy and Russia and send milk home by Western Union. You ferment the milk into wine, and launch a frenzied campaign to join the EU. Meanwhile, the calf is stolen and sold by rustlers.

Armenia
You have four cows, but three of them live in Los Angeles and think they are horses. They send money for you to build stables.

Azerbaijan
You have one cow that produces lots of excellent milk. You sell the milk to Farmer Browne and buy cattle prods from Israel and Turkey.

Turkmenistan
You had one cow but you sold it to buy a golden statue of a cow that rotates with the sun.

Kazakhstan
You have two cows that produce vast quantities of milk. You sell the milk, buy each cow a gold-plated cow bell, and declare yourself bull for life.

Kyrgyzstan
You have two cows: one Kyrgyz and one Uzbek; they hate each other and refuse to be milked. Instead of hay, feed them tulips. Then sell one each to Russia and the United States. After six months sell them again.

Tajikistan
You have three cows: one Tajik, one Uzbek, and one Russian. You beat the Russian cow until it runs away, and use your misfortune to plead for international aid. Meanwhile Iran milks your remaining cows.

Uzbekistan
You have four cows. You let them drink all the water in the neighborhood swimming pool. Now no one can go swimming. You blame this on "corrupt and lawless elements," and volunteer to remain in power until the problem is solved.

The Baltic States

You have lost half your cows, for which you blame Russia and demand an apology. As consolation, the EU gives you a sleek Scandinavian-designed barn and NATO farmers teach you advanced milking techniques.

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Orientalizing post-Soviet politics?

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Andrew Wilson has an article out on openDemocracy that provides a taxonomy of post-Soviet political systems and where they stand in terms of their employment of "political technology."  The piece is interesting for its anecdotes, and I've always been a big fan of Andrew Wilson's work introducing Westerners to the concept of "political technology."  Some of the main ideas from his seminal 2005 book, Virtual Politics, are outlined in a shorter format in these remarks of his from a few years ago.

The questions that Wilson really seems to be asking with this new article - why do governments of states like Russia and Kazakhstan bother orchestrating falsely competitive elections? what is it about the political culture of certain post-Soviet states that has allowed them to more or less leave the pervasive use of "political technology" behind? are some of these countries destined to remain in some sort of political purgatory, having left behind the "hell" of an authoritarian one-party state but never reaching the "heaven" of the (ultimately unattainable) idealized, squeaky-clean, competitive political system extolled by classic democracy promoters? - are very good ones and have concrete policy applications in addressing Western approaches to other political systems now in transition in the Arab world and elsewhere, not to mention American budgets for the variety of activities that fall under the umbrella of "democracy promotion."

The clarity of the current article's thesis, though, suffers a bit from the author's implication that political dark arts and even practices as benign as the manufacturing of artificial campaign narratives are somehow unique to the post-Soviet space and are something that should be "gotten rid of" as these countries move toward some democratic ideal. 

Is it possible that Wilson believes what he calls the "highly developed industry of political manipulation" that exists in Russia and elsewhere in the region is not in many respects an imitation of our own political system with many more rough edges (and a much smaller price tag, at least when compared to American electoral politics)?  The ghost of Lee Atwater, along with generations of dirty tricksters (from both of America's august major political parties) - not to mention a fella named Breitbart - would beg to differ.

[image source - "history reveals that smear campaigns are as American as apple pie"]

I'm not proposing throwing in the towel and allowing moral relativist "whataboutism" to triumph by making us all shrug and say our systems are no better - because that's not the case.  However, I'm not sure how much we do for the cause of "democracy," however one defines it, by lumping in things like politicized judges, politicians advancing the causes of favored business interests, and advanced political campaigning - which has become a career track and educational specialty in its own right in the U.S. in recent years and includes what Americans call "dirty tricks" and Russians call "black PR" - with factors more uniquely present (one hopes) in the transitional, soft- or hard-authoritarian political systems that Wilson writes about - actual ballot-rigging, the use of law enforcement to muzzle political opponents and domination of the media space by the government.

I also take issue with Wilson's assessment that Moldova became one of the post-Soviet world's "serious potential democracies" only in 2009, but that's another story...

Conflict Cables: Georgia, and the acceleration of the breakup, 1989-1990

Thanks to the August 2008 war, the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia have come to be perhaps the best known of the post-Soviet conflicts in the West.  The roots of these conflicts, according to some accounts, go back centuries, but the immediate triggers as the Soviet Union collapsed included missteps by Moscow, rhetorical overreach by a Georgian leader on the verge of independence, and unease over how inter-ethnic deals which had been enforced by Moscow would fare in the post-Soviet reality.

This batch of cables tracks the beginning of the downward spiral into armed ethnic conflict.  The first of them are post-mortems on the violent dispersal of a public protest in Tbilisi in 1989 that came to be known as the "April 9 events."  Six cables describing those events and their immediate aftermath were summarized in an earlier post in this series (read more about the "Conflict Cables" series here).

A May 5, 1989, cable titled "Georgian Activist on Events in Tbilisi" recounts a US Embassy official's conversation with "a prominent Georgian activist...in the 'moderate' Chavchavadze society," in which the anonymous Georgian source suggested a tangled web of motivations which allegedly led to the authorization for the use of force against non-violent protesters.

The Embassy officials' response to their Georgian source's conspiracy theory shows a charming naivete about the capability of Eduard "Silver Fox" Shevardnadze to engage in such machinations for his personal benefit - or perhaps faith in Shevy, who was at the time involved in negotiations with the U.S. on a much bigger stage: "We doubt that Shevardnadze would have put Perestroyka at risk by allowing or even quietly encouraging an ally to destabilize the situation in Georgia in order to bring down a political foe."

A May 6 cable - "More on Tbilisi Demonstrations" - gives a blow-by-blow account of the protesters' tactics and of their demands, which originally focused on Abkhazia but which progressed, in part due to friction between different dissident groups, to demands for independence.

On June 5, a cable went out describing a May 27 "Conversation with [a] Georgian Dissident" - Zviad Gamsakhurdia - declassified here for the first time, as far as I know, which shows Gamsakhurdia's penchant for wild accusations and inflammatory rhetoric. Gamsakhurdia remains controversial to this day in Georgia. In mid-1989, he began by "ACCUS[ING] THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF WAGING "GENOCIDE" AGAINST THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE, THROUGH THE USE OF CHEMICAL POISONS AND "ECOLOGICAL WARFARE".

