The Parable of the Isms - a guest post by Matthew Rojansky



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The Parable of the Isms, as Applied to the Former Soviet Union
Guest post by Matthew Rojansky

My colleague Karim Sadjadpour recently published a satirical analysis of Middle East politics, "The Cynical Dairy Farmer's Guide to the New Middle East," riffing on a famous Cold War joke about communism and capitalism, known as "the parable of the isms."  As Karim noted,

 No one really knows how the two-cow joke known as "Parable of the Isms" came about, but most students of Political Science 101 have likely come across some variation of the following definitions:

Socialism: You have two cows. The government takes one of them and gives it to your neighbor.

Communism: You have two cows. The government takes them both and provides you with milk.

Nazism: You have two cows. The government shoots you and takes the cows.

Capitalism: You have two cows. You sell one and buy a bull.

Satire it may be, but the essential truth of the "cow jokes" is what makes them funny. Karim's thirteen terse metaphors for Middle Eastern regimes cut to the heart of a complex region in which increasing American interest has followed increasing investments of blood and treasure, with very little added understanding of what's really going on.

The Soviet Union suffered no dearth of American attention over nearly half a century after World War II. Yet even the keenest observers, like Kennan and Kissinger, were focused almost entirely on Moscow, and within it mostly on the Kremlin. During the Cold War, that made good sense - after all, no one in Kiev or Almaty, let alone in Chisinau or Ashgabat, was making particularly important decisions for US foreign policy and global security.

But twenty years after the collapse of Communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, things work a bit differently in Eurasia. To understand why drugs flow so readily from Afghanistan through Central Asia and into Russia and Western Europe requires some sense of what's going on - and what's not - in places like Dushanbe and Astana. To see why a NATO-Russia impasse over missile defense is so serious requires an understanding of how the people, and the governments, in Kyiv and Tbilisi relate to their massive neighbor.

The former Soviet republics are no longer defined so much by being formerly Soviet, as by what they have become after twenty years of independence. Yet the old categories - socialist, communist, capitalist, fascist - don't easily work to describe a region where political cultures draw on everything from Rome and Byzantium to Baghdad and Beijing. Let's see how the "parable of the isms" might offer a convenient shorthand guide to the fifteen states that once made up the USSR.

Russia
You have six cows and four bulls. Two of the bulls die from alcoholism, and the remaining two form a "tandem" to take the cows' milk and sell it to Germany and China.

Ukraine
You have four of the most productive cows on the farm, two of which allow themselves to be milked by Russia, which upsets the other two so much their milk goes sour.

Georgia
You have two cows and one prize-winning bull. The bull is so distracted winning prizes that Russia runs away with both cows.

Belarus
You have one cow which you savagely beat until it produces milk. The milk dries up after your last savage beating, so now you must sell the cow to Russia.

Moldova
You have two cows and a calf, but the cows live in Italy and Russia and send milk home by Western Union. You ferment the milk into wine, and launch a frenzied campaign to join the EU. Meanwhile, the calf is stolen and sold by rustlers.

Armenia
You have four cows, but three of them live in Los Angeles and think they are horses. They send money for you to build stables.

Azerbaijan
You have one cow that produces lots of excellent milk. You sell the milk to Farmer Browne and buy cattle prods from Israel and Turkey.

Turkmenistan
You had one cow but you sold it to buy a golden statue of a cow that rotates with the sun.

Kazakhstan
You have two cows that produce vast quantities of milk. You sell the milk, buy each cow a gold-plated cow bell, and declare yourself bull for life.

Kyrgyzstan
You have two cows: one Kyrgyz and one Uzbek; they hate each other and refuse to be milked. Instead of hay, feed them tulips. Then sell one each to Russia and the United States. After six months sell them again.

Tajikistan
You have three cows: one Tajik, one Uzbek, and one Russian. You beat the Russian cow until it runs away, and use your misfortune to plead for international aid. Meanwhile Iran milks your remaining cows.

Uzbekistan
You have four cows. You let them drink all the water in the neighborhood swimming pool. Now no one can go swimming. You blame this on "corrupt and lawless elements," and volunteer to remain in power until the problem is solved.

The Baltic States

You have lost half your cows, for which you blame Russia and demand an apology. As consolation, the EU gives you a sleek Scandinavian-designed barn and NATO farmers teach you advanced milking techniques.

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Conflict Cables: Georgia, and the acceleration of the breakup, 1989-1990

Thanks to the August 2008 war, the conflicts over South Ossetia and Abkhazia have come to be perhaps the best known of the post-Soviet conflicts in the West.  The roots of these conflicts, according to some accounts, go back centuries, but the immediate triggers as the Soviet Union collapsed included missteps by Moscow, rhetorical overreach by a Georgian leader on the verge of independence, and unease over how inter-ethnic deals which had been enforced by Moscow would fare in the post-Soviet reality.

This batch of cables tracks the beginning of the downward spiral into armed ethnic conflict.  The first of them are post-mortems on the violent dispersal of a public protest in Tbilisi in 1989 that came to be known as the "April 9 events."  Six cables describing those events and their immediate aftermath were summarized in an earlier post in this series (read more about the "Conflict Cables" series here).

A May 5, 1989, cable titled "Georgian Activist on Events in Tbilisi" recounts a US Embassy official's conversation with "a prominent Georgian activist...in the 'moderate' Chavchavadze society," in which the anonymous Georgian source suggested a tangled web of motivations which allegedly led to the authorization for the use of force against non-violent protesters.

The Embassy officials' response to their Georgian source's conspiracy theory shows a charming naivete about the capability of Eduard "Silver Fox" Shevardnadze to engage in such machinations for his personal benefit - or perhaps faith in Shevy, who was at the time involved in negotiations with the U.S. on a much bigger stage: "We doubt that Shevardnadze would have put Perestroyka at risk by allowing or even quietly encouraging an ally to destabilize the situation in Georgia in order to bring down a political foe."

A May 6 cable - "More on Tbilisi Demonstrations" - gives a blow-by-blow account of the protesters' tactics and of their demands, which originally focused on Abkhazia but which progressed, in part due to friction between different dissident groups, to demands for independence.

On June 5, a cable went out describing a May 27 "Conversation with [a] Georgian Dissident" - Zviad Gamsakhurdia - declassified here for the first time, as far as I know, which shows Gamsakhurdia's penchant for wild accusations and inflammatory rhetoric. Gamsakhurdia remains controversial to this day in Georgia. In mid-1989, he began by "ACCUS[ING] THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF WAGING "GENOCIDE" AGAINST THE GEORGIAN PEOPLE, THROUGH THE USE OF CHEMICAL POISONS AND "ECOLOGICAL WARFARE".

