Russia-Belarus Relations at a Political 'Standoff'
Gazeta
www.gzt.ru
June 21, 2010
Article by Fedor Lukyanov: "Russia's Conscience"
[Translation from JRL - note: see here for another comment on this story]
The latest conflict between Moscow and Minsk is no surprise to anyone, because there has already long been no trace of the "union fraternity." But the present-day opposition does not look like the previous rounds. The general context has changed, which has also influenced the logic of behavior of the parties.
The difference in Russian-Belarusian relations from Russia's relations with other neighbors consists of the fact that they were based on an economic foundation. This may seem like a paradox, because, since the late 1990's, Moscow and Minsk were specifically in a political union and practically always held identical positions on questions of foreign and domestic policy. But this alliance was predominantly declarative in nature. However, thanks to the presence of the Union State, political differences were formally removed and did not require special regulation, including with the aid of economic levers of effect (as was the case with, say, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Baltic countries).
The bilateral conflicts of the zero years, which were sometimes very acute, always had the same essence: Attempts to convert political unions into economic dividends. On the part of Russia, the discussion centered around acquisition of Belarusian assets that were necessary for restoration of former Soviet production chains. On the part of Belarus, the goal was to ensure maximal subsidization of the national economy on the part of Moscow. And although the outwardly transitory clashes of Russia and Belarus were reminiscent of the similar Russian-Ukrainian scenario, they did not have the political aftertaste that was characteristic of the latter.
Today, relations have taken on the nature of political opposition. Aleksandr Lukashenka openly spoke out against the Kremlin in an acute and extremely dangerous crisis: The overthrow in Kyrgyzstan and the events that followed it. Having supported Kurmanbek Bakiyev and given him the tribune of the CIS (the ex-president is speaking out in the Minsk staff headquarters of that organization), and in fact accusing Moscow of supporting the overthrow of a legitimate head of state, the Belarusian leader has cast doubt upon Russia's right to post-Soviet leadership. Moreover, this is happening at a moment when objective prerequisites have arisen for such leadership. The other subjects of big world politics are immersed in their own problems and, in essence, do not object to Moscow's sorting out all of the problems on the territory of the former USSR that everyone else has grown tired of.
In prior years, all efforts - intellectual, political-diplomatic, economic, and even military - were aimed at proving to foreign players in the West that Moscow had a predominant influence in that part of the planet. The course was crowned with success, partly because of the consequences of the world crisis, but nevertheless... And here, it turned out that there was no well thought-out plan for restoring leadership. And Lukashenka himself assumed the role of a sort of "conscience of Russia," constantly pointing out to Moscow the inconsistency and contradictory nature of its policy.
The non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was reminiscent of Russia's former position on Kosovo, which Moscow rejected in the case of Georgia. Defense of Bakiyev underscored the fact that the interim government, supported by Russia, has no legal basis, that everything that it does is, strictly speaking, unlawful, and that Moscow shares responsibility for the lawlessness. The refusal to join the Customs Union is a confirmation of the unequal nature of integration, under which the strongest partner makes too few steps toward the weaker ones. Finally, the gas conflict exposed the double standards of Russia: It opts for concessions to Kiev, which is not included in any associations with Moscow, yet makes access more difficult for Minsk, which is formally its closest ally.
Lukashenka says all this publicly, with his inherent talent and convincingness, and also rather willfully juggling the facts. Obviously, the President of Belarus is not fighting for the law and justice in general - he is building his own independent line of defense against Russian pressure by raising the stakes in case of a "big deal."
An independent line is needed because he cannot count on the support of Europe, to which Russia's opponents on the post-Soviet area usually appeal. And this is not because Batka's ("Batka" is nickname for Lukashenka, meaning "Father" - translator's note) authoritarian practice does not suit the West - it would close its eyes to this. Actually, the European Union had begun to clearly "warm up" to Minsk even before the Russian-Georgian war, and the process was accelerated after August of 2008. But the economic - and then also political - crisis of the European Union reduced its activity on the post-Soviet area to a minimum. Brussels and the capitals of the leading states clearly cannot be bothered with this now. Belarus, of course, will try to revive the European phobia against Russian energy imperialism, but the repercussions will not be comparable to the previous "gas wars." Furthermore, the volumes of transit through Belarus are many times less than through Ukraine. It is summer now, and what Europe wants most of all is not to be distracted from the battle over the euro.
Minsk evidently understands this, and so it intends to rely on its own efforts. Lukashenka is holding some trump cards. Aside from the Customs Union, which remains a key priority for Moscow, these now also include the CSTO. Russia needs this organization for legitimization of possible actions in Kyrgyzstan, and Belarus is fully capable of imposing a veto. Especially since Lukashenka's position on Bakiyev (we cannot change the status-quo) finds if not support, then at least the tacit understanding of his counterparts - Islam Karimov, Emomali Rakhmon and Nursultan Nazarbayev. All of them fear to one degree or another that, if Russia is allowed to intervene in domestic affairs, sooner or later this will also affect them.
For Moscow, the conflict with Minsk this time is also primarily political. Integration projects - the creation of the Customs Union, the strengthening of the CSTO - are attempts by Russia to use the world situation and the absence of interest of other players to stop the expansion of other centers of power (EU, China, US) on the post-Soviet area. As strange as it may seem, it is specifically Belarus that has become the main obstacle in the path of realization of this goal, especially because Lukashenka cannot be called either anyone's puppet, or a Russophobe dreamer.
Russia's relations with Belarus today are at a crossroads. It is no accident that the Russian envoy to Belarus, Ambassador Aleksandr Surikov, stated that, if Minsk refuses to join the Customs Union, Moscow may return full customs control to the border between the two countries. This is logical. The project of the Union State in the form in which it was once devised by Boris Yeltsin and Aleksandr Lukashenka has fully exhausted itself. Now there must be a qualitative change. Either this is the beginning of real step-by-step integration, which the Customs Union project envisions. Or it is a return to the fully autonomous existence, with total re-computation (deliveries, transit, duties, markets, payment for military facilities, etc.).
Then again, the second variant would be a political defeat for Russia, because it would demonstrate its inability to convince even its closest ally of the benefit of cooperation. For Belarus, this is also fraught with difficulties: Without preferential conditions and subsidies on the part of Moscow, the Belarusian economy would find itself in an extremely difficult position, and it does not have anyone in particular to count on.
The current opposition of Moscow and Minsk is a war of nerves. Russia needs to prove at any cost that it is capable of overcoming any opposition and achieving its set goals. Belarus must stake out the status of a privileged partner, with whom one must come to agreement seriously and with full respect. And the standoff continues.
(Begin boxed material) Fedor Lukyanov
Lukyanov's biography is an example of how devotion to a beloved cause becomes a guarantee of success. He began his activity in the foreign broadcast editorial office of Moscow Radio. After that, he worked at the newspaper, Segodnya, and later assumed the duties of deputy chief editor of the newspaper, Vremya Novostey. In 2002, Lukyanov headed up the journal, Russia in Global Politics. A year later, he became a member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. Lukyanov has a rare hobby - political caricature of the Soviet period. (End boxed material)
