Opening the U.S. Embassy in Chisinau, April 1992

The U.S. Embassy in Moldova, located in a historic building at 103 Mateevici St. in Chisinau

[image source]

Some of the cables that I received in response to my FOIA request for cables dealing with the post-Soviet conflicts highlight other interesting events from the time of the Soviet breakup.  This was a time when the U.S. had to open a whole bunch of new embassies, including one in the newly independent Republic of Moldova.  The report on the opening of the Embassy in Chisinau included a discussion of the situation in Transdniester and its impact on the Moldovan government:

The deterioration of the situation in the Trans-Dniester is occupying almost all the time of this very small, neophyte government.  While Moldovan officials have the understandable tendency to inflate the importance of their own republic, Embassy Chisinau finds many of their concerns well-founded.

Embassy Chisinau Opens: Moldovan Officials Discuss Trans-Dniester Crisis (March 26, 1992)


And what sort of environment would U.S. diplomats posted to Chisinau find in the capital of newly independent Moldova? This "Preliminary Post Report" from April 13 details a bygone era of wine for 80 rubles a bottle (at an exchange rate of 125 rubles to the dollar) and when travelers using Air Moldova had to be reassured that the airline "to date has a worse reputation than it actually deserves. The stories of standing passengers, four-legged passengers and other non-FAA approved behavior have so far not been witnessed on Air Moldova."

Preliminary Post Report for Chisinau (April 13, 1992)

Conflict Cables: Moldova-Transdniester Nov-Dec 1991

Mircea Snegur votes for himself - Dec. 8, 1991

As the Soviet Union formally fell apart, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur had his leadership validated an uncontested election in December 1991.  It was an eventful month, with the election preceded by independence referendums in Transdniester and Gagauzia on December 1 and followed by renewed violence in Transdniester and then Moldova's signing of the Alma-Ata Protocols under which it joined the Commonwealth of Independent States.  This post summarizes seven newly State Department cables newly declassified and released through the FOIA process, which I have made available on Scribd - read more about the Conflict Cables series here.

The stage is set by a November 5 cable from U.S. Embassy Moscow assessing the "Moldovan Political Scene as Foreign Minister Tiu Visits U.S.," in which the "principal political issue in Moldova" was described as "whether to unify with Romania or set out on the path of full independence." 

On December 8th, as three men signed away the USSR in a forest outside of Minsk, Moldova held elections.  Embassy Moscow had sent officials to observe, and they sent a brief cable on the 9th reporting Snegur's unsurprising victory which concluded with the following comment:

The vote appeared to be more a mandate for Moldovan independence and national unity than a reflection of support for Snegur as an individual.  While many Moldovan officials encountered had high expectations that Snegur would somehow be able to solve the separatist problem once he had a popular mandate, the task looks to be a hard one.  Trans-Dniester and Gagauz officials appear remarkably rigid, and, according to Moldovan government officials, the Trans-Dniester "government" is backed by Soviet military arms provided by forces based in Tiraspol.

A more detailed report on the elections, including difficulties faced by voters in Transdniester, followed several days later:
Moldovan Elections: Snegur Wins While Separatist Regions Obstruct Voting Process (Dec. 12, 1991)

This cable reported on the Embassy observers' visits to Comrat and to Tiraspol, where they learned about "the difficulties and discrimination faced by [ethnic] Moldovans in everyday life in the Trans-Dniester," and noted the following:

In both the Gagauz and Trans-Dniester regions, poloffs heard repeated claims of fraud during the previous week's [December 1] independence referendums and presidential elections.  There were numerous reports of attempts to force people to vote, including the use of armed militia who attempted to force villagers into mobile "bus polls" which went from village to village.  Some said they were threatened with loss of jobs if they did not vote.

Shortly after the elections, a December 13 cable summarized increasing Moldovan concern with alleged Soviet military support for the secessionists in Transdniester, including charges that Soviet troops were participating directly in the conflict, that military equipment being withdrawn from Eastern Europe was being diverted to the region, and in general that the secessionists were "receiving material and political support from mainline Soviet military forces...with the knowledge and perhaps approval of military and political leaders in Moscow."

The December 13 cable also described Moldovan allegations that Moscow was also already beginning to deploy its potent media weapon:

Moldovan officials also claim to see a pattern of bias in official statements and media reporting from Moscow which focuses excessively on Moldovan ethnic and economic problems.  They contend this is an attempt to portray Moldova as a hotbed of ethnic strife with massive economic problems; such an image could later be used to justify interference in Moldova under the guise of protecting ethnic Russians or preventing economic chaos.  On December 2, the presidium of the Moldovan Parliament issued an official statement charging Moscow-based news organizations with a prejudiced attitude toward Moldova.  One Moldovan official cited a November 30 TASS report of electrical shortages in Moldova as an example of inaccurate reporting.  The report claimed Moldova was short of fuel for electrical generation and was therefore alloting only four hours per day of electricity to residences.  The official said this was completely false; during their December 6-9 visit poloffs observed no unusual electricity problems and heard no one mention any such problems.

A "late development" - renewed violence on Dec. 13 in the city of Dubossary - was described in the last paragraph of the cable, including details about Transdniestrian authorities' accusations that the fighting was provoked by the Moldovan Popular Front and involved "Romanian weapons."

A subsequent cable on December 17th went into more detail about the flare-up in Dubossary and related Chisinau's side of the story - that "the fighting was an intentional provocation by the Trans-Dniester leadership designed to sabotage impending Russian recognition of Moldovan independence." The diplomats in Moscow, however, concluded that the violence so soon after elections in both Transdniester and right-bank Moldova "may also have been the result of a new assertiveness on the part of the leaderships of both areas, anxious to exercise their new mandate." Shying away from assigning blame, the cable concludes with the possibility that this was "simply a case of two increasingly assertive forces finally colliding, with both sides equally at fault."
Violence in Trans-Dniester: Complications for Moldovan-Russian Relationship (Dec. 17, 1991)

Also on December 17th, Moscow relayed to Washington that the Moldovan Foreign Minister had urgently requested a meeting to discuss the Transdniester issue with Secretary of State James Baker during the latter's scheduled visit to Kiev, and again summarized Moldovan concerns that the situation could turn into an "inter-republic" confrontation with Russia.