Later in the conversation, he discussed Abkhazia and South Ossetia:

IN DISCUSSING INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS WITHIN GEORGIA, GAMSAKHURDIA SHOWED LITTLE TOLERANCE FOR THE REPUBLIC'S INDIGENOUS MINORITIES AND WARNED OF KARABAKH-LIKE SITUATIONS DEVELOPING IN THE ABKHAZIA AUTONOMOUS SSR AS WELL AS THE SOUTHERN OSETIAN AUTONOMOUS OBLAST'. HE DESCRIBED THE ABKHAZIANS AS "THE TRAITORS OF THE CAUCASUS" AND AS "CORRUPTED PEOPLE" WHO "WANT TO RUSSIFY THEMSELVES", CLAIMING THAT THE ABKHAZIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT IS ACTUALLY PROVOKED BY MOSCOW AND LED BY "TURKISH MOSLEMS" AS A TYPE OF GEORGIAN "INTERFRONT". HE INITIALLY CHARACTERIZED THE POLITICAL POSITION OF ABKHAZIAN AUTHOR FAZIL ISKANDER AS "NEUTRAL" BUT NEVERTHELESS FELT IT NECESSARY TO POINT OUT THAT ISKANDER IS AN ETHNIC PERSIAN AND A "GREAT LIAR".

ACCORDING TO THE GEORGIAN NATIONALIST, A SECOND GEORGIAN "INTERFRONT" -- A REFERENCE TO THE PRO-RUSSIAN GROUPS WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN THE BALTICS -- WAS BEING EXPLOITED BY MOSCOW AMONG THE 60,000 OSETIANS IN SOUTHERN OSETIA. GAMSAKHURDIA CLAIMED THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED REPORTS OF GEORGIANS BEING BEATEN IN SEVERAL OSETIAN VILLAGES, CLAIMING THAT THE OSETIAN POPULATION IS "VERY AGGRESSIVE". GEORGIANS ARE BEING OPPRESSED ON THEIR OWN LAND IN ABKHAZIA AND OSETIA, ACCORDING TO GAMSAKHURDIA, WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR MORE VIOLENT CONFLICTS.

Interestingly, this cable was apparently written by (or at least signed by) Richard Miles, later U.S. Ambassador to Georgia during the Rose Revolution.

During an August 1989 visit to Tbilisi, US Embassy officials spoke with a number of "Georgian intellectuals" (at a time when intellectuals still mattered politically), all of whom had "Abkhazia on their minds."  Their comments were summed up in an August 23 cable titled "Georgian Political Affairs." The Georgians were troubled by their portrayal in the Western press as "oppressors" of their national minorities.  One source saw the interethnic strife as "the work of a local Abkhazian mafia struggling to maintain its privileges in the face of a growing democratic movement throughout Georgia," which would leave the Abkhazians stripped of privileges as a result of being outnumbered  in their own autonomy.

Other interlocutors pointed suspicious fingers at Moscow, Turkey and Central Asia in explaining the unrest in Abkhazia.  None of the Americans' contacts was willing to entertain the possibility of satisfying the Abkhaz demands to elevate the Abkhazian ASSR to union republic status - "there were simply too few Abkhazians for that."  Georgians were already speaking about increased sovereignty and independence, though not necessarily of full-fledged secession from the USSR. 

The next few cables are roundups of "USSR domestic developments" and focus on other issues in addition to Georgia and other hot spots around the Soviet Union, which was by this point coming apart, though no one realized it at the time.  The first of these cables, dated November 9, 1989, includes a summary of a conversation with "noted Soviet pollster" Yuri Levada (paragraphs 15-16) as well as a synopsis of a familiar-sounding interaction with an opinionated taxi driver (para. 22), and quotes the "KGB press service" (para. 18) as stating that the "'present generation' of security officers dissociates itself from the Stalinist NKVD and condemns the arbitrariness of that period" (there appears to have been some regression in that regard since 1989).  Updates on South Ossetia (para. 27) and disruptions of Revolution Day celebrations in "Kishinev, Moldavia" (para. 31) and Tbilisi (para. 32), and the formal establishment of the "Soviet Interfront of Georgia," which swiftly demanded official status for the Russian language (para. 33).  There is also an interesting discussion of Soviet lawmaking (para. 34).

The November 17, 1989 "USSR Domestic Developments" cable melds old-school Sovietology (an extensive discussion of who stood on "the mausoleum" during the November 7 parade) with earnest discussions of the Soviet legislative calendar and priorities and comments from people like Anatoly Sobchak, and speculation like "Yel'tsin on the decline?" (para. 17).  Also interesting in light of current events are discussions of various popular front initiatives (paras. 20-21) and comments from Andranik Migranyan (para. 22) about domestic politics.  There is also a discussion of the "deteriorating" situation in Karabakh (para. 28) and of demands by Gamsakhurdia, whose organization is now referred to as "radical," that "Ossetians either support Georgian calls for independence from the Soviet Union or leave Georgia," and his forays into South Ossetia with busloads of armed men (para. 30).

The final roundup cable in this batch is "USSR Domestic Developments: December 1."  This one contains extensive discussion of Soviet domestic political developments, including some portions that apparently still merit classification and were redacted before the cable was released to me.  Not redacted, though, are some interesting points about the Karabakh conflict as it stood toward the end of 1989 (paras. 25-28), including some interesting comments by Yevgeny Primakov:

DURING A SPASO HOUSE DINNER NOVEMBER 29, YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV (PROTECT), A CANDIDATE POLITBURO MEMBER AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION, SAID, "THE ARMENIANS WILL SIMPLY HAVE TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION." HE IMPLIED THERE WAS NO HOPE NAGORNO-KARABAKH WOULD EVER BE UNITED WITH ARMENIA. ACCORDING TO PRIMAKOV, THERE IS NO SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AND EMOTIONS ARE RUNNING TOO HIGH FOR ARMENIANS AND AZERBAYDZHANIS TO REACH A COMPROMISE.

GEORGIY TARAZEVICH (PROTECT), CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET COMMISSION ON NAGORNO-KARABAKH, WHO VISITED THE AREA EARLY IN NOVEMBER, TOLD EMBOFF NOVEMBER 16 THAT HE BELIEVED THE SITUATION HAS DEADLOCKED.

This cable also has a brief update on continuing tension in South Ossetia (para. 29) and some thoughts from an unnamed Moldovan economist about new First Secretary Petr Luchinsky, and about leadership in the republic in general:

THE ECONOMIST SAID MOLDAVIA'S LEADERS WERE GENERALLY INCOMPETENT BECAUSE, UNLIKE IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS, THE BEST LEADERS IN MOLDAVIA ALWAYS MOVED ON TO MOSCOW.

The next cable in this batch is titled "Tension Mounts in Georgia as Nationalism Grows," and is dated February 13, 1990. Embassy officials visiting Tbilisi "found the sense of fear palpable," and one source told them that the situation was "like a volcano ready to erupt any time."

In the midst of an extensive discussion of Georgian domestic issues, upcoming elections and emerging political groups is this instructive summary of Georgian Popular Front (PFG) Deputy Chairman Avtandil Imnadze's view of minority rights in a Georgia that was lurching toward independence:

THE PFG'S NATIONALIST VIEWS LEAVE FEW RIGHTS TO OTHER REPUBLIC ETHNIC GROUPS. WHILE IMNADZE TOLD EMBOFF THAT "WE WILL NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS," HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THOSE RIGHTS IS VERY LIMITED AND GIVES NON-GEORGIANS VIRTUALLY NO POLITICAL POWER. "AFTER ALL," IMNADZE SAID, "THEY DO NOT BELONG HERE. THEY ARE ONLY OUR GUESTS." SEVERAL OTHER GEORGIANS WHO WERE NOT PFG MEMBERS ALSO EXPRESSED THIS SENTIMENT.