Later in the conversation, he discussed Abkhazia and South Ossetia:

IN DISCUSSING INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS WITHIN GEORGIA, GAMSAKHURDIA SHOWED LITTLE TOLERANCE FOR THE REPUBLIC'S INDIGENOUS MINORITIES AND WARNED OF KARABAKH-LIKE SITUATIONS DEVELOPING IN THE ABKHAZIA AUTONOMOUS SSR AS WELL AS THE SOUTHERN OSETIAN AUTONOMOUS OBLAST'. HE DESCRIBED THE ABKHAZIANS AS "THE TRAITORS OF THE CAUCASUS" AND AS "CORRUPTED PEOPLE" WHO "WANT TO RUSSIFY THEMSELVES", CLAIMING THAT THE ABKHAZIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IS ACTUALLY PROVOKED BY MOSCOW AND LED BY "TURKISH MOSLEMS" AS A TYPE OF GEORGIAN "INTERFRONT". HE INITIALLY CHARACTERIZED THE POLITICAL POSITION OF ABKHAZIAN AUTHOR FAZIL ISKANDER AS "NEUTRAL" BUT NEVERTHELESS FELT IT NECESSARY TO POINT OUT THAT ISKANDER IS AN ETHNIC PERSIAN AND A "GREAT LIAR".

ACCORDING TO THE GEORGIAN NATIONALIST, A SECOND GEORGIAN "INTERFRONT" -- A REFERENCE TO THE PRO-RUSSIAN GROUPS WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN THE BALTICS -- WAS BEING EXPLOITED BY MOSCOW AMONG THE 60,000 OSETIANS IN SOUTHERN OSETIA. GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORTS OF GEORGIANS BEING BEATEN IN SEVERAL OSETIAN VILLAGES, CLAIMING THAT THE OSETIAN POPULATION IS "VERY AGGRESSIVE". GEORGIANS ARE BEING OPPRESSED ON THEIR OWN LAND IN ABKHAZIA AND OSETIA, ACCORDING TO GAMSAKHURDIA, WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR MORE VIOLENT CONFLICTS.

Interestingly, this cable was apparently written by (or at least signed by) Richard Miles, later U.S. Ambassador to Georgia during the Rose Revolution.

During an August 1989 visit to Tbilisi, US Embassy officials spoke with a number of "Georgian intellectuals" (at a time when intellectuals still mattered politically), all of whom had "Abkhazia on their minds."  Their comments were summed up in an August 23 cable titled "Georgian Political Affairs." The Georgians were troubled by their portrayal in the Western press as "oppressors" of their national minorities.  One source saw the interethnic strife as "the work of a local Abkhazian mafia struggling to maintain its privileges in the face of a growing democratic movement throughout Georgia," which would leave the Abkhazians stripped of privileges as a result of being outnumbered  in their own autonomy.

Other interlocutors pointed suspicious fingers at Moscow, Turkey and Central Asia in explaining the unrest in Abkhazia.  None of the Americans' contacts was willing to entertain the possibility of satisfying the Abkhaz demands to elevate the Abkhazian ASSR to union republic status - "there were simply too few Abkhazians for that."  Georgians were already speaking about increased sovereignty and independence, though not necessarily of full-fledged secession from the USSR. 

The next few cables are roundups of "USSR domestic developments" and focus on other issues in addition to Georgia and other hot spots around the Soviet Union, which was by this point coming apart, though no one realized it at the time.  The first of these cables, dated November 9, 1989, includes a summary of a conversation with "noted Soviet pollster" Yuri Levada (paragraphs 15-16) as well as a synopsis of a familiar-sounding interaction with an opinionated taxi driver (para. 22), and quotes the "KGB press service" (para. 18) as stating that the "'present generation' of security officers dissociates itself from the Stalinist NKVD and condemns the arbitrariness of that period" (there appears to have been some regression in that regard since 1989).  Updates on South Ossetia (para. 27) and disruptions of Revolution Day celebrations in "Kishinev, Moldavia" (para. 31) and Tbilisi (para. 32), and the formal establishment of the "Soviet Interfront of Georgia," which swiftly demanded official status for the Russian language (para. 33).  There is also an interesting discussion of Soviet lawmaking (para. 34).

The November 17, 1989 "USSR Domestic Developments" cable melds old-school Sovietology (an extensive discussion of who stood on "the mausoleum" during the November 7 parade) with earnest discussions of the Soviet legislative calendar and priorities and comments from people like Anatoly Sobchak, and speculation like "Yel'tsin on the decline?" (para. 17).  Also interesting in light of current events are discussions of various popular front initiatives (paras. 20-21) and comments from Andranik Migranyan (para. 22) about domestic politics.  There is also a discussion of the "deteriorating" situation in Karabakh (para. 28) and of demands by Gamsakhurdia, whose organization is now referred to as "radical," that "Ossetians either support Georgian calls for independence from the Soviet Union or leave Georgia," and his forays into South Ossetia with busloads of armed men (para. 30).

The final roundup cable in this batch is "USSR Domestic Developments: December 1."  This one contains extensive discussion of Soviet domestic political developments, including some portions that apparently still merit classification and were redacted before the cable was released to me.  Not redacted, though, are some interesting points about the Karabakh conflict as it stood toward the end of 1989 (paras. 25-28), including some interesting comments by Yevgeny Primakov:

DURING A SPASO HOUSE DINNER NOVEMBER 29, YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV (PROTECT), A CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION, SAID, "THE ARMENIANS WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION." HE IMPLIED THERE WAS NO HOPE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WOULD EVER BE UNITED WITH ARMENIA. ACCORDING TO PRIMAKOV, THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AND EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING TOO HIGH FOR ARMENIANS AND AZERBAYDZHANIS TO REACH A COMPROMISE.

GEORGIY TARAZEVICH (PROTECT), CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMISSION ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, WHO VISITED THE AREA EARLY IN NOVEMBER, TOLD EMBOFF NOVEMBER 16 THAT HE BELIEVED THE SITUATION HAS DEADLOCKED.