A third December 17 cable from Moscow describes a conversation with a Moldovan official in Moscow "as the Moldovan delegate to the Bilateral Relations Committee" (name redacted in the version released by the State Department, but they didn't redact his position which should make him easy to identify). This one is perhaps the most interesting of this batch as it summarizes a the candid views (in a conversation at an embassy reception) of a high-level Moldovan at the time about the country's aspirations for reunification with Romania, discussing things like potential territory swaps with Ukraine and the fact one of the factors slowing down reunification is that Snegur "enjoys being 'President' of a separate country and is not eager to give up that role." The source also trash-talks Moldovan Foreign Minister Tiu toward the end of the cable - see for yourself:

Aide to Moldovan Foreign Minister Describes Moldovan Political Picture (Dec. 17, 1991)

As this challenging month of a challenging year came to a close, Moldova after all signed up to join the new Commonwealth of Independent States. The cable below is interesting because it describes Russian and Central Asian reactions to the Alma Ata agreement as well as Moldovan reactions and is worth reading in full for any student of the Soviet collapse:

Reactions to Alma Ata Accords: Russia, Central Asia, Moldova (Dec. 26, 1991)

As a postscript, I can't resist sharing this photo from a later moment in President Snegur's career (presumably some time in 1992), mainly because I can't resist sharing something that shows our current Secretary of State in her previous life as an Arkansas political wife.

[image source]

Conflict Cables Series: Transdniester, October 1991

These three cables cover a fateful month in the development of the Transdniestrian conflict and Moldova's post-Soviet development in general.  This was the period when Igor Smirnov, who would go on to lead what became the secessionist Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic for 20 years (so far), was released from the custody of Moldovan authorities and allowed to return to Tiraspol.  The first cable below goes into interesting detail about the problems presented by "the Trans-Dniester" and Gagauzia, as well as potential border issues with Ukraine.

This was also a month when President Snegur was forced to cancel a visit to the U.S. due to unspecified domestic "political problems."  As the second cable below shows, the visit was intended to familiarize U.S. business and political leaders with Moldova, something the Moldovan government is still working on today.  The second cable also contains a number of statements from official Chisinau about how Moldova saw its future status at that moment in time. 

Tiraspol Blockade Ended; Moldova Avoiding Confrontation with Secessionist "Republics" (Oct. 4, 1991)

Moldovan President to Visit U.S. October 19-24 (Oct. 11, 1991)

Moldovan President Snegur Cancels U.S. Visit (Oct. 18, 1991)

For more about the "Conflict Cables" series, see this post.

The Return

[image source]

It's hard to believe it's been almost four months since I posted anything here.  The fourth quarter of last year was filled with work, work and work, but that's no excuse. Scraps of Moscow is back for 2011 and hoping to provide better content than ever with a new series of posts to be launched over the weekend.  My focus, as before, will be on the "protracted conflict" areas in the post-Soviet space, with other topics to be covered including the domestic politics in Moldova and Russia - both of which promise to be interesting this year.

In the meantime, I was remiss last year in not sharing any of my non-blog writing about the region, which included some thoughts on Karabakh as well as co-authored opinion pieces on "Why Moldova Matters" (Russian version) and on Transdniester (Russian version).  If you're interested in a longer read, an article I co-authored with a mouthful of a title - "Acquiring Assets, Debts and Citizens: Russia and the Micro-Foundations of Transnistria's Stalemated Conflict" - was published in the Fall 2010 issue of Demokratizatsiya but is unfortunately not available online.

I'm still trying to figure out how to usefully integrate some of the content from my Facebook wall into this space - an friend recently referred to it as my "Facebook blog," which is accurate given the amount of links posted and comment discussions that erupt there.  I guess the simplest way is just to be less lazy and do a three-sentence blog post when I see an interesting article instead of a one-sentence comment with a shared link on FB.  Stay tuned...

More on "peacekeepers" vs. "occupiers"

[image source] 
GUAM appears to be DOA, of course, but the article below suggests some degree of 
coordination between MD and GE's Russia policies.  I'm not sure I buy it, particularly as
I think the article overstates Acting President Ghimpu's influence on MD foreign policy.
And is wanting Russian troops to leave territory one claims as its own sufficiently strange
of a policy preference as to suggest that it must be the result of a coordinated campaign?

Nezavisimaya Gazeta [translation courtesy of JRL]
August 2, 2010
KISHINEV AND TBILISI NEVER NOTICED MOSCOW'S PROTESTS
Moldova and Georgia demand withdrawal of the Russian military from what they call their territories
Author: Svetlana Gamova
MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA COORDINATE THEIR RUSSIAN POLICIES

Their relations with Russia already soured, Moldova and Georgia got international support. The matter concerns the report on arms control agreements the U.S. Department of State published last Wednesday. The document mentioned presence of the Russian troops on the territories of Moldova and Georgia without their consent. By and large, the thesis in question repeated what State Secretary Hillary Clinton had said about occupation of Moldovan (Trans-Dniester region) and Georgian (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) territories by the Russian military. This statement was made when acting president of Moldova Mihai Ghimpu signed a special decree calling the Russian contingent in the Trans-Dniester region "occupiers" and demanding its withdrawal. The Russian Foreign Ministry then reiterated Moscow's official stand on the matter and gave the floor to Gennadi Onischenko of the Rospotrebnadzor.

Onischenko's words made it plain that Kishinev's objections to the presence of the Russian military in the Trans-Dniester region might cost it dearly. Russia suspended import of Moldovan wines - just to make the point. The Moldovans arranged negotiations to discuss the matter but the effort was wasted. That was when Clinton made her statement and urged Russia to start honoring its obligations. Her words killed the last chance the Moldovans might have had then to reactivate wine export to Russia.

Russian Foreign Ministry called "incorrect" U.S. Department of State's speculations on the presence of the Russian military in Moldova and Georgia. "There are no Russian soldiers in Georgia. As for Abkhazia and South Ossetia on whose territories Russian military bases operate with their consent, these countries are
neither parts or Georgia nor signatories of the Treaty on Conventional Armed forces in Europe." The Foreign Ministry reiterated that Russian peacekeepers were on the Dniester in accordance with the agreement between Russia and Moldova (July 21, 1992). The Moldovan authorities demand withdrawal of the Russian
military contingent and peacekeepers from the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic in the hope to replace them with an international police force.

In any event, official Kishinev studiously ignored all objections and protests from Russia. Moreover, it chose to comment on the conclusions drawn in the U.S. Department of State's report in application to the conflict with Tiraspol. Kishinev no longer accepts the terms formulated by Moscow (conflict resolution first, evacuation of the military afterwards). Moldovan Ambassador to Romania Yuri Renice told the Romanian newspaper Adevarul, "Synchronization of the Russians' withdrawal with Trans-Dniester conflict resolution is a thoroughly counterproductive approach...Presence of the Russian military collides with the principle of neutrality promoted by the Constitution. Most Trans-Dniester residents stand for reintegration of the territory."
Trans-Dniester Foreign Ministry in the meantime appealed to the UN to recognize sovereignty of the Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic in the light of the recent ruling of the International Court of Justice regarding Kosovo. "Our position is clear: the Trans-Dniester region is part of Moldova," said Renice.