There is also discussion toward the end of the cable of the Georgian response to the deployment of Soviet troops in Baku in January 1990.

A cable from November 2, 1990 titled "Georgian Elections - Opposition Round Table Defeats Communists" summarized the implications of the elections won by Zviad Gamsakhurdia's Round Table - Free Georgia group.

GAMSAKHURDIA'S BLOC ADVOCATED INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW, MAINTAINING GEORGIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE FACE OF MINORITY GROUP DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY OR UNION WITH THE RSFSR.

There is also discussion of the way the election observation was conducted and the presence of foreign observers, noting some procedural flaws which did not in the estimation of the Embassy officials detract from the fairness of the elections. However:

MORE SERIOUS, PERHAPS, THAN THESE PROCEDURAL INCONSISTENCIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ELECTION WAS THE DECISION BY ABKHAZIA AND OSSETIAN NATIONAL GROUPS TO BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS. INDEED, IN DISTRICTS WITHIN THE OSSETIAN CAPITAL OF TKHSINVALI LESS THAN TEN PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS CAST BALLOTS. IN TWO DISTRICTS IN ABKHAZIA ELECTORAL COMMISSIONS DISINTEGRATED AND ELECTIONS WERE NOT HELD AT ALL.

The position of the election's victor on the Abkhazians and Ossetians also did not bode well for inter-ethnic harmony in Georgia:

GAMSAKHURDIA ALSO SAID HE BELIEVES IN RESPECT FOR THE POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS OF THE MINORITIES LIVING IN THE REPUBLIC, BUT NOT THEIR INDEPENDENCE OR SEPARATION FROM THE GEORGIAN REPUBLIC. ANY SOLUTION TO THE MINORITY PROBLEM, HE STRESSED, MUST PRESERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF GEORGIA AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RIGHTS OF THE MAJORITY. [...]

GAMSAKHURDIA'S VICTORY COULD FURTHER FUEL ETHNIC TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE REGION. HE IS VIEWED BY SOME OF THE MINORITY GROUPS, PARTICULARLY THE ABKHAZIANS AND OSSETIANS, AS A GEORGIAN NATIONALIST AT BEST AND A CHAUVINIST AT WORST. HIS UNCOMPROMISING POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE SOUTHERN OSSETIANS, WHOM HE HAS CALLED A MINORITY WITHOUT RIGHTS TO THE LANDS THEY OCCUPY, HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY TROUBLING EVEN TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GEORGIAN DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION.

The cable's author(s) reached this unfortunately prescient conclusion:

THE RESISTANCE OF COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATCHIKI, AND THE RESENTMENT AND FEAR EXPRESSED BY MINORITY GROUPS IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTHERN OSSETIA MAKE FOR A VOLATILE MIX: WITHOUT RESOLUTION OF THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES AMONG THE FORMER OPPOSITION LEADERS AND THE CONSENT OF THE ENTRENCHED COMMUNIST BUREAUCRATS, GEORGIA WILL, AT BEST, REMAIN CRITICALLY DIVIDED AT A TIME OF GREAT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTABILITY, AND, AT WORST, MAY SLIDE INTO FACTIONAL FIGHTING AND CIVIL WAR.

The final cable in this batch, from December 18, 1990, is titled "Union Treaty Negotiations: The Caucasus, Moldova, and the Baltics." This one is worth embedding in full, as it is laden with interesting observations about the internal situations in the republics of the Caucasus and Moldova, e.g. "INTERESTINGLY, FORMER COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER GElDER ALIYEV, FAMOUS FOR HIS CORRUPT POLITICAL PRACTICES, HAS MADE A POLITICAL COMEBACK AS A REBORN NATIONALIST."

Union Treaty Negotiations: The Caucasus, Moldova, and the Baltics (Dec. 18, 1990)

 

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Moskovskiy Komsomolets
August 25, 2010
Commentary by Marina Pervozkina: Thanks to Everyone, Everyone Is Free. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are gradually gaining independence from Russia. [Translation from JRL]

"Abkhazia is less dependent on Russia than Russia is on Abkhazia," one of the popular Abkhaz newspapers wrote recently. And the impression sometimes forms that the author was right on target. In any case, the elites of both the republics recognized by Russia often behave as if these words were inscribed on their family seal. Abkhazia and South Ossetia increasingly recall the willful beauty who condescendingly receives gifts from her long-standing, loyal suitor at the same time as her eyes are darting around looking for other interesting partners. And as always happens in such cases, the alternative is quickly found.

The Quiet American

"I think that he (Mikheil Saakashvili -- author) used the confrontation with Russia for personal goals: to muffle the voices of the discontented people in his own country. I hope that Saakashvili realized what harm he did to his own country, losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia in this way. After all, in this situation there will no longer be a road back."

"Kremlin propaganda again," some progressive reader will say involuntarily. And he will almost be right: such thoughts were heard on the official level in Russia so often that they became a kind of cliche that already seems almost improper somehow.

Nonetheless, these words, spoken just before the second anniversary of the August war, were a real sensation. After all, the person acting as the mouthpiece for Kremlin propaganda on this occasion is called the "shadow architect of American foreign policy" by well-informed people. And some consider him one of the most authoritative representatives of the American intelligence community. And not without grounds: Paul Goble (the quotation cited above belongs to him) in fact worked for a long time in the CIA, then served as an associate of the US State Department's Bureau of Research and Intelligence and as deputy director of broadcasting for Radio Liberty/Free Europe. He is considered one of the best experts on the Caucasus and inter-ethnic conflicts in post-Soviet space. In short, the classic "quiet American." Very quiet and very influential.

The significance of a person is best illustrated by the legends that surround him. There is a story that circulates about Goble, that supposedly the speaker and the prime minister of Armenia, who died at the hands of terrorists in October 1999, were paid back for rejecting the so-called Goble plan to settle the Karabakh conflict. We are sure that this is malicious slander.

And if such a complex person says publicly, "I think that on the threshold of the conflict Saakashvili misinterpreted statements by the US president and secretary of state... He did not hear at all what we had in mind. I hope that the American authorities are aware of the harm Saakashvili caused by his actions. We did not need that war," this certainly bodes no good for Saakashvili. It may already be time for him to look for a job in a quiet provincial American university. Just in case.

But here is the most interesting thing: "I believe in the right of nations to self-determination," Mr. Goble says. "And I am sure that Abkhazia has demonstrated its possibility of realizing this right in practice."

But what will happen with the territorial integrity of Georgia, for which official Washington is constantly affirming its support? The events of recent years have shown that for the Americans the integrity of other countries is always a relative value. When a probable enemy or its ally loses integrity it is welcomed. The examples of the USSR and Yugoslavia are known to all. But while the USSR collapsed relatively peacefully ("just" a few tens of thousands killed in Tajikistan, Abkhazia, the Dniester region, and South Ossetia), everything was much worse in Yugoslavia. At first glance US policy toward Slobodan Milosevic looked somewhat schizophrenic: after all, in its time Yugoslavia was the most pro-Western country in the socialist camp and had difficult relations with Moscow while Milosevic himself up to a certain time seemed to be a completely loyal client of Washington. He made concessions easily, in fact surrendered Serbian Krajna, and declared an economic blockade of the Bosnian Serbs (how can we help recalling here the multi-year blockade of Abkhazia by the Russian Federation?). But here is the paradox: the more Milosevic gave away, the less the West liked him. Ultimately the Serbs even gave up Milosevic himself, but they still took Kosovo away from them. The poor devils simply did not understand that it was not a matter of Milosevic, but of themselves -- the West does not need a strong, unified Serbia, which sooner or later will return to its traditional role as Russia's outpost in the Balkans.