This cable also has a brief update on continuing tension in South Ossetia (para. 29) and some thoughts from an unnamed Moldovan economist about new First Secretary Petr Luchinsky, and about leadership in the republic in general:

THE ECONOMIST SAID MOLDAVIA'S LEADERS WERE GENERALLY INCOMPETENT BECAUSE, UNLIKE IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS, THE BEST LEADERS IN MOLDAVIA ALWAYS MOVED ON TO MOSCOW.

The next cable in this batch is titled "Tension Mounts in Georgia as Nationalism Grows," and is dated February 13, 1990. Embassy officials visiting Tbilisi "found the sense of fear palpable," and one source told them that the situation was "like a volcano ready to erupt any time."

In the midst of an extensive discussion of Georgian domestic issues, upcoming elections and emerging political groups is this instructive summary of Georgian Popular Front (PFG) Deputy Chairman Avtandil Imnadze's view of minority rights in a Georgia that was lurching toward independence:

THE PFG'S NATIONALIST VIEWS LEAVE FEW RIGHTS TO OTHER REPUBLIC ETHNIC GROUPS. WHILE IMNADZE TOLD EMBOFF THAT "WE WILL NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS," HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE RIGHTS IS VERY LIMITED AND GIVES NON-GEORGIANS VIRTUALLY NO POLITICAL POWER. "AFTER ALL," IMNADZE SAID, "THEY DO NOT BELONG HERE. THEY ARE ONLY OUR GUESTS." SEVERAL OTHER GEORGIANS WHO WERE NOT PFG MEMBERS ALSO EXPRESSED THIS SENTIMENT.

There is also discussion toward the end of the cable of the Georgian response to the deployment of Soviet troops in Baku in January 1990.

A cable from November 2, 1990 titled "Georgian Elections - Opposition Round Table Defeats Communists" summarized the implications of the elections won by Zviad Gamsakhurdia's Round Table - Free Georgia group.

GAMSAKHURDIA'S BLOC ADVOCATED INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW, MAINTAINING GEORGIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE FACE OF MINORITY GROUP DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY OR UNION WITH THE RSFSR.

There is also discussion of the way the election observation was conducted and the presence of foreign observers, noting some procedural flaws which did not in the estimation of the Embassy officials detract from the fairness of the elections. However:

MORE SERIOUS, PERHAPS, THAN THESE PROCEDURAL INCONSISTENCIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ELECTION WAS THE DECISION BY ABKHAZIA AND OSSETIAN NATIONAL GROUPS TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS. INDEED, IN DISTRICTS WITHIN THE OSSETIAN CAPITAL OF TKHSINVALI LESS THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS CAST BALLOTS. IN TWO DISTRICTS IN ABKHAZIA ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS DISINTEGRATED AND ELECTIONS WERE NOT HELD AT ALL.

The position of the election's victor on the Abkhazians and Ossetians also did not bode well for inter-ethnic harmony in Georgia:

GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO SAID HE BELIEVES IN RESPECT FOR THE POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF THE MINORITIES LIVING IN THE REPUBLIC, BUT NOT THEIR INDEPENDENCE OR SEPARATION FROM THE GEORGIAN REPUBLIC. ANY SOLUTION TO THE MINORITY PROBLEM, HE STRESSED, MUST PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GEORGIA AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY. [...]

GAMSAKHURDIA'S VICTORY COULD FURTHER FUEL ETHNIC TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE REGION. HE IS VIEWED BY SOME OF THE MINORITY GROUPS, PARTICULARLY THE ABKHAZIANS AND OSSETIANS, AS A GEORGIAN NATIONALIST AT BEST AND A CHAUVINIST AT WORST. HIS UNCOMPROMISING POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE SOUTHERN OSSETIANS, WHOM HE HAS CALLED A MINORITY WITHOUT RIGHTS TO THE LANDS THEY OCCUPY, HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY TROUBLING EVEN TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GEORGIAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.

The cable's author(s) reached this unfortunately prescient conclusion:

THE RESISTANCE OF COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATCHIKI, AND THE RESENTMENT AND FEAR EXPRESSED BY MINORITY GROUPS IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTHERN OSSETIA MAKE FOR A VOLATILE MIX: WITHOUT RESOLUTION OF THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES AMONG THE FORMER OPPOSITION LEADERS AND THE CONSENT OF THE ENTRENCHED COMMUNIST BUREAUCRATS, GEORGIA WILL, AT BEST, REMAIN CRITICALLY DIVIDED AT A TIME OF GREAT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY, AND, AT WORST, MAY SLIDE INTO FACTIONAL FIGHTING AND CIVIL WAR.

The final cable in this batch, from December 18, 1990, is titled "Union Treaty Negotiations: The Caucasus, Moldova, and the Baltics." This one is worth embedding in full, as it is laden with interesting observations about the internal situations in the republics of the Caucasus and Moldova, e.g. "INTERESTINGLY, FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER GElDER ALIYEV, FAMOUS FOR HIS CORRUPT POLITICAL PRACTICES, HAS MADE A POLITICAL COMEBACK AS A REBORN NATIONALIST."

Union Treaty Negotiations: The Caucasus, Moldova, and the Baltics (Dec. 18, 1990)

 

Opening the U.S. Embassy in Chisinau, April 1992

The U.S. Embassy in Moldova, located in a historic building at 103 Mateevici St. in Chisinau

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Some of the cables that I received in response to my FOIA request for cables dealing with the post-Soviet conflicts highlight other interesting events from the time of the Soviet breakup.  This was a time when the U.S. had to open a whole bunch of new embassies, including one in the newly independent Republic of Moldova.  The report on the opening of the Embassy in Chisinau included a discussion of the situation in Transdniester and its impact on the Moldovan government:

The deterioration of the situation in the Trans-Dniester is occupying almost all the time of this very small, neophyte government.  While Moldovan officials have the understandable tendency to inflate the importance of their own republic, Embassy Chisinau finds many of their concerns well-founded.