Georgia took Washington's position as a clear confirmation: there are no sovereign Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there are but regions of Georgia occupied by Russia. Ghimpu said that he would pay an official visit to Tbilisi before long. It is clear that Kishinev and Tbilisi intend to coordinate their Russian policies.

Moldova's neighborhood as seen from Moscow

Selections from the June 25 and June 28 editions of RIA Novosti's "What the Russian Papers Say" section:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Bucharest blacklists Moscow

Romanian President Traian Basescu has submitted to the parliament a draft national defense strategy listing Russia as an external threat. The document says the deployment of Russian forces in the Republic of Moldova threatens Romania's national security.

The defense strategy mentions the deployment of foreign troops, rather than Russia's peacekeeping force, near Romanian borders. Moldovan media has promptly reported Bucharest's intention to take an active part in the region's demilitarization and the withdrawal of illegally deployed weapons systems.

The response in Transnistria, a breakaway territory located between the Dniester River, the eastern Moldovan border, and Ukraine, where the Russian task force is deployed, has been more emphatic: Bucharest must not intervene, or it will do more harm than good.

Transnistria's Foreign Minister Vladimir Yastrebchak stressed that the self-proclaimed republic's stance regarding the presence of the Russian peacekeeping force and limited troop contingent on its territory had remained unchanged since the end of the 1992 armed conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

Commenting on Romania's proposal to mediate a bilateral peace settlement, Yastrebchak said Bucharest had already acted as mediator in the run-up to the 1992 war. At the time Romania supplied weapons to the Moldovan army, which had unleashed the conflict.

It may be a paradox, but Serafim Urekyan, leader of the Alliance Our Moldova, part of the Alliance for European Integration ruling coalition, supported Yastrebchak. Although Moldova and Romania are more than just neighbors, Bucharest had better mind its own business and not intervene in our affairs, Urekyan said.

The Moldovan politician said the conflict between Chisinau and Tiraspol should be settled in line with the Five Plus Two negotiating format involving Russia, Ukraine and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as guarantors and mediators, the European Union and the United States as observers, as well as Moldova and Transnistria as the parties to the conflict.

Urekyan also said the peace settlement should duly heed the relevant agreements on this issue between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Bucharest's new draft national security strategy notes that the last barriers dividing a single nation could be eliminated by involving Romania in a common European space, Urekyan said. This implies Moldova being openly called a second Romanian state by Bucharest, which does not recognize the existence of the Moldovan nation.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Moscow and Brussels would do everything possible to resume negotiations, and that the main task was to search for a mutually acceptable resolution of this conflict through the preservation and strengthening of Moldovan sovereignty. Lavrov added that the EU may become involved in the Transnistria peacekeeping mission.



Vzglyad [often-tendentious online pro-Kremlin rag] - Top Moldovan official signs controversial document

(Acting Moldovan president tries to add Soviet Occupation Day to national calendar)

Moldovan Parliament Speaker Mihai Gimpu, who is now acting president of Moldova, has signed a decree on marking Soviet Occupation Day every June 28. Gimpu admitted that he had issued the decree without consulting his colleagues in the Alliance for European Integration ruling coalition.

On June 28, 1940, Soviet forces entered Bessarabia, and this became a black day in the history of Moldova, Gimpu said.

Political analyst Pavel Svyatenkov at the Moscow-based Institute of National Strategy said Moldova was following in the wake of other East European states, former Warsaw Pact members.

"But Moldova was part of the Soviet Union. It has an absolutely special status because Moldovan nationalists believe that there is only one Romanian, rather than Moldovan, nation. Moldova's conversion to anti-Communism is another step in severing ties with Russia," Svyatenko told the paper.

Gennady Konenko, head of the Moldova and Transdnestr section at the Institute of CIS Studies, said the decision to institute Soviet Occupation Day was not historically or legally motivated. He said Romania had taken advantage of Soviet Russia's weaknesses in 1918 and seized the Bessarabia Gubernia (Region) which had been part of the Russian Empire since 1812.

The opposition Communist Party of Moldova thinks that Gimpu has soured relations with Russia and was whipping up an anti-Communist hysteria in order to boost his popularity ratings before presidential elections. The latest opinion polls show Gimpu is supported by only 2% of respondents. Consequently, he is in no position to assume top state positions in the future.

In his decree, Gimpu demanded that Russia, the Soviet Union's legal successor, unconditionally and promptly withdraw its forces and weapons from Moldova. A Russian troop contingent has been fulfilling a peacekeeping mission in the self-proclaimed Transdnestr Republic since 1992.

Yuri Muntyan, Executive Secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party's Central Committee, said Gimpu and other ruling coalition leaders were ready to deprive Russian of its interethnic language status, and were preparing to amend the current polyethnic national policy concept.

Muntyan said his party was preparing to oppose official repressions strictly by legal means. The Communist Party is confident that Gimpu's decisions will be abolished after it stages a political comeback. Consequently, there will probably not be enough time for June 28 to become part of Moldova's political calendar.



Nezavisimaya Gazeta - Moldova to mark Soviet Occupation Day

New tensions in Russian-Moldovan relations were provoked by Moldovan authorities, who declared June 28 Soviet Occupation Day. Russia is the legal successor of the Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991, and must now withdraw its "occupation troops" from Transdnestr, a breakaway republic of Moldova, the Moldovan leader said in a decree.

Acting President Mihai Ghimpu has recreated the situation of 1991, when his predecessor, Mircea Snegur declared war on Russia during his speech in parliament, but took his words back almost immediately. However, Ghimpu will not rethink or reword his demand.

He is preparing for the parliamentary and possibly presidential elections and needs to increase his extremely low rating of 2%. The popularity of his Liberal Party has fallen in the past six months, and its members are fleeing to another pro-Romanian rightwing party, the Liberal Democratic Party, whose rating has been growing.

Ghimpu has nowhere else to win votes because Moldova's rightwing electorate comprising intellectuals and students who identify themselves as Romanians is very stable, 20%, and has not been growing. That electorate is divided between the two parties, which reflect certain moods of society but not of its majority. This explains why Moldovans are divided over Ghimpu's decree.

The Moldovan parliament will today hear a report on the consequences of the Communist regime in the country. The agenda includes a proposal to prohibit the use of all Soviet and Communist Party symbols in the republic.

Ghimpu is expected to submit to parliament a draft law canceling the concept of the republic's nationalities policy adopted in 2003, in which Moldova was described as a polyethnic state and Russian as the dominant spoken language. That concept provoked major protests in the republic.