But whereas everything is clear with Serbia, Turkey is, after all, a reliable ally and strategic partner of the Americans. And therefore the Americans' support of Kurdish separatism in Iraq is, from the Turkish point of view, completely beyond good and evil. I took a look at the Kurdish website yesterday, and saw there threats to secede from Iraq with highly promising commentary: "And if the Kurds slam the door, glass will fly across the whole region." In connection with which very alluring prospects could open up for Turkish Kurdistan. And how is Georgia better than Turkey?

Normal Heroes Always Take the Bypass

It is not only no better, but even in some respects worse: Georgia, an Orthodox country like Serbia, was a reliable supporter of the Russians during the Caucasus war and together they wiped out the mountain rebels, who are brothers in spirit and faith with the Kosovo terrorists, the United States' current strategic partners. So who will sort them out, the Georgians? Where will their sun rise tomorrow? Half of the North Caucasus is related by kin to the Abkhazes.

Of course, from the standpoint of America's strategic interests it would be best if a united Georgia including Abkhazia and South Ossetia joined NATO. But the West is starting to understand that it is probably impossible for Abkhazes and Georgians to live in one state. That means it is necessary to "enter" already independent Abkhazia maybe as a carcass, maybe as a scarecrow, maybe as an embassy if nothing else works.

"For Moscow the worst development of the situation in the Caucasus is if the West, and the United States in particular, decides to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia," Mr. Goble says. "Picture 27 embassies of the NATO members in Sukhum. No doubt the Russian authorities would be horrified at that. Then after all, there are others in Russia who would like self-determination -- Dagestan, for example. I do not rule out such a development of events. I hope that we greet the 10th anniversary of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in a significantly calmer state. There will be fewer comments on Russian aggression, and more embassies of foreign states in Sukhum. I do not know if there will be an American Embassy among them. That, of course, is a very bold dream."

Paul Goble is undoubtedly a brilliant analyst and a master strategist. He set forth a perfectly realistic plan to "nullify" Russia's August victory: reorient Abkhazia to the West and turn it into a Mecca for North Caucasian separatists. This is not fantasy. Suffice it to recall the Gorskaya (Mountain) Republic that was declared after the fall of the Russian Empire. It included Abkhazia, Ossetia, and five other republics of the North Caucasus. The ideas of the Gorskaya Republic were reborn after the fall of the Union. In November 1991 Sukhum was declared the capital of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. During the war with Georgia representatives of all the national movements of the North Caucasus fought on the Abkhaz side. The minister of defense of war-time Abkhazia was Sultan Sosnaliyev, a Kabardin, and Shamil Basayev was his deputy. Kabardin and Chechen battalions played a decisive part in the war. Afterw ard those same Chechens, having become battle hardened on the fronts of Abkhazia, fought against Russian troops.

Highly-placed people I spoke with in Sukhum told me that even before the August events representatives of Western countries in private conversation hinted on occasion that Abkhazia's main problem was its pro-Russian orientation. "If the Abkhazes turn their faces to the West, anything is possible, including international recognition" -- according to my interlocutors that is how these emissaries talked.

"If the 'restoration' of Georgian rule is a fantasy, accordingly it is essential to prevent Abkhazia from finally falling under Russia's power," the journalist Neal Ascherson writes in his article entitled "Abkhazia and the Caucasus: the West's Choice," which was posted on the Open Democracy website. "The West is facing an urgent need to arrange direct contacts with Abkhazia -- economic, social, and cultural contacts -- and to get access to Abkhaz ports. That will help Abkhazia emerge from isolation."

News from the Field

As for South Ossetia, in the opinion of Western analysts it has fewer grounds for independence. Small territory, small population. And geographic position: South Ossetia is a "dagger aimed at Tbilisi," an ideal launching point for an invasion of Georgia. But the main thing is that North Ossetia is located in the Russian Federation. In this connection (I am again speaking on the basis of the words of participants in events who hold high positions in the Ossetian elite) on numerous occasions the Ossetians have been told unofficially that if North Ossetia unites with South Ossetia and withdraws from Russia, such a united Ossetia could well expect international recognition.

This idea is not at all as utopian as it seems.

In Tskhinval today we observe a paradoxical situation. While South Ossetia, its people, and the whole elite are entirely dependent on our maintenance -- in the war-ravaged republic nothing is working, there are no domestic sources of income at all, and even its security depends entirely on Russia -- Moscow cannot resolve a single significant problem there. Not even monitor the expenditure of its own money or protect its own people. Moscow (and according to my information the Russian premier personally) was even unable to get Mr. Kokoyty to dismiss South Ossetian officials who were caught stealing and whose names were known. The story of former health minister Nuzgar Gabarayev, who distributed Russian financial aid, is illustrative. His name has already become part of the language in the republic. After Moscow protege Vadim Brovtsev sent Gabarayev into retirement, President Kokoyty appointed him his own state counselor. Evidently an indispensable personage. Even more illustrative is the story of General Barankevich, who Moscow wanted very much to appoint to be head of the MVK (interdepartmental commission on the restoration of South Ossetia), but COULD NOT. In other words, in this case terribly dependent and very proud Tskhinval, living entirely on our money, was actually able to influence our internal personnel policy. At the same time we cannot influence Tskhinval's. I would say that this is the apotheosis of impudence.

There is an analogous situation in Abkhazia, where Moscow is unsuccessfully trying to get the property rights of Russian citizens who were illegally deprived of their housing restored. In order to avoid misunderstanding, I will emphasize that we are not talking here about the property of Georgian refugees. Their problems should be the subject of bilateral talks between Georgia and Abkhazia. It is those for whom the Russian government is fighting, principally Russians, Armenians, Greeks, and the like. Many of them never left Abkhazia at all.

In these very days another scandal has flared up. Sukhum rejected a document sent to it by the MID RF (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) entitled "Concept of the Work of the Joint Russian-Abkhaz Commission on Questions of Restorin g the Property Rights of Citizens of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Abkhazia." We will recall that the decision to form such a commission was reached in Moscow after an article published in MK (Moskovskiy Komsomolets) made the problem a matter of public record. Before this, according to our information, the MID RF and the Russian Embassy in Sukhum had sent several diplomatic notes to the Abkhaz side (dated 25 November 2008, 19 March 2009, 22 April 2009, and 31 July 2009). President Medvedev and foreign minister Lavrov discussed the problem with the president of Abkhazia. Sergey Baghapsh pointed out to the chiefs of local administrations the necessity of "taking a hard line with seizures of property." However, nothing happened. Not one of the protagonists of our article has gotten his apartment back at this point.