Embassy Chisinau Opens: Moldovan Officials Discuss Trans-Dniester Crisis (March 26, 1992)


And what sort of environment would U.S. diplomats posted to Chisinau find in the capital of newly independent Moldova? This "Preliminary Post Report" from April 13 details a bygone era of wine for 80 rubles a bottle (at an exchange rate of 125 rubles to the dollar) and when travelers using Air Moldova had to be reassured that the airline "to date has a worse reputation than it actually deserves. The stories of standing passengers, four-legged passengers and other non-FAA approved behavior have so far not been witnessed on Air Moldova."

Preliminary Post Report for Chisinau (April 13, 1992)

Conflict Cables: Moldova-Transdniester Nov-Dec 1991

Mircea Snegur votes for himself - Dec. 8, 1991

As the Soviet Union formally fell apart, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur had his leadership validated an uncontested election in December 1991.  It was an eventful month, with the election preceded by independence referendums in Transdniester and Gagauzia on December 1 and followed by renewed violence in Transdniester and then Moldova's signing of the Alma-Ata Protocols under which it joined the Commonwealth of Independent States.  This post summarizes seven newly State Department cables newly declassified and released through the FOIA process, which I have made available on Scribd - read more about the Conflict Cables series here.

The stage is set by a November 5 cable from U.S. Embassy Moscow assessing the "Moldovan Political Scene as Foreign Minister Tiu Visits U.S.," in which the "principal political issue in Moldova" was described as "whether to unify with Romania or set out on the path of full independence." 

On December 8th, as three men signed away the USSR in a forest outside of Minsk, Moldova held elections.  Embassy Moscow had sent officials to observe, and they sent a brief cable on the 9th reporting Snegur's unsurprising victory which concluded with the following comment:

The vote appeared to be more a mandate for Moldovan independence and national unity than a reflection of support for Snegur as an individual.  While many Moldovan officials encountered had high expectations that Snegur would somehow be able to solve the separatist problem once he had a popular mandate, the task looks to be a hard one.  Trans-Dniester and Gagauz officials appear remarkably rigid, and, according to Moldovan government officials, the Trans-Dniester "government" is backed by Soviet military arms provided by forces based in Tiraspol.

A more detailed report on the elections, including difficulties faced by voters in Transdniester, followed several days later:
Moldovan Elections: Snegur Wins While Separatist Regions Obstruct Voting Process (Dec. 12, 1991)

This cable reported on the Embassy observers' visits to Comrat and to Tiraspol, where they learned about "the difficulties and discrimination faced by [ethnic] Moldovans in everyday life in the Trans-Dniester," and noted the following:

In both the Gagauz and Trans-Dniester regions, poloffs heard repeated claims of fraud during the previous week's [December 1] independence referendums and presidential elections.  There were numerous reports of attempts to force people to vote, including the use of armed militia who attempted to force villagers into mobile "bus polls" which went from village to village.  Some said they were threatened with loss of jobs if they did not vote.

Shortly after the elections, a December 13 cable summarized increasing Moldovan concern with alleged Soviet military support for the secessionists in Transdniester, including charges that Soviet troops were participating directly in the conflict, that military equipment being withdrawn from Eastern Europe was being diverted to the region, and in general that the secessionists were "receiving material and political support from mainline Soviet military forces...with the knowledge and perhaps approval of military and political leaders in Moscow."

The December 13 cable also described Moldovan allegations that Moscow was also already beginning to deploy its potent media weapon:

Moldovan officials also claim to see a pattern of bias in official statements and media reporting from Moscow which focuses excessively on Moldovan ethnic and economic problems.  They contend this is an attempt to portray Moldova as a hotbed of ethnic strife with massive economic problems; such an image could later be used to justify interference in Moldova under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians or preventing economic chaos.  On December 2, the presidium of the Moldovan Parliament issued an official statement charging Moscow-based news organizations with a prejudiced attitude toward Moldova.  One Moldovan official cited a November 30 TASS report of electrical shortages in Moldova as an example of inaccurate reporting.  The report claimed Moldova was short of fuel for electrical generation and was therefore alloting only four hours per day of electricity to residences.  The official said this was completely false; during their December 6-9 visit poloffs observed no unusual electricity problems and heard no one mention any such problems.

A "late development" - renewed violence on Dec. 13 in the city of Dubossary - was described in the last paragraph of the cable, including details about Transdniestrian authorities' accusations that the fighting was provoked by the Moldovan Popular Front and involved "Romanian weapons."

A subsequent cable on December 17th went into more detail about the flare-up in Dubossary and related Chisinau's side of the story - that "the fighting was an intentional provocation by the Trans-Dniester leadership designed to sabotage impending Russian recognition of Moldovan independence." The diplomats in Moscow, however, concluded that the violence so soon after elections in both Transdniester and right-bank Moldova "may also have been the result of a new assertiveness on the part of the leaderships of both areas, anxious to exercise their new mandate." Shying away from assigning blame, the cable concludes with the possibility that this was "simply a case of two increasingly assertive forces finally colliding, with both sides equally at fault."
Violence in Trans-Dniester: Complications for Moldovan-Russian Relationship (Dec. 17, 1991)

Also on December 17th, Moscow relayed to Washington that the Moldovan Foreign Minister had urgently requested a meeting to discuss the Transdniester issue with Secretary of State James Baker during the latter's scheduled visit to Kiev, and again summarized Moldovan concerns that the situation could turn into an "inter-republic" confrontation with Russia.

A third December 17 cable from Moscow describes a conversation with a Moldovan official in Moscow "as the Moldovan delegate to the Bilateral Relations Committee" (name redacted in the version released by the State Department, but they didn't redact his position which should make him easy to identify). This one is perhaps the most interesting of this batch as it summarizes a the candid views (in a conversation at an embassy reception) of a high-level Moldovan at the time about the country's aspirations for reunification with Romania, discussing things like potential territory swaps with Ukraine and the fact one of the factors slowing down reunification is that Snegur "enjoys being 'President' of a separate country and is not eager to give up that role." The source also trash-talks Moldovan Foreign Minister Tiu toward the end of the cable - see for yourself:

Aide to Moldovan Foreign Minister Describes Moldovan Political Picture (Dec. 17, 1991)

As this challenging month of a challenging year came to a close, Moldova after all signed up to join the new Commonwealth of Independent States. The cable below is interesting because it describes Russian and Central Asian reactions to the Alma Ata agreement as well as Moldovan reactions and is worth reading in full for any student of the Soviet collapse:

Reactions to Alma Ata Accords: Russia, Central Asia, Moldova (Dec. 26, 1991)

As a postscript, I can't resist sharing this photo from a later moment in President Snegur's career (presumably some time in 1992), mainly because I can't resist sharing something that shows our current Secretary of State in her previous life as an Arkansas political wife.