Valery Klimenko, leader of the socio-political movement Equality, described the developments as a rollback to the 1990s, when the Moldovan People's (Popular) Front held the power in the republic. Ghimpu was one of its leaders.

The extreme rightwing government pursued a policy that provoked an armed conflict on the Dniester, which has not been settled to this day, Klimenko said.

Bulgars and Gagauz, small ethnic groups living in compact communities in the south of Moldova, have expressed protest against the authorities' actions that are complicating relations with Russia.

The Civil Society movement said it would call people to the streets today, but the Liberals have the support of young people, who are society's most energetic part. This means that Ghimpu's decree may provoke clashes in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova.

Discouraging words

[image source]

This article from Nezavisimaya (original is here, the translation below is courtesy of JRL) is not encouraging, particularly on the issue of peacekeepers.  However, I suspect Gamova - especially given her habit of spinning stories about these regions in what are supposed to be straight news pieces - is not quite accurately reflecting Moldovan elite opinion with respect to the Kozak Plan:

Nezavisimaya Gazeta
May 13, 2010
MEDVEDEV AND YANUKOVICH TO OPEN TRANS-DNIESTER REGION
Runaway Moldovan province pins a good deal of hopes on the new Ukrainian authorities
Author: Svetlana Gamova
THE EVE OF DMITRY MEDVEDEV'S VISIT TO UKRAINE: THE TRANS-DNIESTER REGION EXPECTS SUPPORT FROM KIEV NOW ALONG WITH THAT FROM MOSCOW

Presidents of Russia Dmitry Medvedev and Ukraine Victor Yanukovich will make a joint statement regarding the Trans-Dniester region during Medvedev's visit to Ukraine on May 17-18.

A source within the Foreign Ministry said that the statement in question would declare coordination of efforts in Trans-Dniester conflict resolution. (Both Russia and Ukraine are guarantors and intermediaries in the process.) Quite importantly, there are almost 150,000 Russians and 100,000 Ukrainians living in the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniester Moldovan Republic. Medvedev once promised Trans-Dniester leader Igor Smirnov that the locals with Russian passports could count on Russian protection. Smirnov called it the most important guarantee the self-proclaimed and non-recognized republic had.

Insiders say that the joint statement to be made by Russian and Ukrainian presidents will reiterate their stand on the matter of peacekeepers: they should be left where they are. It is going to be an answer to the idea regularly brought up by Kishinev to replace the existing peacekeeping contingent in the Trans-Dniester region comprising Russian, Moldovan, and local units with foreign policemen or observers.

The Trans-Dniester parliament (Supreme Council) in the meantime hopes that installation of the new regime in Ukraine will mean an end to the blockade. Aided by then President of Ukraine Victor Yuschenko, the Moldovan authorities were able to close the border for goods and produce from the Trans-Dniester region in 2006. EU observers have manned the Trans-Dniester part of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border ever since. Without Russian aid, the region would have never survived.

"That Yanukovich wants no EU experts or whoever on the border is common knowledge. I suspect that he will do everything now to prevent prolongation of the Europeans' mandate. The Ukrainian border with the Trans-Dniester region will open then," said Arkady Barbarosh, Director of the Center for Social Policy (Kishinev).

"The EU has never wielded any clout or possessed any leverage with the region in question. Its Eastern Partnership initiative does not even promote any such objectives," said Alexander Rahr of the German Foreign Policy Council. "Russia would like to return to the region, of course, but with Yuschenko in Kiev it was impossible. It is different now. Moscow will probably reanimate Kozak's Plan, and Yanukovich will raise no objections."

"Moldova is not going to accept Kozak's Plan because it stands for continued presence of the Russian military on the Moldovan territory," Barbarosh said.

Considering the attitude of the powers-that-be currently in Kishinev, there is no chance to reanimate the Kremlin's plans first designed in 2003. The parliamentary election in Moldova this autumn may change everything. The Moldovan political establishment is already castigating ex-President Vladimir Voronin for the dismissal of Kozak's Plan. Marian Lupu, leader of the Democratic Party which is part of the ruling alliance nowadays, said that official Kishinev had failed then to consider all implications and made a mistake. Were it not for this mistake, there would have been no wine embargo that crippled Moldovan economy, he said.

Where's the content?

Highly politicized map of Bessarabia, from the 1930 edition of the Malaya Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia.

[source: Wikipedia]

It's hard to believe I have neglected this space for three solid months now.  Things have been quite busy, and now we're about to enter another transitional period which might make it easier for me to devote more time to blogging but more likely will not.

Therefore, with the thought that this might be the "front-page" post for at least a few weeks, I thought I'd give a rundown of what I've been reading/watching/looking at online, with the assumption that of course if I've found it interesting, you will as well.

The interesting, insidery blog Diplopundit points out a recent blog post by U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle that made something of a splash, and Russian politicians (and their aides) are also capable of making news these days with nothing more than a click of the "post" button:

ADVISER TO RUSSIAN SPEAKER CALLS FOR RECOGNITION OF MOLDOVA'S BREAKAWAY REGION
Ren TV, privately-owned Russian television channel, Feb. 18, 2010

A statement that could cause a new large international scandal - in his blog today, an adviser to the chairman of the Federation Council of Russia, Aleksandr Chuyev, expressed the opinion that it is time for Russia to recognize the independence of the Dniester region, following Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Interestingly, this statement coincided with the statements by Igor Smirnov, leader of the Dniester republic, which broke away from Moldova, according to which they are prepared to accept Russian Iskander missiles and other armaments.

Other recent stories about Transnistria have ranged from disappointing to optimistic (and another), and from nutty to nuttier.

Some blogs to read while this one lies dormant:

- The Russia Monitor, which Jesse has turned into a must-read resource.
- Siberian Light - lots on there recently for you sports fans, or sport fans, as I guess they say here in the UK.
- Sean's Russia Blog - Sean's still got it, and now that he is in Russia the posts are even better.
- Robert Amsterdam - comprehensive as always.
- Window on Eurasia - just check it out (especially this post on fake NGOs).
- Poemless - opinionated, in a good, entertaining way.
- A Good Treaty - an interesting NKOTB, which came to my attention via Poemless.
- Morning in Moldova - for those interested in keeping current on developments there.

Other worthwhile reads - the long but engrossing Vanity Fair piece chronicling the rise and fall of the Exile, and (from the dead-tree realm) Keith Gessen's New Yorker piece on the Ukrainian elections and Yushchenko's failures (full text not available online w/o subscription), which captures Ukraine's dilemmas, from the profound to the ridiculous:

[Quoting Leonid Shvets:] 'But Ukraine was a historical actor, and how! I have a friend, one of his grandfathers was in the Galician S.S. and died fighting, and his other grandfather was in the Red Army and made it all the way to Berlin.  What do you do with that?  Politicians should stay away from it.  They should look to the future.' [...]