At the same time strange articles are appearing in the Abkhaz press in which the plans to form the commission are called "anti-state and anti-Abkhaz," while giving people back property that was fraudulently taken from them is considered a threat to the Abkhaz people. The Abkhazes never tire of repeating that their foreign policy must be multi-vectored, that they are not some pathetic outpost of Russia, but a sovereign state with its own interests. Thus if there is a change in the West's position on the issue of Abkhaz independence, Moscow stands a good chance of being left empty-handed.

And if we close our eyes to the problems that already exist in relations with our Abkhaz and Ossetian partners, it is not impossible that some day museums "of the Russian occupation" will open on the central squares of Sukhum and Tskhinval.

God forbid, of course.

Post-gaming Hillary's visit to the Caucasus

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Nezavisimaya Gazeta
July 7, 2010
RELOAD FOR SOUTH CAUCASUS [Translation courtesy of JRL]
Washington had better bear in mind differences in psychological makeup and mentality of the local countries
An update on U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton's tour of the Caucasus
Author: Alexander Karavayev
EVERY COUNTRY OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS COUNTS ON WASHINGTON'S ATTENTION TO ITS PROBLEMS

U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton's visit to the Caucasus was supposed to have a sedative effect on the anxious local regimes. Pointed attention from a world power is always flattering. Discounting George W. Bush's visit to Tbilisi, there have been no visits from high functionaries of American administrations to the region in a decade. Every country of the South Caucasus pins high hopes on the United States and expects from it sympathy with regard to local problems and particularly in connection with territorial issues.

On a stay in Baku, Clinton spoke of Washington's willingness and firm resolve to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When in Yerevan, she guaranteed the hosts America's support in the same process. In Tbilisi at last, Clinton assured Georgia of America's solidarity with it. Her statement there became recognition of the status quo. The United States is Georgia's ally but not even the United States can change anything in the situation at this point or help Tbilisi reintegrate Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Putin's elite and Saakashvili's regime are diametrically polar in everything but the desire to set foreign policy for years to come. The only difference is that political life in Georgia is less rigid because the Georgian regime does permit existence of the opposition. It stands to reason to assume that Clinton brought a message to Saakashvili that Washington will welcome his efforts to normalize relations with Moscow. All things considered, however, making general statements is Tbilisi's only option. Moscow in its turn is convinced that it is better off without all and any contacts with Saakashvili.

The Karabakh conflict situation is certainly different. Where this problem is concerned, Russia and the United States are more or less neutral intermediaries. A broad assortment of options is available here - positive (encouragement of the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace) and negative alike.

In fact, two momentous events preceded Clinton's visit to the region. Presidents Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama, and Nicolas Sarkozy made a joint statement regarding Karabakh during the G8 summit. Fighting had occurred along the line-of-contact a week before that, right when president Serj Sargsjan and Ilham Aliyev were meeting in St.Petersburg. This clash might be interpreted as a hint at probability of military escalation in case peace efforts failed.

Granted that Azerbaijan and Armenia remain obstinately deaf to most arguments, there nevertheless exist principles of conflict resolution that are quite promising. The declaration made the three presidents plainly stated the necessity of the return of occupied Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh and interim status of the enclave with adequate guarantees of security and self-government. Establishment of a corridor connecting Armenia and Karabakh and return of all refugees to their homes are other priorities. That might necessitate a humanitarian-peacekeeping mission headed by OSCE Minsk Group countries. Last but not the least, foreign intermediaries believe that the future legal status of Karabakh ought to be decided at a referendum. Official Baku took the document with barely concealed enthusiasm even though its Russian translation somehow managed to miss the term "occupied".

Ethnic peace is difficult to establish - but possible all the same. Karabakh peace project will become an expensive political investment for Moscow and Washington and, also importantly, a serious financial strain on Baku. Infrastructure of the districts in question will have to be rebuilt from scratch. Foreign specialists will have to be found and brought in to consult in refugee-return matters and peaceful co-existence of two ethnic communities. Problems are a legion, but they must be addressed without delay...

Armenia fears that the suggested return of occupied territories adjacent to Karabakh will put Azerbaijan in a position to launch an outright offensive and try to reconquer Karabakh. It seems unlikely that Baku will want to disrupt peace process just when it has begun to bear results. Aliyev is not Saakashvili.

Whither the "Near Abroad"?

 [image source]

A couple of translations from today's Johnson's Russia List:

Rossiiskaya Gazeta
July 6, 2010
FAR AWAY AND CLOSE BY
CIS countries hold little interest for Russia
Author: Leonid Radzikhovsky
RUSSIA: CIS COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN OFF THE PRIORITY LIST FOR A LONG TIME NOW

When the recent Russian-Belarussian gas war broke out, pointless but no less ferocious for that, President Dmitry Medvedev was away in California prior to attending G8 and G20 meetings.

What is closer to Russia then - California or Belarus? And what is more important?  As a matter of fact, Russia removed CIS countries off its list of priorities long ago.

Trade with post-Soviet countries accounts for only 17% of the total volume of Russian trade with foreign countries. Major recipients of Russian export include (in the descending order) the Netherlands, Italy, Germany, Turkey, and finally Ukraine. Major suppliers to Russia are China, Germany, Japan, and finally Ukraine.

Neither does the Commonwealth offer anything sufficiently interesting to Russian investors. Economies of most post-Soviet countries are so weak and legislations so bizarre that Russian businesses know better then invest in neighbors. Ukraine is probably the only exception. Roman Abramovich and Alisher Usmanov did procure some assets in Donbass there; Ukraine's Antonov Company recently joined the Russian United Aircraft Corporation.

As for human contacts, approximately 20 million Russians visited distant foreign countries and about 13 million chose CIS countries in 2008 (no hard data on 2009 travel yet).

Where political relations are concerned, the overall situation is no better. Everyone remembers conflicts with Georgia (and not just verbal conflicts, unfortunately), Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine (under its previous president), and the permanent "brotherly" quarrel with Belarus. Compared to that, Russia's relations with major European countries, China, India, Japan, Middle East countries, African and Latin American states are but exemplary.

So is the relationship with the United States. There are no trade, political, or even information wars between our countries any more. Attitude toward the United States in Russia is changing for the better. Forty-six percent Russians did not see the United States as an adversary a year ago. These days, they already number 59%.

Conclusions:
1. Russia has many more common economic interests with the European Union, China, and America than with its CIS neighbors;
2. conflicts with CIS countries vastly outnumber quarrels with distant foreign countries.

What about the Commonwealth being a zone of Russia's special interests or zone of influence then? The impression is that the Kremlin means to establish Russian domination of the post-Soviet zone. Forget it. No post-Soviet country will put up with it anymore. Political establishments throughout the Commonwealth are as sensitive to Russian political dictatorship as the Russian establishment is to American or Chinese. Meaning that no dictatorship at all will be tolerated.

And what do we have then? The Commonwealth has nothing to offer Russia in terms of modernization, particularly technological, that official Moscow is focused on, these days. The Ferghana Valley is not the Silicon Alley after all.