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Conflict Cables Series: Abkhazia and the April 1989 Events in Tbilisi

 

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Unfortunately, I do not have too many cables on Abkhazia to share (read more about the "conflict cables" series here).  I'm still awaiting a response on my FOIA request covering the years of the actual conflict; therefore the Abkhazia-related material I'll be uploading for now is from 1989-90, when people were still trying to figure out what was going to happen to the USSR.

One of the clarifying events - at least viewed from a distance of a couple of decades - was the violence of April 9, 1989 in Tbilisi, Georgia.  The demonstration that Soviet troops broke up by hacking their way through a crowd of protesters with sappers' shovels was at least in part a response to a gathering the previous month in the Abkhazian village of Lykhny calling for the Abkhazian ASSR no longer be a part of the Georgian SSR. This tragedy still serves as a rallying point for Georgians who see the country's future free of Russian influence.

In the aftermath of April 9, the Soviet government attempted to demonstrate its openness by conducting a public investigation - above is a clip from Vremya in 1989 in which a the country's deputy general prosecutor is interviewed about the progress of the investigation, and here is the final report of the "Sobchak Commission" - constituted by the Congress of People's Deputies and headed by Anatoly Sobchak, who later became better known as the mayor of St. Petersburg and as a supporter of his former subordinate and protege, Vladimir Putin (Sobchak's name has lived on after his untimely death in 2000 as his daughter, TV personality and Paris-Hilton-like waste of space Ksenia Sobchak, has grown ever more infamous).

But I digress.  The six cables I've uploaded today are dated between April 6 and 13, 1989, and contain descriptions of the events in Abkhazia that motivated the Tbilisi demonstration and of the aftermath of the April 9 violence.

They also show the difficulties U.S. diplomats based in Moscow faced in monitoring rapidly developing situations in far-flung republics and the degree to which they were forced to rely on potentially unreliable sources in informing Washington, as well as the surprising fact that aspirations on the part of some Georgians to join "NATO" were causing problems in Tbilisi's relationship with Moscow as far back as 1989.  Click on the titles below to view scans of the full cables (I decided to experiment with not embedding them from Scribd, as I think doing so may make the page load slower).

Political Turmoil in Georgia over Abkhazia (April 6, 1989)
ACADEMICIAN SAKHAROV (PROTECT) TOLD A NATO AMBASSADOR APRIL 3 THAT GEORGIAN SOURCES HE CONSIDERED RELIABLE REPORTED THAT TROOPS FROM TBILISI WERE DEPLOYED TO ABKHAZIA OVER THE APRIL 1 WEEKEND TO FORESTALL POSSIBLE ETHNIC DISTURBANCES AS A RESULT OF RISING ETHNIC TENSION THERE. GEORGIAN DISSIDENT SOURCES REPORTED THE SAME. SAKHAROV ALSO REPORTED HE HAD HEARD THERE WERE ANTI-GEORGIAN DEONSTRATIONS IN SUKHUMI MARCH 31, AND HE DREW A PARELLEL WITH THE SITUATION IN ABKHAZIA AND THAT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH IN LATE 1987, I.E., BEFORE THE KARABAKH CRISIS BLEW UP.

Abkhazia First Secretary Removed; Tbilisi Demonstrations Continue (April 10, 1989)
DEMONSTRATION ORGANIZERS HAVE SPLIT OVER THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE ABKHAZIA ISSUE. MODERATES IN THE IL'YA CHAVCHAVADZE SOCIETY AND RUSTAVELLI [SIC] SOCIETY, AS WELL AS RADICALS IN THE SAINT IL'YA SOCIETY, HAVE SOUGHT TO FOCUS PUBLIC ATTENTION ON ABKHAZIA. WHEREAS RADICALS IN THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP) AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY (NIM) INVOLVED IN ORGANIZING THE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE REJECTED CALLS FOR A MASS INFLUX OF GEORGIANS TO ABKHAZIA AND HAVE EMPHASIZED THE GOAL OF GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE FROM THE USSR. MODERATE GEORGIAN NATIONALIST ZURAB CHAVCHAVADZE, ADDRESSING DEMONSTRATORS APRIL 5, REPORTEDLY CALLED FOR ADLEYBA'S REMOVAL. HUNGER STRIKERS IN FRONT OF THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE NUMBERED 170 ON THE EVENING OF APRIL 7, ACCORDING TO GEORGIAN DISSIDENT SOURCES.

Soviet Troops Break up Tbilisi Demonstration; at Least 16 Dead (April 11, 1989)
ACCORDING TO GEORGIAN DISSIDENT SOURCES, SPECIAL RIOT TROOPS DISPERSED WITH FORCE ABOUT 8000 DEMONSTRATORS IN FRONT OF THE TBILISI GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT 3 A.M. APRIL 9. THE TROOPS REPORTEDLY USED TEAR GAS, CLUBS AND SPADES (LOPATKY).

ACCORDING TO AN AM[ERICAN] CIT[IZEN] (PROTECT) IN TBILISI, THE CROWD WAS DEMONSTRATING PEACEFULLY WHEN THE TROOPS MOVED IN. ONE GEORGIAN WOMAN REPORTEDLY THREW HERSELF IN FRONT OF AN APPROACHING TANK AND WAS CRUSHED. AN APRIL 9 TASS STATEMENT PUT THE DEATH TOLL AT 16 AND CLAIMED THEIR DEATHS RESULTED FROM BEING TRAMPLED BY THE CROWD WHEN SECURITY FORCES CLASHED WITH THE DEMONSTRATORS. [...]