Yanukovych's people were taking no chances.  If there was an initiative to be seized by taking to the streets, they were going to be the ones to seize it.  The...square filled up with Yanukovych 'supporters.'  A television crew on the scene conducted interviews.  Many supporters were drunk, and men in Yanukovych jackets began cutting off interviews before they began.  But they didn't manage to reach one angry woman in time.  'We've been here since 5 a.m., and they still haven't paid us!' she said.  'It's outrageous!'  It was an interesting moment in post-Soviet life: a paid participant in a street action meant to fool the media was appealing to the media for justice, because she had not been paid.

Poking around online to check prices of antique maps, I happened upon Wikipedia's surprisingly content-rich "Atlas of Moldova" page (the source for the illustration above).

I also noticed a Moldovan connection while watching the Winter Olympics (well, not really, my sister clued me in) - apparently, one of the U.S. ice dancing pairs used a song for their routine that was identified as a "Moldavian Folk Dance."  NBC makes the video content from the Games somewhat challenging to access, but there are a couple of YouTube clips showing the duo using the routine in previous competitions.  Predictably, the comments on both YouTube clips are taken up in large part by arguments over whether this is a Romanian melody or a Moldovan one. 

On a more serious note, I've been spending some time remembering my father, who passed away ten years ago this weekend, thanks to some material that has appeared online recently about the work he was doing before I was in the picture (see also this recently posted four-part article - part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4). 

And what could be a better soundtrack for such reminiscences than this classic song (an even more old-school video is here)?

"A Soviet Fly in Geopolitical Amber"

[image source]

Strange Maps provides a dandy headline phrase describing Transnistria, as well as an detailed map of the region. I have a similarly fascinating poster-sized map of Moldova with various demographic breakdowns and migration statistics, but unfortunately I have no way to scan in such a big piece of paper.

Here's a recent update on the prospects for conflict resolution (if you can get past the tired phrases like "it could be a museum of the Soviet Union"), and here's a great resource if you are looking for further reading on the subject - three volumes of essays on the conflict which were presented at a conference that I attended in late May.

Here are some photos of Tiraspol, Transnistria's capital, from my most recent trip there on June 18 of this year:

CIMG3392, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.
HQ of the local youth organization, Proryv (Breakthrough).


CIMG3391, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.
Billboard of Russian President Medvedev and Transnistrian leader
Igor Smirnov - the banner at left reads "Our strength is in unity with Russia!"


CIMG3385, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.
Decidedly old-school advertising posters outside of the Officers' Club,
which now rents some of its space to other organizations - unfortunately
I wasn't able to photograph the incredible, museum-like display of portraits
of historical Russian military figures which adorns one of the large rooms inside.


CIMG3381, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.
Inside the HQ of the Transnistrian Communist Party (not a huge vote-getter, but - according to the party's leader - a
genuine opposition party, although according to others I spoke with if they threaten the authorities too much then they
might face a mud-slinging campaign based on their earlier contacts with the Moldovan Communist Party)


CIMG3378-1, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.
Recruiting poster for the Felix Dzerzhinsky (!) boarding school for cadets, which prepares 5th- to 9th-graders
for a career in the local police or internal troops - the appeal is to "Duty, Honor, Fatherland" - MacArthuresque!

Chisinau at night - a roundup

Unimedia has posted new photos from the evening's events:

[source for both - unimedia.info]

In addition, Unimedia's blow-by-blow account of events gives us the following quotes (translated by a non-native English speaker, apparently) from opposition figures:

Vlad Filat, president of Liberal Democrat Party: "The Communists want to put the accent from fake elections to violent actions, because the police, which was in a small number at the protest, could not assure the public order."

Dorin Chirtoacă, vice-president of the Liberal Party says that there were provocateurs among the young people that have thrown first with stones and made that a peaceful action become violence.

It has been quite a day - and apparently quite an evening - in Chisinau.

drugoi posted this photo by Reuters photog Gleb Garanich of a young protester apparently after looting some high-tech gear from the Parliament building.

It's interesting to follow reactions from around the Internet. One website from Moldova's secessionist region, Transnistria, has a post up in which the author talks about the "indescribable sense of pleasure and schaudenfreude" he experienced while watching the rather tragic events of Tuesday unfold in Chisinau. A couple of commenters on the post have taken the author to task for such sentiments, but in general its not surprising that folks in Transnistria, which has for many years existed in de facto separation from Moldova, would have different impressions of the events in Chisinau, especially as the nationalistic overtones of some of the Moldovan protesters reinforce one of the reasons that Transnistria initially sought to split from Moldova. The condescension of Transnistrians regarding their right-bank (de jure) compatriots, though, is a bit too much at times - witness this post dubbing today's events the "Mamaliga Revolution," after the polenta-like Moldovan national dish.

A commenter on sholademi's LJ blog this evening reported peaceful demonstrations in the largest city in Moldova's north, Balti, and noted that there were a lot of police in the streets and that "land line phones are not working, nor is [local] TV - we're watching the Romanian channels."

Georgian blogger cyxymu posts a set of Reuters photos and adds the sympathetic title, "I wouldn't wish this even on an enemy."

Blogger Julien Frisch has a post about the protests with a number of links to coverage from around the web.

Yandex's Russian-language blog aggregator now has a dedicated page titled "'Color Revolution' in Moldova," collecting on-topic posts. I haven't read too many of the reactions from the Russian blogosphere, but it's fair to assume that a substantial percentage will fall back on negative opinions of "color revolutions" formed during the events in Ukraine and Georgia years ago.

I've taken a bit of time to translate one last nugget I found on the web - a comment on one of Natalia Morari's posts about the protests - because I think it articulates what many older and more level-headed (or perhaps passive) Moldovans might have thought about the election results and protests initially [ellipsis as in original]:

...so who voted for the Communists? A bunch of grandmas and old ladies...and? Riiiiight, lots of our parents... if the people who are now shouting out in the main square could have convinced their parents not to vote for the Communists, then maybe they wouldn't have won?

But this raises two questions:

1) Who should they have voted for?
2) How can they be convinced otherwise? Yesterday I was talking with my mother, she is retired and receives a pension, just like my father... but he still goes to work, he teaches at a university, so he's a state employee... anyway, I asked her, "Why did you vote for the Communists?"

She answered, "They increased my pension."

I told her, that this was at the expense of the youth, and let's imagine that she told me she didn't care, her own children are overseas and she's in Moldova, she has to think about herself.