Security of Russia requires at least relative political stability in Central Asia. Unfortunately, the latest developments in Kyrgyzstan make it plain that Russian clout with this region, Russia's ability to exert influence with it, is quite restricted, not to say non-existent. God bless the Kremlin for having had the
sense not to send Russian paratroops to rioting Kyrgyzstan. And not to try to tame another regime that would have cost it dearly without giving anything worthwhile in return.

Russia lacks the resources (financial, moral, or physical) for the so called "strong" policy in the region. It follows that it had better abandon its penchant for shouldering all of the responsibility for Central Asia and start involving other
countries. After all, all of the international community ought to be interested in a stable Central Asia. Once again, the recent events in Kyrgyzstan are proof that nobody in the world is really eager to become involved.

Last but not the least, Moscow should finally do something about the endless saga of the so called Russian-Belarussian union.

The Russian-Belarussian union is not a harmless myth. This concept (for lack of a better term) is a source of endless conflicts. Were it not for this myth, it would never have occurred even to Minsk to demand all these colossal preferences and unprecedented discounts from Moscow. Time to dispel this myth and shut down this stillborn project. Invented by Boris Yeltsin's PR specialists in 1996, it has made no progress at all in all these years. What it keeps fomenting are scandals and quarrels. Were it not for the myth itself, there would have been no high hopes and expectations that are so frequently frustrated. This lie about a union harms both countries. Time to say that there is no Russian-Belarussian union and there has never been any.

Labor immigration is Russia's major link with CIS countries. The need for cheap labor will keep growing, and Central Asia remains the essentially inexhaustible source of menial workers. This is what Russia ought to focus on. It ought to perfect immigration legislation and so on - but this is Russia's domestic affair that has nothing at all to do with influence with Central Asian countries.

It all comes down to a choice, really. When the concept of "relations of priority" with CIS countries collides with reality, something ought to be done. Either concept amended, or reality changed. What's your pleasure?

___________________________________________________

Kommersant
July 6, 2010
RELOAD BYPASSING RUSSIA
Official Washington is rebuilding its clout with Ukraine and republics of the Caucasus
Author: Alexander Gabuyev, Georgy Dvali, Rafael Mustafayev, Ike Dzhanpoladjan
WASHINGTON DISAGREES WITH THE CONCEPT THAT REGARDS UKRAINE AND THE CAUCASUS AS A ZONE OF MOSCOW'S EXCLUSIVE INTERESTS

U.S. State Secretary Hillary Clinton completed her tour of Ukraine, Poland, and three countries of the Caucasus. The trip was intended to bolster America's clout with these countries and facilitate Nabucco, project of a gas pipeline to Europe bypassing Russia. Reload or no reload, Clinton's tour plainly shows that the United States denies Russia the right to regard Ukraine and republics of the Caucasus as a zone of its special, much less exclusive interests.

Clinton visited Ukraine, Poland, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia - just like Vice President Joe Biden did a year ago. Biden visited Ukraine and Georgia right in the wake of his patron Barack Obama's triumphant visit to the capital of Russia. It was Washington's way of telling Moscow that the United States stands by its allies regardless of what might be happening in and with the American-Russian relations.

It is fair to add that America's positions in the region did weaken in the last twelve months. New President of Ukraine Victor Yanukovich began his term of office with the permission to Russia to leave its Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea after 2017. Not a single senior functionary of the U.S. Administration visited Ukraine yet (before Clinton). As for Poland, it is still seething at Obama for abandonment of his predecessor's plans to develop the third position area in this country (and in the Czech Republic). Where countries of the Caucasus are concerned, it was Clinton's first visit there in the capacity of the state secretary. Moreover, the United States does not even have its ambassador in Azerbaijan. Its inability to choose an adequate candidate remains a source of quiet resentment for official Baku.

That Clinton could not hope to solve or even address all problems in the course of so brief a visit goes without saying. Assistant Secretary Philip Gordon explained that Clinton's tour was supposed to demonstrate that the United States has no intention to abandon its own interests in the region for the sake of betterment of the relations with Moscow. In fact, Clinton's brief stay in Kiev confirmed it. She discussed with Yanukovich advancement of the relations between Ukraine and the Western community and assured him that NATO was always there, waiting for him to change his mind perhaps and apply for membership after all.

The day Clinton deplaned in Kiev, the International Monetary Fund declared readiness to loan Ukraine $14.9 billion. Foreign Minister Konstantin Grischenko in the meantime announced that Clinton and he discussed "diversification of nuclear fuel suppliers". Contract with Russia's TVEL signed last month all but made the Russians monopolists in the Ukrainian market of nuclear fuel - or so the Russians thought. It seems now that Westinghouse might elbow its way in, too.

Clinton visited Azerbaijan and Armenia within a single day, Sunday. She met with presidents Ilham Aliyev and Serj Sargsjan as well as with her opposite numbers Elmar Mamedjarov and Edward Nalbandjan. The visitor spoke, choosing her words carefully, of the necessity to settle the matter of Karabakh on the basis of the
Madrid Principles formulated by the OSCE Minsk Group. Considering seriousness of the problem, it is unlikely that Clinton expected her brief speech to have any effect on Karabakh conflict resolution process.

In any event, she had other things to discuss with the hosts, things of more immediate interest to the United States. With Sargsjan, she discussed normalization of the relations with Turkey and called for the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border the sooner the better. In Azerbaijan, the discourse was centered around energy cooperation. Neither Clinton nor Azerbaijani functionaries offered comment afterwards, but observers assumed that they had been discussing Nabucco, the international project halted due to the discord between Baku and Ankara over gas transit. In fact, Aliyev put off his planned visit to Turkey on two occasions already.

Georgia was the last stop on Clinton's route. The visiting U.S. functionary called Abkhazia and South Ossetia "occupied by Russia" to President Mikhail Saakashvili's vast relief. Her meeting with Saakashvili over, Clinton met with leaders of the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats. The former are represented in the parliament of Georgia. Leader of the latter Irakly Alasania had polled almost 20% in the race for mayor of Tbilisi not long ago. Official Washington regards Alasania as a promising politician in the light of the presidential election scheduled to take place in Georgia in 2013. Also importantly, Alasania served as representative of Georgia to the UN in the past. He has extensive contacts within the American establishment.

Alasania's aide Aleksy Petriashvili said that his patron and Clinton discussed politics - presidential election, undesirability of amendment of the Constitution or transformation of Georgia into a parliamentary republic where Saakashvili will remain essentially the ruler in the premier's capacity.

The Caucasus in 1842

Caucasus1842, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

This is the latest in an ongoing series of Caucasus maps (note that some other maps will probably also be caught by the "Maps" label, but most are from this endlessly interesting part of the world).

Map of 1993 fighting in Georgia

[image source]

I'm not sure how accurate this map is (I found it on Wikipedia, a website which is often a good reminder that you get what you pay for), but it's interesting and I decided to post it in keeping with my practice of posting maps, especially maps of the Caucasus. Full-sized version can be found here.

Another old Caucasus map

Check out this very high-res (but unfortunately in eight parts) map of the Caucasus from sometime in the 19th Century or perhaps earlier.

The Caucasus in 1927 - "New Political Boundaries"

Caucasus 1927, full-sized version available here.

More fun with maps

Regular readers will recall my summertime practice of scanning in and posting maps, mostly of the Caucasus and various regions thereof - see the photoset here and previous map-themed posts here.