WE HOPE TO GET SEVERAL EMB[ASSY] OFF[ICIAL]S TO GEORGIA BY THE END OF THE WEEK TO TRY TO GET A CLEARER PICTURE OF WHAT APPEARS TO BE QUITE A TENSE SITUATION

Georgian Update: Situation April 11 (April 11, 1989)
SEVERAL GEORGIAN DISSIDENT SOURCES AND AM[ERICAN] CIT[IZEN] OBSERVERS HAVE SHARED WITH US THEIR VIEW THAT THE DECISION TO SEND IN TROOPS STEMMED FROM CONCERN THAT THE DEMONSTRATION, WHICH HAD BEGUN IN PROTEST AGAINST CALLS FOR ABKHAZIA'S SECESSION FROM GEORGIA, HAD TAKEN AN ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-RUSSIAN TURN.

DEMONSTRATION LEADERS DEMANDING GEORGIAN INDEPENDENCE AND BANNERS CALLING FOR REMOVAL OF RUSSIANS FROM GEORGIA HAD TOUCHED A RAW NERVE IN MOSCOW. IN THESE SOURCES' VIEW, CALLS BY DEMONSTRATION SPEAKERS FOR AN INDEPENDENT GEORGIAN REPUBLIC'S ADMISSION INTO THE "UN" AND "NATO" MUST HAVE PROVOKED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO AGREE TO USE TROOPS TO DISPERSE THE DEMONSTRATORS.

Georgia Update: April 13 (April 13, 1989)
GEORGIAN INTELLECTUALS WERE CONCERNED OVER THE GROWING DISPARITY BETWEEN THE COVERAGE OF THE SOVIET CENTRAL MEDIA AND THE GEORGIAN MEDIA. FOR EXAMPLE, AN APRIL 12 ARTICLE IN "KOMMUNIST", AN ORGAN OF THE GEORGIAN CC, DESCRIBED THE APRIL 9 DEMONSTRATION AS "PEACEFUL AND NO THREAT TO PUBLIC SECURITY," WHILE THE CENTRAL PRESS (SEE TASS APRIL 12) ACCUSED DEMONSTRATION LEADERS OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGIC DEATHS, STATED OUR SOURCE. [...]

THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR NON-RUSSIAN REPUBLICS IS A SENSITIVE ONE FOR SOVIET LEADERS. GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR IN HIS APRIL 12 APPEAL TO THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE THAT HE REJECTS CALLS FOR GEORGIA INDEPENDENCE. SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET MEDIA HAS REFRAINED FROM PUBLICLY ACCUSING WESTERN STATES OF FOMENTING NATIONALIST UNREST IN GEORGIA.

Abkhazian Accusations Against Georgians (April 13, 1989)
EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FROM A DISSIDENT SOURCE A COPY OF WHAT PURPORTS TO BE THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT NOW CIRCULATING IN ABKHAZIA ACCUSING GEORGIANS OF VIOLATING THE RIGHTS OF THE ABKHAZIAN PEOPLE. THE STATEMENT HAS REPORTEDLY BEEN SIGNED BY OVER 30,000 PERSONS, INCLUDING B.V. ADLEYBA, A DEPUTY TO THE CONGRESS OF PEOPLE'S DEPUTIES WHO WAS OUSTED AS ABKHAZIA OBKOM FIRST SECRETARY APRIL 6. [Text of statement follows].

Conflict Cables Series: Transdniester, October 1991

These three cables cover a fateful month in the development of the Transdniestrian conflict and Moldova's post-Soviet development in general.  This was the period when Igor Smirnov, who would go on to lead what became the secessionist Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic for 20 years (so far), was released from the custody of Moldovan authorities and allowed to return to Tiraspol.  The first cable below goes into interesting detail about the problems presented by "the Trans-Dniester" and Gagauzia, as well as potential border issues with Ukraine.

This was also a month when President Snegur was forced to cancel a visit to the U.S. due to unspecified domestic "political problems."  As the second cable below shows, the visit was intended to familiarize U.S. business and political leaders with Moldova, something the Moldovan government is still working on today.  The second cable also contains a number of statements from official Chisinau about how Moldova saw its future status at that moment in time. 

Tiraspol Blockade Ended; Moldova Avoiding Confrontation with Secessionist "Republics" (Oct. 4, 1991)

Moldovan President to Visit U.S. October 19-24 (Oct. 11, 1991)

Moldovan President Snegur Cancels U.S. Visit (Oct. 18, 1991)

For more about the "Conflict Cables" series, see this post.

Conflict Cables Series - Inaugural post

In the spring of 2008, I filed a number of requests under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with the State Department, asking for cables related to the initial "hot" stages of the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniester which have, over the years, come to be known first as "frozen conflicts" and nowadays as "protracted conflicts."  The FOIA process took a couple of years, but in 2010 I finally received two large packages with documents responsive to my requests.  I am uploading them to Scribd and highlighting some of the more interesting ones on this blog.

Unlike the Wikileaks cables, these documents were all obtained legally through the FOIA process, but that doesn't make them any less interesting.  Although I can't promise a juicy revelation in every one, I am pretty sure that most of them were previously classified and unreleased and therefore potentially have new information of interest to researchers interested in these conflicts.  In addition, a number of them mention one of the conflicts in the context of broader issues of the US approach to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

 [image source - RIA Novosti]

Protest rally in Tiraspol, Sept. 1991; the sign reads, "Ukraine and Russia, defend your citizens!"

The batch of cables I am going to upload first was received in response to my request for documents related to the Transdniestria conflict.  Below are the first two cables in this batch.  In the first one, paragraph 11 describes a visit by U.S. officials to Tiraspol, where they met with Igor Smirnov, then Gorispolkom (city council) Chairman, as well as the "recently named chairman of the 'Supreme Soviet of the Trans-Dniester Republic'...and a number of other people whose functions were not entirely clear."  "Smirnov treated pol[itical] off[icer]s with a degree of suspicion reminiscent of the Cold War days, asking why American diplomats were interested in coming to Tiraspol, and refusing to accept the standard replies."

The second cable provides a brief assessment of the political situation in Moldova in the fall of 1991: "The Moldovan government is steering a careful course between the Scylla of the breakaway Trans-Dnister and Gagauz 'republics' and the Charybdis of militant pan-Romanian nationalists."