"In years past part of our heating bill was paid by the city government, but now Chirtoaca [a prominent opposition politician and Mayor of Chisinau] fell out with the heating utility company, and we have to pay the whole amount."

Even though I know that the Communists were also involved in this conflict, it's hard to argue with the much higher heating bills...

"Before the Communists came to power I was afraid to go outside, but now things are stable in the country, there is less crime..."

I have to agree with this, although I can't say I'd let my kids outside alone even now...

"A bunch of other reasons..."

And it's not so important why they voted for the Communists, what matters is that no one was able to convince them otherwise and no one gave them another worthy choice instead...

And now, when parents see their children out on the square, they will be even more firmly on the side of the Communists, I won't bother to write why, it's obvious...

Transnistrian developments

Post-soviet de facto "presidents" Bagapsh, Kokoity and Smirnov adorn a billboard in Tiraspol.
Two of these men are now recognized by Moscow as Presidents (without the scare quotes).
[image source]

For those of you interested in the still-"frozen" conflict in Moldova (interest in which has increased after the unfreezing of the conflicts in Georgia this summer), I have collected a few relatively recent and worthwhile articles on the topic.

The must-read of the bunch is by William Hill, who provides both an excellent grounding in the history of the conflict for those less familiar with it and the level of insight one would expect from someone who has been involved in the resolution process for years.

Another interesting perspective is provided by Thomas de Waal, dean of the Caucasus conflict journalists, who reflects on his first visit to Transnistria and breaks down some of the key differences between Moldova's secessionist conflict and the ones in the Caucasus.

If you're interested in the view from Tiraspol, this write-up of Transnistria's de facto leadership's visit to Moscow earlier this fall (by the region's acting foreign minister) provides some insight. Unfortunately, the translation is not perfect and to get the full flavor you should read the original version in Russian. As an example of what gets lost in translation, the sentence translated as the neutral-sounding "The Russian Federation has already rendered assistance to Transnistria" could just as easily have been translated as "[Transnistria] is experienced in receiving aid from Russia," which puts the secessionist leaders' hat-in-hand trip to Moscow in a somewhat different light.

Finally, this article by a Moscow analyst discusses why a settlement did not take place after a flurry of activity this fall and why one may not be likely in the foreseeable future. The Russian version is available here.

For ongoing coverage of developments, you can sign up for this regular email bulletin put out by a Moldovan think-tank which includes a section on Transnistria, although the English version is sometimes incomprehensible.

"Our strength is in unity!"
[image source]

Voice of Tiraspol

CIMG6523, originally uploaded by lyndonk2.

As has happened more times in the past than I'd care to admit, a few weeks ago a discussion in the comments section of Sean's Russia Blog sent me searching for info on a fairly obscure topic. One result was that I revisited ocity, the LiveJournal community set up by residents of Tiraspol - for those of you who understandably might not follow these things, that's the capital of the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (a.k.a. PMR, Transnistria, Transdniester, Pridnestrovie, etc.), a little strip of land that's been trying to secede from Moldova since the breakup of the USSR.

It seems that some of Tiraspol's netizens are unhappy with some of the initiatives of the territory's de facto government. Here are my translations of a couple of recent posts to the ocity community (which also exists outside of LJ):

Demand and complaint addressed to Evgeny Shevchuk, Chairman of the "Renewal" (Obnovlenie) party (posted by 06_07_1970)

Dear Evgeny Vasil'evich!

We woke up this morning and left our apartments intending to head to the cemetery and honor our dearly departed.

In the entryway of the building where we live, we found a huge quantity of "Renewal" party newspapers - they are strewn on the landing on every floor, in the stairwells, in people's mailboxes (several copies of this spam in each mailbox), and in the elevator. Part of the area in front of the building is already besmirched with your party's newspapers - some of the building's residents have tossed them out of the stairwell.

It should be noted that this is not the first time when the entryway of our residential building has been littered with such trash.

Based on these facts, I request that you organize the cleanup of the stairwells of the building at Zapadnyi Per. 19/1 in Tiraspol as soon as possible.

Otherwise, we will have to go to court with a complaint against the Renewal party and against you personally as the director of that organization.

With respect,

Residents of the besmirched [засранного] building

This complaint was also posted on a more traditional online forum, where it has generated some 25 comments. On LiveJournal, it generated the following comment by verba77:

They say our government is impoverished, but think how much money was spent on this garbage. Our authorities don't do anything useful for the people, instead they rub in the people's faces what good rulers we have.

I should note, in fairness to Obnovlenie and Shevchuk, that it's not unheard of for political parties in the post-Soviet space (and probably elsewhere) to engage in the "dirty trick" of placing their opponents' materials in locations designed to annoy voters. I seem to recall that one example of such "black PR" involved party A sticking party B's stickers on cars parked on the street. In this case, though, if I had to guess, I'd say the offending newspapers were probably left by overzealous "Obnovlentsy."

Here's another assessment of the local government by a resident of Transnistria:

Defense of human rights, Transnistrian-style (posted by verba77 [whose journal is subtitled "life with a 'special' child in a 'special' country"])

Two years ago, on June 7, 2006, Pridnestrovie first appointed a representative on human rights issues. An 10-room office was set up and luxuriously renovated to European standards. Dozens of new computers and other office equipment was purchased, excellent furniture, air conditioners, etc. There are plans to open branch offices of the human rights representative in other cities in Transnistria.

Interruptions in - and later complete denial of - the government's supply of essential medication to disabled children began around the same time.

Is it possible that the funds which had previously been devoted to saving the lives of disabled children are now going toward the human rights representative's office?

From my conversation with Transnistria's human rights representative V. Kol'ko last week:

- Does the non-issue of medications which are legally provided for to disabled children constitute a violation of human rights?
- Yes, of course, but what can I do about it?
- What do you mean, what, you are the human rights representative. Can you defend the rights of a sick child?
- There isn't any money in the budget for those medications, our government is very poor.
- Then why does the government have money for such luxurious facilities for a human rights office which is unable to protect human rights?
- What, it's my fault that the Supreme Soviet decided to create this office?

I might also suggest that our rulers do away with pensions and use the money saved to create an office of the representative of pensioners' rights. Or they could close the hospitals and open an office of the representative for the rights of sick people.

In the comments, verba77 explains that his family pays for a couple of more expensive medications, but is trying to get the government to pay for one cheaper item prescribed for their child which is included in the official list of medications the government is supposed to provide:

This has become a matter of principle, because those animals are buying themselves expensive official cars, building lordly estates, and renovating their offices to European standards using the money of the Transnistrians who break their backs working for them, but they refuse to comply with the law guaranteeing medication to sick children. But they spit on my requests and on all of us put together. The animals have made it to the trough.

