A couple of the hired guns at one of last weekend's pro-gov't counterprotests.My favorite part is the unrealistically hard-looking image of Dimmovochka.
[image source]
But United Russia's supporters - both the ones hired as crowd filler and the ambitious, plum-job-seeking core - seem to be running on faith (to use a phrase immortalized by Eric Clapton).
It's no secret: in Russia today there are forces which are trying to blame Putin, Medvedev and United Russia for our temporary difficuties. These forces are like a dangerous virus - as soon as they sense a weakening of our immune system, they'll attack.That post drew over 4,000 comments, many of them critical, compelling Ms. Sergeeva to write a rambling rebuttal castigating the "two-legged cockroaches on LiveJournal" and "parasites," and even deploying against her critics United Russia's rhetorical WMD - a quotation from the ideological architect of "sovereign democracy" himself, Vladislav Surkov - but (in case we forgot it was all about her) taking the first two paragraphs to marvel at her newfound fame. She sort of has elements of a Russian Sarah Palin - spunky and down-to-earth, but also self-contradictory and determinedly dim-witted, and not really ready for prime time.
But let's be honest with ourselves. Take me, for instance, a student who pays full tuition. In 1998 I wouldn't have known what to do. And now I don't just believe. I know for certain that Putin, Medvedev and the United Russia party will protect me. They'll give me the chance to take out a student loan at a rate of five percent, not 55 percent. They'll give me a job. They won't allow me to be fired illegally.
It turns out that Ms. Sergeeva is not only a YouTube celebrity of sorts - an irony-free and more heavily managed version of Obama Girl, except without, you know, the singing - she is also a member of the political council of the Young Guards (United Russia's youth wing, usually abbreviated as MGER) and a videoblogger on United Russia's website, where the section devoted to blogs is wittily titled "Berloga" (which means "bear's den," but also happens to be spelled by inserting the initials of United Russia - ER, in Russian - after the "B" in "blog" - how punny!).
Based on her apparent inability to memorize even a few sentences of her monologues, and assuming the MGERovtsy are supposed to be a breeding ground for future Russian political elites, there really will be problems finding qualified leadership among the younger generation. Youth wings of political parties - especially parties with no opposition - are of course populated by careerist hacks to some degree in all countries, but this young lady takes self-absorbed hackdom to another level.
Anyway, here is a rather more articulate analysis of why Putin remains popular even in the face of an economic situation that seems to get more calamitous every week. The English translation is from the JRL, the original article in Russian is here.
Putin's Stable Popular Support Based on Cultural Closeness, Not Results
Gazeta.ru
January 29, 2009
Commentary by Boris Tumanov: "People Like Putin"
Despite all the crises,tragedies, disasters, and disorders, the citizens of Russia are not disillusioned with Putin because he is a symbol and the personification of themselves.
The global economic crisis with its still unknown outcome has already caused a marked intellectual revival in that segment of Russian society that can tentatively be called the thinking part of our elite. The general catalyst of this process is the expectation of sociopolitical cataclysms.
Russian thinkers who belong to the "vertical hierarchy of power" consider this perspective as a threat to their own well-being and seriously hope to avert it with the help the non-existent middle class and the traditionally obedient "tin soldiers,"' who are already being pushed into manifestations of loyalty. And their freedom-loving opponents believe just as sincerely that the coming upheavals will be a factor in the inevitable liberal transformations in the sociopolitical life of Russia.
However, in the former case it is nothing more than a helpless simulation of their own professional suitability, while in the latter it is an equally nonsensical, equally pretentious attempt at Cartesian analysis of the inscrutable instincts of Russian society.
As Solovyev's Khodzha Nasreddin would say in such circumstances, "Oh jinnis, you are searching where it is not hidden." For the main, if not the only, effective factor capable of determining the state of Russia in the foreseeable future is that almost symbiotic unity that exists between the largest part of Russian society and the person of the "national leader" known as Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.
This unity could not be shaken by the tragedies of the Kursk, Nord-Ost, and Beslan, the administrative tyranny of "sovereign democracy," "Basmannyy justice," or the rumors of the "national leader's" fabulous personal wealth just as it cannot be shaken by the current growth in unemployment, inflation, devaluation of the ruble, the disintegration of mortgages, or even the coming deprivations.
Here are figures that thoroughly illustrate this assertion. According to the findings of the Levada Center, in September of last year an overwhelming majority of Russian citizens polled --61% -- thought that things were moving in the right direction in Russia and only 21% of the respondents thought that the country was taking a wrong path. The short war in Georgia played a part here, of course, but even today a majority of Russia's citizens believe that things are going well in the country. In December 2008 and January of this year their number remained constant at 43% while the number of pessimists dropped from 40% to 34%.
Last September also marked the peak of positive assessments of the activities of the government headed by Vladimir Putin, 66% against 31%. But in December 2008 and January of this yeart hese figures were 60% and 36%, and 58% and 38% respectively.
But then the activities ofVladimir Putin personally in the job of premier are evaluated by Russian citizens using some different system of coordinates and criteria, if we judge by the fact that in December 2008 and January 2009 he was consistently approved by 83% of those polled, while the number who were dissatisfied with his activities declined from 15% in December to 14% in January. We will add that the peak of approval of Putin's activities, 88%, came in that same victorious September.