Increasing Political Polarization in Moldova (April 12, 1991)

Moldova: A Fragile Stability Endures, but for How Long? (Sep 28, 1991)

The Return

[image source]

It's hard to believe it's been almost four months since I posted anything here.  The fourth quarter of last year was filled with work, work and work, but that's no excuse. Scraps of Moscow is back for 2011 and hoping to provide better content than ever with a new series of posts to be launched over the weekend.  My focus, as before, will be on the "protracted conflict" areas in the post-Soviet space, with other topics to be covered including the domestic politics in Moldova and Russia - both of which promise to be interesting this year.

In the meantime, I was remiss last year in not sharing any of my non-blog writing about the region, which included some thoughts on Karabakh as well as co-authored opinion pieces on "Why Moldova Matters" (Russian version) and on Transdniester (Russian version).  If you're interested in a longer read, an article I co-authored with a mouthful of a title - "Acquiring Assets, Debts and Citizens: Russia and the Micro-Foundations of Transnistria's Stalemated Conflict" - was published in the Fall 2010 issue of Demokratizatsiya but is unfortunately not available online.

I'm still trying to figure out how to usefully integrate some of the content from my Facebook wall into this space - an friend recently referred to it as my "Facebook blog," which is accurate given the amount of links posted and comment discussions that erupt there.  I guess the simplest way is just to be less lazy and do a three-sentence blog post when I see an interesting article instead of a one-sentence comment with a shared link on FB.  Stay tuned...

 [image source]

Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 25, 2010
Commentary by Marina Pervozkina: Thanks to Everyone, Everyone Is Free. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are gradually gaining independence from Russia. [Translation from JRL]

"Abkhazia is less dependent on Russia than Russia is on Abkhazia," one of the popular Abkhaz newspapers wrote recently. And the impression sometimes forms that the author was right on target. In any case, the elites of both the republics recognized by Russia often behave as if these words were inscribed on their family seal. Abkhazia and South Ossetia increasingly recall the willful beauty who condescendingly receives gifts from her long-standing, loyal suitor at the same time as her eyes are darting around looking for other interesting partners. And as always happens in such cases, the alternative is quickly found.

The Quiet American

"I think that he (Mikheil Saakashvili -- author) used the confrontation with Russia for personal goals: to muffle the voices of the discontented people in his own country. I hope that Saakashvili realized what harm he did to his own country, losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in this way. After all, in this situation there will no longer be a road back."

"Kremlin propaganda again," some progressive reader will say involuntarily. And he will almost be right: such thoughts were heard on the official level in Russia so often that they became a kind of cliche that already seems almost improper somehow.

Nonetheless, these words, spoken just before the second anniversary of the August war, were a real sensation. After all, the person acting as the mouthpiece for Kremlin propaganda on this occasion is called the "shadow architect of American foreign policy" by well-informed people. And some consider him one of the most authoritative representatives of the American intelligence community. And not without grounds: Paul Goble (the quotation cited above belongs to him) in fact worked for a long time in the CIA, then served as an associate of the US State Department's Bureau of Research and Intelligence and as deputy director of broadcasting for Radio Liberty/Free Europe. He is considered one of the best experts on the Caucasus and inter-ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet space. In short, the classic "quiet American." Very quiet and very influential.

The significance of a person is best illustrated by the legends that surround him. There is a story that circulates about Goble, that supposedly the speaker and the prime minister of Armenia, who died at the hands of terrorists in October 1999, were paid back for rejecting the so-called Goble plan to settle the Karabakh conflict. We are sure that this is malicious slander.

And if such a complex person says publicly, "I think that on the threshold of the conflict Saakashvili misinterpreted statements by the US president and secretary of state... He did not hear at all what we had in mind. I hope that the American authorities are aware of the harm Saakashvili caused by his actions. We did not need that war," this certainly bodes no good for Saakashvili. It may already be time for him to look for a job in a quiet provincial American university. Just in case.

But here is the most interesting thing: "I believe in the right of nations to self-determination," Mr. Goble says. "And I am sure that Abkhazia has demonstrated its possibility of realizing this right in practice."

But what will happen with the territorial integrity of Georgia, for which official Washington is constantly affirming its support? The events of recent years have shown that for the Americans the integrity of other countries is always a relative value. When a probable enemy or its ally loses integrity it is welcomed. The examples of the USSR and Yugoslavia are known to all. But while the USSR collapsed relatively peacefully ("just" a few tens of thousands killed in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, the Dniester region, and South Ossetia), everything was much worse in Yugoslavia. At first glance US policy toward Slobodan Milosevic looked somewhat schizophrenic: after all, in its time Yugoslavia was the most pro-Western country in the socialist camp and had difficult relations with Moscow while Milosevic himself up to a certain time seemed to be a completely loyal client of Washington. He made concessions easily, in fact surrendered Serbian Krajna, and declared an economic blockade of the Bosnian Serbs (how can we help recalling here the multi-year blockade of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation?). But here is the paradox: the more Milosevic gave away, the less the West liked him. Ultimately the Serbs even gave up Milosevic himself, but they still took Kosovo away from them. The poor devils simply did not understand that it was not a matter of Milosevic, but of themselves -- the West does not need a strong, unified Serbia, which sooner or later will return to its traditional role as Russia's outpost in the Balkans.

But whereas everything is clear with Serbia, Turkey is, after all, a reliable ally and strategic partner of the Americans. And therefore the Americans' support of Kurdish separatism in Iraq is, from the Turkish point of view, completely beyond good and evil. I took a look at the Kurdish website yesterday, and saw there threats to secede from Iraq with highly promising commentary: "And if the Kurds slam the door, glass will fly across the whole region." In connection with which very alluring prospects could open up for Turkish Kurdistan. And how is Georgia better than Turkey?

Normal Heroes Always Take the Bypass

It is not only no better, but even in some respects worse: Georgia, an Orthodox country like Serbia, was a reliable supporter of the Russians during the Caucasus war and together they wiped out the mountain rebels, who are brothers in spirit and faith with the Kosovo terrorists, the United States' current strategic partners. So who will sort them out, the Georgians? Where will their sun rise tomorrow? Half of the North Caucasus is related by kin to the Abkhazes.

