Using lists to think about the bilateral relationship under BHO

Obama's honeymoon period appears to be lending itself to lists in the minds of analysts - here's a list-driven piece by Steve Biegun, the McCain campaign's Russia guy and someone with a Russia background including studying the language in college, working there for the IRI in the early 1990s and serving on the Board of Directors of Ford, a company which has enjoyed a great deal of success in Russia.

And the article below by Nikolai Zlobin (the translation, which is not perfect, is from today's JRL - the original Russian is here), which is as insightful as his analyses of the bilateral relationship usually are, also runs down a list.

Vedomosti
January 28, 2009
US-RUSSIA: SIX BARRIERS
NIKOLAI ZLOBIN ON BARRIERS AND ILLUSIONS IN THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Discussions continue in Moscow on how Barack Obama's election
the US President will change everything in the Russian-American
relations now. Most of these discussions are based on the
following thesis: friction in the bilateral relations was fomented
by mistakes of George W. Bush's policy, vexation of Washington
with the growth of Moscow's clout with the world and its efforts
to check this growth, installation of a ring of hostile states
along the Russian perimeter, neglect of Russian interests, and so
on. More often than not the discussions end in the conclusion that
it is up to Washington now to mend its ways and remedy the
situation. I fear that this approach is erroneous. Moreover, it
constitutes a dangerous self-deception, one fraught with new
disappointments and conflicts.

Bush's policy was anything but anti-Russian. In fact, he was
probably the most pro-Russian president one could wish for. His
only fault in the relations with Russia was that he paid it
considerably less attention that Moscow would have preferred. Even
so, the US establishment kept criticizing Bush for what it thought
was pampering of Russia and for attaching what it thought was too
much importance to it.

As a matter of fact, all difficulties in the bilateral
relations stem from their own unbelievably asymmetric nature.
America is of considerably more importance to Russia than Russia
is to America - both politically and economically.

This asymmetry keeps growing. On the one hand, Russia
accounts for under 1% of the US foreign trade turnover and
therefore cannot count on being seen by the new US Administration
as a critical partner in the effort to survive the crisis. On the
other, Washington believes that all this alleged growth of
Russia's clout with the world is something of a myth really,
something cultivated in Russia itself and needed for exceptionally
domestic purposes. Neither in the shooting war with Georgia nor in
the gas conflict with Ukraine later on did Russia secure any
support abroad, within the international community or even within
the Commonwealth. No state lacking allies and partners may aspire
to any growth of its international influence and clout.

This growing asymmetry offers persuades me that Obama will
focus on Russia any more attention than his predecessor did.
Paying it lip service is more likely. That's fact number one.

Number two. The US establishment is more or less uniformly
anti-Russian. On the one hand, American elites understand that
Russia is not an adversary they should lose any sleep over or
waste time and effort to develop defense from. On the other, they
know that Russia being what it is cannot really hope to be an ally
or friend of America so that there is no overwhelming need to go
out of their way to improve relations with it. Moscow's opinion
will carry considerably less weight for Obama than opinions of
Berlin, Paris, or even Warsaw. Political values of Russia will
keep putting more and more distance between it and America with
Europe. These latter have no leverage with Moscow and perceive no
practical necessity to be seeking any. Mutual distrust will keep
growing. Claims that Washington was the puppet-master that
engineered the gas conflict with Ukraine recently only served to
convince the US establishment that the Russian authorities were
quite paranoidal in their attitude toward the United States. The
situation being what it is, trust Obama not to promote a policy
with regard to Russia that will clash with the general disposition
Washington feels toward Moscow.

Number three. The United States honestly does not think that
the responsibility for the deteriorating relations with Russia
rests with it. It will rather accept a diametric assumption. The
list of Washington's complaints against Russia is longer than
Moscow's against the United States. The widespread opinion in
Washington is that Bush's Russian policy - fraught with numerous
mistakes as it was - was nevertheless quite rational. Moreover, it
is not as if Washington had any bright ideas on how to change this
policy. The impression is that neither can Moscow boast of any
such ideas or political will to promote them.

Number four. Obama the politician is absolutely different
from Bush. On the one hand, Obama is a typical specimen of the
Chicago political machine, one known for coldly rational and
sometimes even purely administrative approach to politics. On the
other, Obama is more self-assured and self-sufficient that his
predecessor could even hope to be. Unlike Bush's, his foreign
policy will never be based on any psychological stuff like
sympathies or antipathies.

Number five. General public in the United States does not
care about improvement of relations with Russia. No forces
interested in better relations with Moscow are to be found among
US businesses, civil society, academic circles, journalist
community, or the military. And by the way, neither has Russia
lifted a finger to change this state of affairs. As a result,
Russia is absent from the US market of lobbying and it is this
market exactly that defines priorities of the new US
Administration to a considerable extent. And since improvement of
relations with Moscow is not even regarded by Washington as a
priority, how can Russia expect Obama to push other matters aside
in order to concentrate on Moscow and relations with it? General
public in Russia itself is not exactly hot on betterment of
relations with America. It is common knowledge meanwhile that this
situation is a result of a deliberately promoted policy. In a
word, it only serves to convince Washington not to waste its time
on Russia.

Number six. There is no point in expecting a serious revision
of America's relations with individual foreign states prior to a
revision by the new US Administration of the very basis of
American foreign policy. And, also importantly, without clear
signals and practical steps on the part of the mentioned
individual foreign states. Signals from Moscow never convinced
Washington that Russia was ready to meet it halfway.