Remarking this phenomenon, both the liberals and the state-minded thinkers -- the one in vexation, the other with chauvinistic satisfaction -- explain it by essentially the same factor, which is indeed the main, although not the only, factor in "Putinomania." For some this factor is formulated as the patriarchal inertia of Russian society, the result of many centuries of slavery, while the others see it as a manifestation of sovereign Russian uniqueness expressed in communality, spirituality, and patriotic unity with the government. At the same time the most inquisitive opponents of Putin become lost guessing about what kind of mistakes and blunders he would have to make or what "Egyptian plagues" would have to overtake Russia under his leadership to disillusion the majority of Russian citizens who love him.
It would be simplest to answer this question by saying that Vladimir Vladimirovich can do anything he wants, practically without risk to his popularity rating. But such an answer, even if it corresponds to reality, demands convincing explanation, or rather a detailed investigation of the genesis of the "national leader's" unprecedented popularity. Russia's leaders and Vladimir Putin personally are absolutely right when they say that the main reason for the current crisis was their responsible consumption of the West, above all the United States. But afterall, it was this very mindless consumption that caused the manna from heaven that poured down on Russia in recent years in the form of incredibly fast-rising oil prices.
And if we take an unbiased look at the results of these "seven fat years," those who sincerely care for the real interests of Russia and its citizens could register serious charges against the Russian leadership and Vladimir Putin himself regarding how they managed the wealth that Russia enjoyed.
Instead of fighting corruption, instead of effective army reform, instead of development and diversification of domestic production, instead of building up still restless provincial Russia, they worked on strengthening the vertical hierarchy of power, which guarantees them practically lifetime terms of office. And after setting their intention as restoring Russia's stature on a global scale, the Russian ruling elite managed to quarrel with almost all of their Western partners; indeed they have found themselves in virtual isolation. Beginning with Vladimir Putin's Munich speech and up to the recent gas war with Ukraine, Russia has stubbornly destroyed its own international reputation and pushed away not just Europe and the United States, but also our neighbors in the CIS.
If Russian society were consciously striving to assume responsibility for the fate of the country or, at a minimum, if it were capable of an independent evaluation of the government's actions, its reaction to such behavior by the government would be much less equable. But civic responsibility presupposes a search for alternatives, which requires intellectual and psychological exertion, and the citizens of Russia will not be ready for that for a long time. Not just because the few opponents of the government are incapable of formulating an intelligible alternative to the current course, but above all because of the traditional and almost panicky fear that Russian society will be deprived of its paternalistic oversight by the state. That is why Russian citizens do not try to look carefully at the mechanisms of control over the state, the economy, and society, preferring to rely on the omniscience of the tsar, great leader, or national leader who by definition cannot answer for the mistakes of the ordinary mortals under him.
But in Putin's case there is one substantive aspect that prevents us from viewing the universal trust of him exclusively in the framework of the fatalistic formula: "Good tsar but his boyars are indifferent." For unlike the tsars who are "ordained from above" and the general secretaries, the citizens of Russia are convinced that Putin took charge of Russia as the result of their own will, not Divine Providence or a decision of the Politburo. And the fact that they chose him the way they choose the best fellow in the village (athlete, does not smoke, likeable, went into intelligence work) only emphasizes that from the beginning this choice did not presuppose any political responsibility of Putin to the voters. That is why, from the standpoint of the citizens of Russia, Putin does not have to answer for the activities of his own government, for the results of his own term in office.
They do not judge Putin because for society he is not functional. He is a symbol. He is the personification of the Russian citizens themselves; they identify themselves with him. And this is perhaps the first case in Russian history when the purely reflexive worship by the Russian masses of the latest domestic divinity is tinged with a sincere feeling of solid affection for him.
Affection that is linked not with his political and economic decisions, but rather with the fact that his worldview, hopes, and complexes are indistinguishable from those of the average Russian citizen.
It is the diehard fastidious intelligentsia who may be horrified at the vulgar language that Vladimir Putin uses with emphatic pleasure in his public statements, and especially in contacts with Western politicians and journalists. It is the numerous snobs who are amused at the former president's almost childish liking for dressing up as a submariner, a fighter pilot, or showing off his torso, and his way, plainly seen at Kennebunkport, of imposing the company of his Labrador Koni on his foreign guests. It is the liberal analysts, who are becoming extinct, who see in his aggressive megalomania in relation to the West echoes of the old humiliation felt by the future national leader when he discovered that Germany, even though it was socialist, was able, unlike the USSR, not only to produce an adequate amount of beer, but also to bottle it in three-liter bottles with a convenient spigot. And they are malicious skeptics who blasphemously mock the apocryphal tale that during his entire KGB career Vladimir Putin, surrounded by militant and vigilant atheists, never parted with the cross around his neck and his belief in the Almighty, risking exposure at the first physical training exercise.
On the other hand, a majority of Russian society is in complete solidarity with these behavior traits of the national leader because they fully coincide with the social culture of the Russian citizens themselves, with their ideas about the outside world and their complaints about the rest of the human race.
Well then, if we add to these feelings the easy material well-being that coincided with Vladimir Vladimirovich's term of office for a significant part of the society, which continues to believe furiously in the return of the "rivers of gas and banks of oil," we can say with certainty that Putin is going to last a long time.
And, incidentally, so is today's Russia.