Of course, from the standpoint of America's strategic interests it would be best if a united Georgia including Abkhazia and South Ossetia joined NATO. But the West is starting to understand that it is probably impossible for Abkhazes and Georgians to live in one state. That means it is necessary to "enter" already independent Abkhazia maybe as a carcass, maybe as a scarecrow, maybe as an embassy if nothing else works.

"For Moscow the worst development of the situation in the Caucasus is if the West, and the United States in particular, decides to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia," Mr. Goble says. "Picture 27 embassies of the NATO members in Sukhum. No doubt the Russian authorities would be horrified at that. Then after all, there are others in Russia who would like self-determination -- Dagestan, for example. I do not rule out such a development of events. I hope that we greet the 10th anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in a significantly calmer state. There will be fewer comments on Russian aggression, and more embassies of foreign states in Sukhum. I do not know if there will be an American Embassy among them. That, of course, is a very bold dream."

Paul Goble is undoubtedly a brilliant analyst and a master strategist. He set forth a perfectly realistic plan to "nullify" Russia's August victory: reorient Abkhazia to the West and turn it into a Mecca for North Caucasian separatists. This is not fantasy. Suffice it to recall the Gorskaya (Mountain) Republic that was declared after the fall of the Russian Empire. It included Abkhazia, Ossetia, and five other republics of the North Caucasus. The ideas of the Gorskaya Republic were reborn after the fall of the Union. In November 1991 Sukhum was declared the capital of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. During the war with Georgia representatives of all the national movements of the North Caucasus fought on the Abkhaz side. The minister of defense of war-time Abkhazia was Sultan Sosnaliyev, a Kabardin, and Shamil Basayev was his deputy. Kabardin and Chechen battalions played a decisive part in the war. Afterw ard those same Chechens, having become battle hardened on the fronts of Abkhazia, fought against Russian troops.

Highly-placed people I spoke with in Sukhum told me that even before the August events representatives of Western countries in private conversation hinted on occasion that Abkhazia's main problem was its pro-Russian orientation. "If the Abkhazes turn their faces to the West, anything is possible, including international recognition" -- according to my interlocutors that is how these emissaries talked.

"If the 'restoration' of Georgian rule is a fantasy, accordingly it is essential to prevent Abkhazia from finally falling under Russia's power," the journalist Neal Ascherson writes in his article entitled "Abkhazia and the Caucasus: the West's Choice," which was posted on the Open Democracy website. "The West is facing an urgent need to arrange direct contacts with Abkhazia -- economic, social, and cultural contacts -- and to get access to Abkhaz ports. That will help Abkhazia emerge from isolation."

News from the Field

As for South Ossetia, in the opinion of Western analysts it has fewer grounds for independence. Small territory, small population. And geographic position: South Ossetia is a "dagger aimed at Tbilisi," an ideal launching point for an invasion of Georgia. But the main thing is that North Ossetia is located in the Russian Federation. In this connection (I am again speaking on the basis of the words of participants in events who hold high positions in the Ossetian elite) on numerous occasions the Ossetians have been told unofficially that if North Ossetia unites with South Ossetia and withdraws from Russia, such a united Ossetia could well expect international recognition.

This idea is not at all as utopian as it seems.

In Tskhinval today we observe a paradoxical situation. While South Ossetia, its people, and the whole elite are entirely dependent on our maintenance -- in the war-ravaged republic nothing is working, there are no domestic sources of income at all, and even its security depends entirely on Russia -- Moscow cannot resolve a single significant problem there. Not even monitor the expenditure of its own money or protect its own people. Moscow (and according to my information the Russian premier personally) was even unable to get Mr. Kokoyty to dismiss South Ossetian officials who were caught stealing and whose names were known. The story of former health minister Nuzgar Gabarayev, who distributed Russian financial aid, is illustrative. His name has already become part of the language in the republic. After Moscow protege Vadim Brovtsev sent Gabarayev into retirement, President Kokoyty appointed him his own state counselor. Evidently an indispensable personage. Even more illustrative is the story of General Barankevich, who Moscow wanted very much to appoint to be head of the MVK (interdepartmental commission on the restoration of South Ossetia), but COULD NOT. In other words, in this case terribly dependent and very proud Tskhinval, living entirely on our money, was actually able to influence our internal personnel policy. At the same time we cannot influence Tskhinval's. I would say that this is the apotheosis of impudence.

There is an analogous situation in Abkhazia, where Moscow is unsuccessfully trying to get the property rights of Russian citizens who were illegally deprived of their housing restored. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will emphasize that we are not talking here about the property of Georgian refugees. Their problems should be the subject of bilateral talks between Georgia and Abkhazia. It is those for whom the Russian government is fighting, principally Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and the like. Many of them never left Abkhazia at all.

In these very days another scandal has flared up. Sukhum rejected a document sent to it by the MID RF (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) entitled "Concept of the Work of the Joint Russian-Abkhaz Commission on Questions of Restorin g the Property Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Abkhazia." We will recall that the decision to form such a commission was reached in Moscow after an article published in MK (Moskovskiy Komsomolets) made the problem a matter of public record. Before this, according to our information, the MID RF and the Russian Embassy in Sukhum had sent several diplomatic notes to the Abkhaz side (dated 25 November 2008, 19 March 2009, 22 April 2009, and 31 July 2009). President Medvedev and foreign minister Lavrov discussed the problem with the president of Abkhazia. Sergey Baghapsh pointed out to the chiefs of local administrations the necessity of "taking a hard line with seizures of property." However, nothing happened. Not one of the protagonists of our article has gotten his apartment back at this point.

At the same time strange articles are appearing in the Abkhaz press in which the plans to form the commission are called "anti-state and anti-Abkhaz," while giving people back property that was fraudulently taken from them is considered a threat to the Abkhaz people. The Abkhazes never tire of repeating that their foreign policy must be multi-vectored, that they are not some pathetic outpost of Russia, but a sovereign state with its own interests. Thus if there is a change in the West's position on the issue of Abkhaz independence, Moscow stands a good chance of being left empty-handed.

And if we close our eyes to the problems that already exist in relations with our Abkhaz and Ossetian partners, it is not impossible that some day museums "of the Russian occupation" will open on the central squares of Sukhum and Tskhinval.

God forbid, of course.