Monday, April 30, 2007

Be a teacher - be a hero

Last Thursday, I attended a conference at Georgetown on the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria. I took detailed notes and hope to post a few portions of them here in the coming weeks, final exams notwithstanding. The conference had two panels, one with "civil society" representatives and the other with officials - mainly ambassadors - from all of the entities involved in the (non-existent at the moment) 5+2 format talks except for the OSCE and the Transnistrian de facto government itself. Out of all the people who spoke, the most impressive and inspiring was an educator who had travelled all the way from Transnistria to tell his story in Washington:


Alexei Catan, head of the Evrica NGO and Lyceum in Rybnitsa, located in Transnistria, was introduced by Vlad Spanu as one of the “true heroes,” someone who has stayed put in Transnistria and fought for reintegration with Moldova.

Catan started his remarks by noting that he represents around 700 parents as well as all of the schools located in Transnistria which still follow the right-bank Moldovan curriculum. This includes seven lyceums which on matters of curriculum answer to Chisinau and teach in Romanian using the Latin alphabet. Since 1989, Catan said, he has taught only using the Latin alphabet, but in 2004 the pressure against doing so in Transnistria reached its apogee. First in Tiraspol, and then in Rybnitsa, the Transnistrian militia destroyed classrooms in Romanian-language schools. Seven parents and one teacher were arrested, tried, and jailed.

The conditions of their imprisonment were difficult to imagine in the 21st century: 20 to 25 people in an 18-square-meter cell, who had to take turns sleeping and were allowed only two visits per day to a toilet, having to use a bucket in their cell the rest of the time. They were fed only once a day and were not even given enough spoons to eat what they were fed. While Catan never had any dealings with the Soviet authorities, he imagines this might be what treatment at their hands was like. It was a difficult shock for intellectuals who had never had to deal with this type of treatment.

Why did Catan and his colleagues endure this? Because they are citizens of the Republic of Moldova and support the integration of the country; and are willing to do anything possible to make it happen. Transnistrian statistics say that 40% of the population of the region is ethnically Moldovan. However, these people have no access to any kind of media in their own language and are not represented in the government. The only language used in Transnistria is Russian, in spite of the existence of three so-called constitutional languages.

Romanian-speakers do not have the chance to teach their children as they want, and those children are unable to continue their studies in Romanian if they have grown up using only the Cyrillic alphabet. If students want and are able to continue their education in Romanian, they have to go to Chisinau. Graduates of Chisinau universities generally do not want to return to Transnistria and have a difficult time if they decide to do so – diplomas issued in Chisinau are not recognized by the Transnistrian authorities. This is being done specifically to promote Russification and to push the Moldovans out of the region. Moldovans must defend themselves somehow against this policy.

Although the Moldovans in Transnistria are frequently criticized by Chisinau for not doing enough, they vote in Moldovan elections and do as much as possible. The majority of residents of Transnistria are citizens of the Republic of Moldova. Possibly due to pressure from Russia, there has been a recent trend of people renouncing their Moldovan citizenship and taking Russian citizenship. Russia has opened illegal consular offices in Transnistria and quickly grants Russian citizenship to people there without the proper, legally required documentation. Eventually, there will be more Russian citizens in Transnistria than Moldovan citizens, and the situation will be similar to what has happened in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In addition, residents of Transnistria who are Moldovan citizens are unable to vote in local elections, own businesses, or enjoy other rights unless they accept Transnistrian “citizenship.” Catan stressed that this was a huge infringement on the rights of ethnic Moldovans in Transnistria. Since 1990, they have had to travel outside of the region in order to vote in Moldovan elections; the Transnistrian de facto government has established customs and migration posts on all roads crossing the border between Moldova and Transnistria; these posts impose an entry/exit tax of 8 lei on Moldovan citizens only, which is “humiliating”; and Moldovan citizens are searched at these border crossings.

The town of Rezina is two kilometers from Rybnitsa, and lots of people from Rezina work in Rybnitsa. Every time they cross the border, they have to pay this tax. Also, without Transnistrian “citizenship,” people who work in Transnistria are required to pay income tax to the Transnistrian de facto government at a rate of 35%.

All of this takes place under the supervision of the Russian peacekeeping forces, whose only mission is to preserve the status quo. It is said that there has been no shooting in the region since 1992 thanks to the Russian peacekeepers, but this is no great achievement, because the people on the right bank and the left bank of the Dniester are one people and have no reason to shoot each other. A change to the makeup of the peacekeeping forces would change public opinion so that Transnistrians would realize that the Russian peacekeepers are not doing a good job.