Recently I've been taking advantage of London's status as the center of the world's antique maps trade and have been checking out some of the offerings. The two maps below are not exactly antique - they are from Harmsworth's Atlas, n.d. but variously dated as 1919-1923 - but they are pretty interesting. The first appears to show the brief period after WWI during which the states of the South Caucasus were independent. The second shows that Romania within its current borders (much less its interwar borders) is a relatively recent phenomenon and that when it comes to the notion of redrawing borders in that part of the world, just about any group can select a long-ago date to use as a reference point that would give it more than what it has today.

Caucasia, view full-sized version here.

Romania Historical, view full-sized version here.

South Ossetian Shakeup?

«Не место этому президенту в Южной Осетии» // Бывший секретарь совбеза республики о конфликте с Эдуардом Кокойты Герой войны в Южной Осетии, бывший секретарь совбеза республики АНАТОЛИЙ БАРАНКЕВИЧ рассказал спецкору “Ъ” ОЛЬГЕ АЛЛЕНОВОЙ о причинах своего увольнения, конфликте с президентом Кокойты, а также о кадровой и экономической политике Цхинвала. открыть материал ...

Kommersant has run a lengthy interview with former Russian army general and former South Ossetian de facto Minister of Defense which puts the region's president, former wrestling champion and phys. ed. teacher Eduard Kokoity, in a rather unflattering light.

General Anatoly Barankevich is one of the examples cited in recent years by Western observers in order to highlight the fact that South Ossetian secessionism at some point shifted from "self-determination" to a situation where the determination of key personnel appointments took place in Moscow. There were other former (or seconded) Russian officers serving in the territory's de facto government, but he was among the most prominent. And now he has come out with an interview mocking Kokoity's flight from Tskhinvali during the five-day war and relating tales of a reconstruction effort paralyzed by corruption.

One of the more damning excerpts reads as follows (my translation, hopefully Kommersant will put this on their English-language website but they haven't done so yet) - Barankevich is relating a scene he observed at a police station in Dzhava on August 10th:

And then I saw the following picture: a Georgian prisoner with his hands tied and shirt off, his hands had already gone blue, you couldn't see his eyes, he couldn't even cry, and the [South Ossetian] militants [бойцы, apparently police officers - trans.] were beating him. I went over to them and said, "What are you doing? You are mountain men [горцы - implying, apparently, that they should hew to some code of honor - trans.]. You can't beat a prisoner, his hands are tied." They looked embarrassed and said, "Sorry, comrade General."

I told them to go get someone from the KGB. To take the Georgian away. Right away they untied his hands. And then the president showed up. He saw me, saw the prisoner and understood what was going on. And the first thing he did was run up to the prisoner and start kicking him. It turned my stomach. The guys from the police looked at the ground, they were ashamed.

Without wanting to engage in too much Kremlinological tea-leaf-reading, one wonders what the publication of this interview means, given that it was published in a newspaper owned by Alisher Usmanov, the Kremlin-friendly oligarch and debt collector for Gazprom who - no doubt out of the goodness of his heart, and certainly not to win a natural resource tender - ponied up a billion rubles in aid for the post-war rebuilding effort in South Ossetia in September.

I somehow doubt that Eduard Kokoity is feeling comfortable in his presidential chair.

More Maps of Georgia

A couple more maps that I had the chance to scan in before leaving DC last week. Complaints about the white line through the larger images can be directed to the folks at A.U.'s library, although since they make an otherwise nice scanner fairly freely accessible I didn't have the heart to complain. The first is a map of tourist routes through Georgia which dates from 1966:

Georgia - Tourism Map 1966 - Cover, full-size image available here.

Georgia - Tourism Map 1966, full-size image available here.

The second is a city map of Tbilisi with a nifty folding layout, printed (according to the guy who sold it to me in Tbilisi) for the city's 1500th anniversary celebration in 1958; I am not sure about the "800" imprinted on the cover:

Tbilisi - 1958 Street Map Cover, full-size image available here.

Tbilisi - 1958 Street Map, full-size image available here.

This and all previous map-related posts can be seen on a single page here, or all of the map images I've uploaded can be viewed on Flickr here.

More maps of the Caucasus

A friend of mine who's based in Tbilisi has emailed me these four maps: three interesting German maps of the changing political geography of the Caucasus (sorry, I don't know the source or copyright holder), and a fourth one (also quite interesting in its own way) which goes more toward the present-day situation in a small part of the region.

Histrorical Georgia 1774-1878, full-size version available here.

Histrorical Georgia 1917-1936, full-size version available here.

Histrorical Georgia 1936 - 1959, full-size version available here.

South Ossetia Areas of Control (geor-SO), full-size version available here.
Areas controlled by South Ossetian de facto authorities in red, areas controlled by Georgia in blue.
Here's one good backgrounder on the conflict, and here's another fairly interesting brief.

More maps of the Caucasus, as well as my general disclaimer about how, while I think the old maps are fascinating, I'm also convinced they are a fairly unhelpful lens through which to view the resolution of current territorial conflicts, can be seen here.

Home

[image source]

Now that everyone seems to be talking about an impending war over Abkhazia, in spite of Germany's best efforts (see the latest news here), I've decided to finally translate this post from a few months ago by LiveJournal blogger Cyxymu (perhaps my favorite blogger from the Caucasus), a Georgian who spent his childhood in Abkhazia but now lives in Tbilisi, having become an "internally displaced person" (IDP) during the hostilities in the early 1990s.

Why am I translating this now? For one thing, it's good to remember the human side of the conflict at times like this, but I had a more selfish reason for translating this post - the parts which describe pre-war bliss sort of called to my mind my childhood comfort level visiting my grandparents in Peoria and Madison combined with my in-laws' house in Floresti, Moldova (same corrugated roof, same clattering downspouts, same type of cellar...), where I hope to be spending some time next month.

And perhaps the most selfish reason for undertaking the task of translating this lyrical post rather than rooting around the internet for the most up-to-the minute speculations and accusations is that I just don't have time to do a proper roundup of all the analysis and pseudo-analysis that's circulating at the moment about what might actually happen in the region. Hopefully it will stay at the usual level of saber-rattling.

Anyway, here is cyxymu's post, titled "home":

Last night I dreamed about my grandfather's house. I hadn't dreamed about it in a long time, and it was amazing to find myself back in my childhood.

Most of the time I spent in Sukhumi I lived in that house, I knew all of its nooks and crannies, had secret hiding places and places to be alone and dream...

I dreamed that I was climbing the stairs to the attic, and it was so nice to listen to the rain fall up there. My brother and I went up there a lot and listened to thunderstorms, you could hear the branches banging against the corrugated roof, the rain pounding the tile and flowing down the gutter.

I also liked to hide in the garage, my brother and I had our headquarters there, the garage had a metal roof and the rain would pound on it really hard...

Sometimes when the Besletka [river] would rise during a rainstorm, it would start to flood. The water would pour into the cellar, and then we had to save our supplies) heroism was rewarded with the jam that grandmother made.

In the cellar we had hiding places where we hid all sorts of things, even just before we left, we hid an optical sight that I had found that very day. In back of the house was a chicken coop, and a rooster woke us up every morning as he summoned the sun to rise. Sometimes rats would get into the chicken coop, and I would hunt them with a small-caliber Geco. That's what I wanted the sight for.