That there are spheres and areas where Russia and the United
States cannot help cooperating goes without saying: from nuclear
arms and technologies control to international security and war on
terrorism, from ecology and space exploration to humanitarian
projects and Afghanistan. It stands to reason to expect
effectiveness of the American-Russian cooperation in these areas
to be higher now with Obama in the Oval Study. Actually, Obama
himself promised it in the inauguration speech. In any event,
belief that improvement of the bilateral relations is Washington's
singular task now and that Obama is itching to become friends with
Moscow is a dangerous delusion.

Time to repair the relationship?

One of Fred Kaplan's thoughtful "six priorities for President Obama" (headlined "A Foreign Policy Repair Manual") is this:

Normalize relations with Russia. This may sound cold, but Russia is too important—on energy, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, peace in the Middle East, nearly everything—for our relations to get warped in a new Cold War over the integrity of South Ossetia.

Moscow's aggression should not be blithely tolerated, but it's absurd to respond by, say, admitting Georgia into NATO. First, members are required to have recognized borders, which Georgia lacks. Second, do you—do any Americans—really want to go to war for Tbilisi? (This is what security alliances are all about.) Impose economic and diplomatic pressure. But also assure the Russians that we have no intention of further NATO expansion. Tell them we will proceed to deploy missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland if the system works (a nudge-and-wink signal that we probably will not proceed after all). This is not "appeasement," since we have—or should have—no interest in behaving otherwise.

Resume strategic arms talks, and demand in return that Moscow reaffirm the Reagan-era treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which Vladimir Putin has been threatening to abrogate. Putin has been riding high these past few years on the vast revenues brought in by high oil prices; the recent plunge and the crash of his stock market might make him more pliant. In short, the time is ripe for a policy of applying pressure where our differences matter and giving way where they don't.

All sounds OK to me.

[Update Nov 7]

Here's a link to Sestanovich's recent Foreign Affairs article - sure to be widely read among people trying to understand trends in the bilateral relationship - which was mentioned in the comments.

And today's Moscow Times had pieces from two Russian politicians, both titled "Getting Along with Obama." Neither of them seemed particularly optimistic.

Liberal ex-Duma Deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov:

Of course, Obama inherited a slew of thorny problems on the foreign policy front -- above all, a very unstable Iraq and a worsening situation in Afghanistan. But overall, we can expect a general improvement in the U.S. position and a global resurgence of trust in Washington -- with one large exception: Russia.

Russia is the one country with which improved relations are unlikely. Obama's administration will have to face the same divisive issues that confronted President George W. Bush. First, Obama has not definitively rejected U.S. plans to deploy elements of a missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Second, he supports the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the expansion of NATO. Third, Obama's position on Georgia differs little from his rival John McCain's, and he will look just as unfavorably at any attempts by Moscow to increase its influence in the former Soviet republics. Fourth, energy resources and pipelines remain a source of constant rivalry as the United States seeks to circumvent Russia by sponsoring alternative oil and gas delivery routes from the Caucasus and Central Asia to the West. Finally, it is safe to say the hawkish advisers in Obama's campaign team -- namely, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke and former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski -- probably didn't paint Russia in the most positive terms.

I continue to find it odd but not surprising to see Obama's list of foreign policy advisers - which was as large as 300 people at one point - so frequently cherry-picked to highlight those individuals who are seen as hostile toward Russia.

Federation Council "Senator" Mikhail Margelov strikes a slightly more optimistic (albeit cautiously so) note:

As for Russia, it is too early to speak of any warming of relations between our two countries under the Obama administration. Judging from his advisers, Obama will surely support the U.S. missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic — particularly after President Dmitry Medvedev's state-of-the-nation address on Wednesday, in which he promised to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. Thus, it is far from certain that Russia and the United States will become closer partners under an Obama administration.

Most likely, both sides will be content to continue their ongoing selective cooperation on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the fight against international terrorism. But the same old disagreements will remain over other former Soviet republics, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Kosovo, Iran, Iraq and over differing world views.

At the same time, Medvedev said during his address that Russia is not infected with anti-Americanism and does not want a confrontation with the United States. This was underscored when Medvedev emphasized the importance of modernizing Russia, which he said must include fundamental democratic changes. Tensions with the United States and its allies would heavily undermine the country's democratic development.

Confrontation with Russia is clearly not in the interests of the United States either. Obama's administration will not be conducting "cowboy diplomacy" as his predecessors did. Moreover, Obama understands that without Russia it would be difficult to resolve many global problems affecting key U.S. interests. There are certainly people in Obama's inner circle who are not favorably disposed toward Russia, but if they want to bolster U.S. interests and security, they will be forced to cooperate with Russia. The two countries can work together without having to be the best of friends.

And there are concrete reasons why Russia and the United States need to cooperate. The world is becoming more chaotic, and this is dangerous because we are armed to the teeth. Existing measures for ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear and conventional armaments are ineffective. International institutions created under Cold War conditions are in crisis. The number and scale of conflicts is increasing around the world, including ethnic and religious clashes. Terrorism and poverty remain global powder kegs. State sovereignty gives rise to state egoism. The world community has lost its sense of solidarity and a common conception of good and evil. Foreign policy of nations increasingly favor selfish interests over universal values.

Such a world needs change. But without close cooperation between the leading powers — including the United States and Russia — those changes will not take place.