Catan expressed a desire to see the peacekeeping force internationalized but acknowledged that it would of course depend on “higher powers.” He noted that he had experienced the inefficiency of the Russian peacekeeping forces in 2004. They were called twice to help when the Romanian-language educators and parents of schoolchildren were besieged in their school, but they did not resolve the situation.

Catan then spoke about democratization. His point of view is that the Smirnov regime cannot be democratized. He made a few statements on behalf of the members of Transnistrian civil society organizations as their representative. In the West, some people believe that democratization can happen through the development of a civil society. Catan does not believe this is possible in Transnistria, but he still believes that civil society development should be promoted.

Even Transnistrian officials have understood the need to create the impression that civil society is being developed. Unfortunately, the NGOs which exist in Transnistria cannot say a word against the authorities. Last winter, Catan was looking for a representative of a Transnistrian NGO to represent a point of view on a TV show. He was unable to find anyone willing to appear on the air and was told that some of the people he called were visited by the local security services the next day.

People are afraid – even those who want to speak out are fearful of doing so. More support from international organizations is needed for civil society and NGOs in Transnistria that believe in and support integration of the country. In closing, Catan called on everyone present to do everything possible to bring Moldova under the influence of the West.

Sunday, April 29, 2007

Motherland: a photoset from Russia

Photographer Simon Roberts travelled across Russia for a year, and the BBC recently ran a few photographic gems from his trip. Here are a couple of my favorites:

Motherland is the result of British photographer Simon Roberts’ year long journey throughout Russia with his wife Sarah, in which they visited over 200 locations.


Evgenia is a student who works part time as a waitress whilst studying dentistry at the university in Magadan. Its remote location means the cost of living is among the highest in Russia leading to a steady decline in the city’s population.

"Trafficking Arms on Europe's Doorstep"

Recently, there was some to-do about a French documentary about the color revolutions that was aired in Russia on the channel Rossiia (perhaps the most state-run of all state-run Russian TV channels) in a questionably edited version shortly after the Dissenters' March. The film was heavily advertised and purportedly showed Western involvement in the color revolutions in the post-Soviet space and Serbia. I couldn't find the original version on YouTube or Google Video. Here is (I think) the version that aired on Russian TV, with some portions edited out and the name of the film's French producer also chopped from the credits.

Here is another French documentary film, released last year. This one investigates the allegations that the Transnistrian de facto government has been and is engaged in trafficking arms - both those remaining in the Soviet-era Colbasna stockpile and small arms which it may be producing in its own factories. It has been said that the recent introduction of EUBAM border monitors conclusively proves that there is no longer any cross-border arms smuggling in the region; however, this film notes the existence of an airstrip in Tiraspol which may provide the opportunity for flying weapons out.

The tone of the film is fairly one-sided, but it is definitely worth watching. I've embedded a clip with the first 10 minutes below. Beneath the embedded clip are links to the other four ten-minute sections of the film.


Friday, April 27, 2007

On the bright side, The Bright Line...

I'm fortunate enough to be on the editorial staff of a small (print run of about 700 copies, put together by a few student editors) arts and literary journal published by and for Georgetown Law students. It has been fun to see some of my photographs appear in print, although of course our publication is fairly modest in scope. Next year, we're hoping to establish an online presence.

Anyway, to celebrate the printing of what was unfortunately our only issue this year (next year, there will be one per semester!), I've decided to post the photos I had in the issue. I immodestly suggest clicking on them to expand for full appreciation. And yes, I know it's pretentious to take black-and-white photos and give them titles...


Front Cover (can't remember the title, but we forgot to note
a title inside anyway - Tbilisi, Georgia, Aug. 13, 2006)

CDG Ceiling (Paris, France, Aug. 19, 2006)

Christmas Morning (St. Petersburg, Russia, Dec. 25, 2005)

Dusha Peterburga (with apologies to Antsyferov)
(St. Petersburg, Russia, June 18, 2006)

Robot Che (Moscow, June 28, 2006)
We ran a poem about robots, and this seemed to fit.

Shadow of Faith (Tbilisi, Georgia, Aug. 13, 2006)

Off the Air (St. Petersburg, July 22, 2006)
This one ran with a poem (not mine) called
"Turning Forty Feeling Like an A**hole"

Too Much Fun (Paris, France, Aug. 19, 2006)

Moscow 2006 (Moscow, Russia, June 30, 2006)

[Update: I wanted to add a link to the Flickr photoset containing all of my submissions to the Spring 2007 issue - most of which, of course, didn't make it in]

Mini-documentary on EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)

The EU is "Working Together for Regional Security and Economic Development on the Moldovan-Ukrainian Border." One of the goals has been to monitor and cut down on the level of smuggling on that border.