And on a more humorous note, here's a comment from the same forum titled "[Customer] Service" (posted by sasha_ethna):

Tiraspol'. The train station. We get on the number 3 minibus, hoping to get to Balka.

...I was already handing the driver my fare when a one-lady orchestra came up to the minibus. She had a guitar on her shoulder, fancy luggage and several musical instruments. She tossed her first bag into the minibus and was getting ready to toss in the second, when the driver spat out "I'M NOT GOING TO BALKA!"

All of the passengers were baffled, the one-lady orchestra quickly retrieved her bags, and many people prepared to get off the minibus.

"But we all want to go to Balka!" said a few people.

"Everything's OK - that's where we're going. I just wanted to avoid all of that baggage," said the driver, revealing the logic behind his trick.

[update July 15]

Incidentally, there used to be a LJ community called Foto_PMR (I reposted one cool photo from that forum here) devoted to photos from Transnistria, but within a couple of months after I discovered and linked to it that forum disappeared, replaced by a LJ error message which reads “This journal has been deleted and purged.”

What's in a name?

Valeri, we hardly knew ye!

[image source]

It seems that Valeri Litskai, the native of Tver' who has been de facto foreign minister of the PMR (as Transnistria's de facto government calls the territory) for as long as I can remember has been pushed out, and just at a time when some believe a resolution to the conflict might be in the works. We can only hope that the guy taking his place wasn't chosen because of his name - Владимир Ястребчак (Vladimir Yastrebchak). Ястреб means "hawk" in Russian. Strangely (or perhaps not so strangely), the "Tiraspol Times" (by all indications an online propaganda project funded by someone close to the PMR's powers-that-be) had a story forecasting this turn of events a couple of months ago.

Here is Regnum's article on the story, one-sided as their stories generally are on the post-soviet "frozen" conflicts and quoting extensively a rather tendentious Transnistrian "politologist" (who was, at least a few years ago, "dean of the Law Faculty at Transnistria State University"). And here's another Regnum story, quoting a Transnistrian politician's comment on the change, at a time when Litskai had just eight months left until retirement and (perhaps more importantly) when talks on resolving the conflict are reaching their final phase: "you don't change horses in midstream." We'll see if this change signals a revolution in the PMR's "foreign" policy toward Moldova, but I'm not holding my breath.

[Update July 11]

Here are some additional thoughts from a Moldovan think-tank on the reasons behind the reshuffle at the pinnacle of the PMR's foreign policy apparatus:

Some developments in the second half of June have made observers suppose that the race between Ukraine and Russia to control the Transnistrian regime has intensified. After Russia has refused to recognise Transnistria’s independence despite its promise to extend the "Kosovo precedent" Transnistrian leaders signalled the need to promote a "multi-vector" foreign policy which would replace the one addressing Russia only. The multi-vector foreign policy may consist in oscillations between Russia and Ukraine only, as the existence and the survival of the separatist regime have always depended on willingness of the two countries. [...]

In all likelihood, Russian authorities have decided to get involved in order to prevent the development of Tiraspol’s game with Kiev, given their "friendly" relations with Ukraine.

Litskai has made public the target of playing on contradictions between Chisinau and Kiev, while Chisinau is trying to get in the good graces of Moscow in the detriment of relations with Kiev. [...]

Transnistrian authorities have appointed Deputy foreign minister Vladimir Yastrebchiak as ad-interim minister shortly after the visit by Russian diplomats led by Zubakov to Chisinau and Tiraspol. The news agency Novy Region quoted sources in the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry as saying that Smirnov will fire Litskai soon for the pro-Ukraine policy he has tried to promote in the last months. The eventual dismissal of Litskai is allegedly linked to his alcohol addiction which often turns into public debauches. In these circumstances, one shall see the real reasons why Litskai is disgraced for: promotion of the so-called "multi-vector" foreign policy with oscillations between Russia and Ukraine, serious drunkenness, health, etc. Indeed, all these factors are convergent. [...]

The lighter side of secessionism

There has been plenty of serious discussion from all quarters - not to mention overblown posturing from some - about Kosovo's declaration of independence. Heck, even here at Scraps of Moscow I have been unable to resist posting on the subject from time to time (though not because it should necessarily have any relevance or precedential value for the resolution of the other unresolved conflicts). But there is also a lighter side to the struggle of unrecognized states, de facto states, microstates and other secessionist entities for legitimacy.

For example, shortly after Kosovo's "UDI," snarky DC gossip site Wonkette - in a tongue-in-cheek style which was intended to ape American provincialism but really just confirms a sort of knowing indifference which may be worse than ignorance - posted a rundown of the other spots on the globe vying to be next:

The Foreigns Present: Your Guide To The Hellholes

Those crazy Kosovars! Their little declaration of independence has caused quite the shitstorm — not just among the great powers who are wrangling over whether to recognize them or not, but among the world’s other pissant quasi-countries, who are mad that they didn’t get to do it first....This week, The Foreigns will take you on a tour of the world’s saddest unrecognized not-countries.

The territories profiled were "TRANSNISTRIA: Come for the heroin, stay for the whores"; "NORTHERN CYPRUS: Maybe this 'independence' thing wasn’t such a hot idea"; "SOMALILAND: Proving that 'hellhole' is a relative term"; "ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA: Sometimes pawns are just happy to be in the game"; and "WESTERN SAHARA FREE ZONE: Sand, sand sand!"

The highlights of the comments section:

Bill Clinton: "Transnistria? I think I caught that from a New Orleans hooker once."

And:

"because nothing could possibly go wrong for you when your enormous neighbor is playing games with your sovereignty for its own larger geopolitical purposes!"

Huh. I have that EXACT phrase on my license plate holder.

But the real impetus for this rundown was not a month-and-a-half-old Wonkette post. No, it was my good fortune in happening upon a hilarious episode of Family Guy entitled E Peterbus Unum. Here is Wikipedia's plot synopsis:

Peter declares his house to be the new microstate of "Petoria." He spends a night in Quahog insulting Horace (at The Druken Clan) and bringing beer out into the streets, stepping on grass that can't be touched, and violating numerous laws such as littering, sexual harassment, and vandalism. He flaunts his diplomatic immunity by singing a parody of MC Hammer's song "U Can't Touch This" and mentions that he can’t be sued by Hammer.

Snubbed at the United Nations, Peter follows the advice of a diplomat from Iraq and annexes Joe's pool, calling it "Joe-hio." Days later, when Chris tries to go to school, he is turned away because the US Army surrounds and blockades the nation of Petoria with tanks and missiles as part of "Operation: Desert Clam." Further, all electricity and water has been cut and Lois home schools the kids.