In the garden grew everything necessary for human life: two types of pears, apples (champagne and winter), persimmons, green springtime plums [ткемали], plums, feijoa, medlar, figs and two kinds of cherries. I planted the peaches with my own hands. And tomatoes, cucumbers, raspberries, strawberries (though the strawberries often went bad, since we had very damp earth). The cucumbers liked to climb up on the raspberries, and we sometimes missed a cucumber, since we couldn't always see them in the greenery, and it would grow into a big, yellow cucumber. Then grandpa would say, "Well, it's OK, we'll use it for seeds next year."

Every spring he would start the seeds first in cans, then he would replant them into wooden crates, and only then into glass hot-houses. And when the tomatoes grew tall, grandpa and I strung nets over them, so that the pears wouldn't fall on the tomatoes when they ripened.

During [the war], when an Abkhazian shell hit next door, a bit of shrapnel took down a branch of the champagne apple tree as wide as your arm, some of the other trees lost limbs also, and I kept saying that it was the trees that protected us...

Shrapnel chopped up the whole house then, pieces flew in the window of the room where grandpa and grandma slept, miraculously not touching them, lots of bits penetrated the walls, tore the roof apart, knocked out all the windows in the house... But we didn't go move into an Abkhazian's house, instead we put in new glass and fixed the roof (patched the holes). Thinking ahead, we stuck crosses of white paper tape on the windows...

My heart aches for that house more than any other, in spite of the fact that we had nicer houses and apartments in Sukhumi. My heart stayed behind in that house.

And more than anything I can't forgive myself for leaving behind my grandpa and grandma - when I took my parents out of Sukhumi, I was hoping to return in a couple of days.

And no one from my family was able to make it to Sukhumi for my grandpa and grandma's funerals. We simply weren't allowed to return.

Even more Caucasus maps

I found one last book with scan-worthy inlaid maps in my attic archives - Kavkazskii Krai - Putevoditel' (Caucasus Territory - Guidebook) by Sergei Anisimov, from 1928. The book's largest and perhaps most spectacular map - a map of Caucasus tourism routes - is something I'm still trying to stitch together from four digital files, since the original was too big to scan in one piece, even on a large flatbed scanner. But the ones which scanned in easily are still quite lovely and - as with many artifacts of the Caucasus - susceptible to being invested with all kinds of meaning.

Anisimov - Kavkazskii Krai - Cover

The coolest of the maps I was able to scan in would have to be this map of Caucasus transit routes, which bristles with all kinds of quaint station-names, including Tikhoretskaya, a station made famous as the destination of the train in the beautiful and haunting song sung variously by Alla Pugacheva in the classic movie "Irony of Fate" (Ironiia Sud'by) (a subtitled video of the song from the movie, with Barbara Bryl'ska lip-synching to Pugacheva's singing, is at 7:45 of this clip (part of a medley of songs from the movie, the second part of which is here) and a clip of just the song, without subtitles, is here) and by Vladimir Vysotsky.

Kavkazskii Krai - Transit Routes, full-size version here.

[update July 15]

Another interesting thing about this map is that it shows the state of railways in Abkhazia in the 1920s - when there wasn't a single line in the region. Wikipedia has more on the history of Abkhazian rail transport. The rail line through the region has of course has cropped up as a relevant point in the conflict resolution talks (and as the subject of a few interesting online photo essays documenting the crumbling infrastructure) a number of times over the years and has more recently become a convenient excuse for Russia to increase its troop presence in the region.

[/update]

Also of interest is this map of the Caucasus' always controversial ethnography. This 1928 snapshot is the sort of thing that proponents of secession in Abkhazia and South Ossetia like to roll out to verify (perhaps not without justification) that "once upon a time, these lands were ours." Often this is accompanied by the tongue-twisting - and often mind-bendingly employed - word "autochthonous."

Kavkazskii Krai - Ethnographic Map, full-size version here.

This map of the Caucasus' geological zones is perhaps interesting in its own right, but I found the most interesting aspect of it to be that it measures longitude in degrees from Pulkovo.

Kavkazskii Krai - Geological Map, full-size version here.

And I'm including this map of Tbilisi Tiflis mainly because it is a cool-looking, old-timey map, which is ultimately the spirit that motivates much of my map-scanning, although I am sure one could do an interesting analysis of the street names - which ones had already been changed by the Soviets by the late 1920s, which ones would later be changed, etc.

Kavkazskii Krai - Tiflis Map, full-size version here.

See all of the maps I've posted here.

Black Sea Coast of the Caucasus

This map took much longer than I'd care to admit to scan in, since it had to be scanned in bits and then digitally assembled - and I don't really have the proper software for that, so sadly I had to use the very basic MS Paint. I might have given up if the thing wasn't so visually spectacular. It dates from 1970 and has thumbnail photos and brief summaries of tourist attractions on the back.

Through sometimes painful experience, I've concluded that Flickr is a better photo host than Blogger, so I've uploaded the images there - if you want to see larger-sized versions, click on the picture or the link underneath it and then once you have been taken to Flickr, look for the "all sizes" icon above the photo. I've also added a link to the very largest version of each image in the captions below.

BlackSeaCoastMap, originally uploaded by lyndonk2; full-size version here.

BlackSeaCoastMap-Back, originally uploaded by lyndonk2; full-size version here.

More on Abkhazia

I'm not in a position to try to follow the breaking aspects of the story and provide updates on the escalation or de-escalation of tensions, various visits to the region by foreign dignitaries, etc., but I did want to post a few more maps as well as point out that the International Crisis Group has just issued a report on the situation in Abkhazia. I haven't read it yet, but if it's anything like their past reports on the conflict it will be interesting and useful. I normally skim over the "recommendations" portions of their reports and head to the meatier narrative portions, which contain insights from interviews conducted by ICG which you might not see elsewhere.

As for the maps, I've scanned them in from a book I recently acquired, Konflikty v Abkhazii i IUzhnoi Osetii: Dokumenty 1989-2006 gg. I was expecting a dry compilation of documents and perhaps some black-and-white maps - imagine my surprise when the book arrived with two inlaid full-color maps and maps on each of the endpapers.

The book is published in Moscow and at least one of the maps appears to have been authored by a relative of Abkhazia's de facto leader Sergei Bagapsh, so it is quite possible that the maps are designed to make subtle and perhaps deceptive political points (this is also suggested by the somewhat tendentious title of the second map - rough translations of the map titles appear as captions below).

Nevertheless, they are so well-designed that I couldn't resist posting them (though I'll be happy to take them down if the copyright holders object!), and I would imagine that at least the ones based on 1989 figures are reliable. The map titled "peacekeeper deployment" also contains ethnic breakdown figures, but they are based on the questionable 2002 census figures arrived at by the de facto Abkhazian authorities.

Click on the images to expand them:

Ethnic minorities in Georgia (based on the 1989 census)

Ethnic minorities within (the internationally recognized borders of) Georgia
(based on 2002 figures)

Abkhazia: an ethnic map based on the 1989 census

Republic of Abkhazia and peacekeeper deployment