From the EUBAM website:

EUBAM was established by the EU at the joint request of the Presidents of Moldova and Ukraine in their joint letter of 2 June 2005.

While the management of the border guard and customs services is firmly in the hands of the experienced personnel of the two states, the EU stands ready to assist and advise wherever this may be helpful. The Mission is seeking to make a sustainable contribution to enhancing the delivery of good quality border and customs services to the citizens of Moldova and Ukraine.

Our common aim is a system of border and customs controls and border surveillance which meets not only European standards, but also, and especially, the legitimate needs of the citizens of each country.
I found this documentary on YouTube:

Thursday, April 26, 2007

Downtown Tiraspol in pictures

"Board of Honor" on the wall of an enterprise near the bus station
- it was vacant when I first saw it in 1999, and it's still vacant today.

Lenin statue on the square in front of
the main government building.

Statue of Suvorov

Near the Suvorov statue. WWII memorial signage; the sign
on top of the building is promoting a construction company, I
think, and says, rather imperatively:
"We are building the city in which you will live!"

Street scene near the main government building.

Inside the wall is a time capsule.

The plaque is addressed
"To the generation of Tiraspolians who will greet the 100th
anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution"
and is inscribed as a
"Declaration of the workers of the city adopted at the rally
on 7 November 1967 dedicated to the 50th anniversary of...
[the Revolution, I assume, but the last bit of text has worn off]"

The billboard says "We love our city!"
The street-level signage is from the government-organized
youth organization "Proryv" - the PMR's answer to Russia's
Nashi - which uses Che Guevara for its logo.

Central movie theater "Kinoteatr Tiraspol"
The empty boards say "Today" and "Coming soon"

Ususally one sees tank trailers like this one selling
kvas, but in this land of the Kvint distillery (whose
logo is on the tank) and large-scale wine production,
they are used for wine also.

All of these photos were taken on Aug 7, 2006. I have run a couple of them before in black & white, in case they look familiar. There are some much more spectacular photos of Tiraspol available on Flickr.

A trip down memory lane: my first impression of the PMR

There has been a lot of discussion about Transnistria (among other things) in the comments section of Sean's blog recently. To grossly oversimplify, Transnistria is a part of Moldova that declared independence in 1990 and fought a brief war (aided by Russian troops) in 1992 for its de facto independence, which it enjoys to this day. I have been fortunate enough to visit the so-called PMR (Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic) several times in the past 10 years, albeit only for day trips. This is an excerpt from an article I wrote for the my academic program's newsletter after my summer studying in Moldova in 1999 (picture at right is from last summer - the entrance to the "Prokhlada" bar in the heart of Tiraspol):
During the last week of my visit to Moldova, my language classes were over, and I finally had the chance to visit the two places within Moldova to which no one wanted to accompany me. First, I visited Comrat, the capital of the semi-autonomous region of Gagauzia. My Chisinau hosts questioned my desire to visit what they saw as no more than a dusty provincial town, but I resisted their efforts to talk me out of it and even managed to have friends of theirs meet me off the bus and show me the town. I was met by a very interesting fellow who identifies himself as ethnically Moldovan, even though his last name is Rusu. He was one of the few people I met who was neither ashamed of his past Communist Party involvement nor particularly hostile toward Moldova’s current direction. A bit of wisdom he imparted as we passed through Comrat’s 2-block-long bazaar suggested he has retained a suspicion of free trade. “Sometimes two fools meet in the bazaar,” he said. “One is selling, and the other is buying.”

When I visited Comrat, there was only a short time left until elections for the local leadership, and the town was festooned with campaign posters. Pointing to the face on the most common poster, my host proclaimed, “That’s our biggest crook.” This was a sentiment I heard expressed rather frequently, about local government and especially about the federal government. When I asked if much attention was being paid to the upcoming elections in Gagauzia, my host responded affirmatively. My comment that this was probably a good thing was met with total disagreement.

“The politicians spend too much time and money on campaigning and on pretty posters, and not enough on practical matters,” I was told. This would seem to be at least one problem about which the electorate in the U.S. can commiserate with the Moldovans. Comrat was indeed sleepier than Chisinau--the centerpiece of my day-trip there was a lengthy afternoon nap--and the Lenin statue in front of the local government building added an anachronistic touch. Nevertheless, the infrastructure was far better than I had been told to expect, with reasonably well-paved roads and progress being made on a network of city water mains, apparently with assistance from the Turkish government. The other “local capital” I visited during my last week in Moldova showed no such signs of renewal and was decidedly less welcoming and relaxing.