Sadly, this is not one of the few Family Guy episodes that have been made available on the TV companies' new video site Hulu. But you can watch MC Hammer parody, "U Can't Touch Me," on YouTube, at least for now:

The idea of being "untouchable" - more commonly known as immunity - as well as a general bad-ass complex, seems like it could be common among the leaders of would-be states. The Family Guy parody calls to mind a story I heard from someone who'd had occasion to meet with Igor Smirnov, the de facto leader of Transnistria. Apparently Smirnov keeps a safe full of gold coins in his office, and when he wants to convince his interlocutor of the fact that he is both independent of Russia and not susceptible to Western inducements, he shows off his hoard.

The last bit of comic relief I wanted to share is about Kosovo, from a Wall Street Journal article last week:

Freedom's Ring: Kosovo Covets A Dialing Code

By CHRISTOPHER RHOADS
March 27, 2008; Page A1

Kosovo, which a month ago declared independence from Serbia, is working on a constitution. One problem: On the front page of the latest draft, the government phone number is Serbian.

....Kosovo has a problem, because it isn't a member of the U.N., and only countries that are can get their own dialing codes. So, land-line calls into Kosovo still must use the exchange, +381, of a group that many Kosovars detest: the Serbs.

"Every country's independence rests on certain pillars," says Anton Berisha, chief telecom regulator of Kosovo, a land of two million a little larger than Delaware. "One of them is a country dialing code."

Matters so mundane aren't usually considered the stuff of patriotic fervor. But in Kosovo during the past tumultuous decade, the battle for telephone autonomy has led to the ouster of the head of a telecom company, the dismantling of cell towers built by a Serbian company and two assassination attempts, one using a rocket launcher.

"I was not prepared for this kind of debate," says Mr. Berisha, the target of both attacks, which occurred last year. He now travels only with police escort.

In fact, dialing codes have figured in nationalist movements before, from the Palestinian territories and Taiwan to Catalonia and Sudan. "Even if it doesn't make sense, people are attaching more weight to having a dialing code," says Richard Hill, whose duties include distributing dialing codes as an official at a U.N. body in Geneva, the International Telecommunication Union, or ITU.

For those of a nationalistic bent, Mr. Hill says, a dialing code can be as meaningful as a flag, a national anthem or a team in the Olympics. He declines to comment on the Kosovo situation.

Without permission from the ITU, the Palestinian phone company has struck agreements with phone companies in sympathetic Arab countries to connect calls through the Palestinian company's unofficial code, +970. Previously, calls to the Palestinian territories connected only through the Israeli dialing code, +972, which is still used by callers from many Western countries.

As for Taiwan, as it emerged as an economic power in the 1980s, it began using an unassigned calling code, +886. Taiwan, too, persuaded some foreign phone companies to send along calls with the number it preferred. The move defied China, which has long claimed Taiwan and had assigned it a regional phone prefix as a Chinese province. After years of negotiations, the ITU in 2006 officially assigned the +886 exchange to Taiwan, while still listing the island as part of China.

Foreign Exchange

Dialing codes carried little of this political baggage in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when they first grew in use and became standardized, according to Mark Cuccia, a retired library worker in Lafayette, La., who tracks phone numbers as a hobby. Creating a single list of dialing codes made it easier for international operators to connect calls, since countries often had unique phone systems.

In the 1990s, political events turned dialing codes "into a big phenomenon," Mr. Cuccia says.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early '90s led to a scramble for dialing codes by new states eager to underscore their independence. Tiny European states like Andorra and Liechtenstein, which had long shared the dialing codes of their bigger neighbors, felt compelled to get their own codes, too. Just last year, Montenegro, a former Yugoslav republic that's now independent, was granted +382.

The struggle for a Kosovo dialing code dates to as early as 1999. Bombing led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had just expelled Serb forces from Kosovo -- then a Serbian province -- and placed Kosovo under U.N. supervision.

The U.N. mission ousted the head of the Kosovo telecom operator after he bitterly opposed awarding a mobile-phone license to Monaco Telecom. His problem: Although the Monaco company had essential international roaming agreements, using the company would mean using Monaco's dialing code.

The disgruntled chief of the local telecom operator, which is called PTK, had wanted a bidder with no dialing code, so he could agitate for Kosovo's own code. But, a U.N. official told reporters at the time, PTK needed a solution that "would actually allow people to make phone calls."

Monaco Telecom began to charge PTK tens of millions of dollars in annual fees to handle Kosovar wireless calls. The deal meant that people abroad who called a cellphone user in Kosovo had to use Monaco's +377 exchange.

But that was still better than using a Serbian carrier, in the eyes of many ethnic Albanians, who are about 90% of Kosovo's population. Ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, most of whom live near the border with Serbia, can pick up signals from a Serbian carrier.

In 2005, a Kosovar delegation visited the ITU in Geneva to argue that Kosovo should get its own code, says Etrur Rrustemaj, a PTK official in the delegation who later served as chief executive officer of PTK.

Unsuccessful, Mr. Rrustemaj turned his attention instead to dismantling antennas installed by a Serbian wireless carrier in the Kosovo capital of Pristina, including one atop a PTK building.

He was careful not to destroy the antennas, just unplug them. "If I took them down, I'd be in jail for attacking minorities," he says.

In February of last year, after a muddled bidding process for Kosovo's second mobile-phone license, Kosovo declared the winner to be Slovenia Telekom. Mr. Berisha, the telecom regulator who oversaw the auction, had to consider foreign bidders, since Kosovo doesn't have its own dialing code.

Bullets Fly

One morning later that month, Mr. Berisha was riding in a car to work with his aunt and her daughter when gunmen emerged from the side of the road and opened fire on their car. No one was injured.

Just six weeks later, Mr. Berisha, by then commuting in a police vehicle with two armed officers, was attacked again. This time, one of the gunmen launched a rocket at the car. It didn't explode properly, and injured only the driver, he says.

One of the alleged attackers, later arrested, turned out to be an official of PTK, the local telecom operator. Mr. Berisha believes his attackers were upset that he had awarded a mobile-phone license to a Slovenian operator and at the prospect of new competition.

The solution, for nationalists who yearn for a Kosovo dialing code, would be U.N. recognition of Kosovo as an independent nation. But while the U.S. and more than 30 other countries recognize Kosovo's newly declared independence, U.N. membership is far from assured. Russia, which has a veto as a permanent Security Council member, has vowed to block it.

"We are forced to work with these mixed country codes, which has made our lives more difficult," says Mr. Berisha.