I visited Tiraspol, the capital of secessionist Transnistria, on my last full day in Moldova. In retrospect, this was probably unwise, given the warnings I had received about travelling in this lawless region, but the lack of a document check at the border was reassuring. I was eager to change some money at the bus station in order to get my hands on some of the ridiculously worthless Transnistrian rubles. The sign specifying exchange rates was unintelligible, perhaps because, as I soon found out, these rubles were around three million to the dollar. Handing over three dollars got me a half-inch-thick wad of 50,000-ruble notes, in addition to several million rubles in 500,000-ruble notes. Looking more closely, I saw that the former had been denominated at 5 rubles when they were first printed in 1994, and that the extra zeroes had been creatively added on a second run through the presses in 1996. Thus bankrolled, I proceeded toward the city center under a dreary rain shower.

Tiraspol looked like the predictable result of a nondescript Soviet city after ten years of neglect. The “Board of Honor” on the building nearest the bus station was still sporting a stern portrait of Lenin at one end and a hammer and sickle at the other, but was otherwise empty. The main park, with a statue of Kirov looking out over an array of non-functioning fountains and stray dogs, was hopelessly overgrown, although an elderly man with a scythe seemed to be making an attempt at beautification. The residential areas were pure USSR, orderly rows of prefab-concrete apartment buildings somewhat the worse for wear, with trash heaps in the middle of the sidewalk at random intervals.

Reaching Tiraspol’s “downtown,” I noticed that Transnistria had other trappings of an independent state besides its currency. Some of the cars had European-style license plates with a Transnistrian flag on them, although many still had Soviet-era plates. There was a local bank, Prisbank, but it did not look as prosperous as the local branch of Gazprombank. Some Moldovans say that Transnistria has become the hideout for local mafia structures, a haven for arms and drug smugglers, as well as for traders in adoptable infants. All of this may well be true, but none of it was reflected by the underpopulated city market where desultory sellers hawked goods a cut below what I saw in Comrat. I saw no late-model luxury cars and in fact very few cars at all--most of the market-goers were disembarking from packed trolleybusses and trudging across a mucky field with a grand statue of Suvorov on horseback. In a nearby park I found the most interesting of the many Soviet-era memorials which remain in Transnistria: a time capsule from 1967, inscribed to the generation of Tiraspolians who were supposed to meet the 100th anniversary of the Revolution in 2017.

As in Comrat, the former local seat of government is graced with a large Lenin statue, but I found out that the people inside the building in Tiraspol take themselves a little more seriously. The Transnistrian White House, if you will, is a grand, Soviet-style monolith, and I wanted a photograph of this building, with its tri-lingual signage (in the three official languages of Transnistria, Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan--the latter in cyrillic script, of course) and the red-and-green “national” flag billowing proudly in the wind. Little did I know that it was considered a strategically significant building by the government. Although there were no signs posted to keep me from taking pictures, a young member of the “President’s Security Service” crossed the square and tracked me down at my next stop, the State History Museum. I never got to see the exhibit on “The First Ten Years of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic,” because I was forced to accompany this man into the building I had just photographed, without being told what I had done wrong.

Needless to say, I began having paranoid thoughts that this was a shakedown, that my documents would not be in order since they had not been checked coming across the border, that since I only had ten dollars they would hold me for 24 hours and cause me to miss my flight, etc. In fact, I was impressed at how businesslike President Smirnov’s bodyguards were in enforcing the prohibition on photographing government buildings without permission. It was all very Soviet, from the way I had to answer my way through several layers of questions from several layers of authorities before I got to the militia captain who was actually responsible for violations of this sort to the nasty tone in which he asked, “So, are you allowed to photograph government buildings in America?” Since it took him 45 minutes to get to the scene of the crime (perhaps he decided not to rush when the guy telephoning in told him that “only picture-taking occurred--no other incidents.”), I had plenty of time to chat with the Transnistrian equivalent of the Secret Service. When the head of this crucial security organization remarked that life in the U.S. must be better and started to complain about living conditions, salaries, and the disparate perks given to members of government, I was at a loss for words.

Indeed, there did not seem to be much going on in the main lobby of the seat of Transnistrian power. One guard was posted in front of the main doors, looking out over the square for potential security threats like me. Cases of mineral water were being unloaded and placed in an elevator to go up to the offices of government deputies, and my captors tried to get the deliveryman to give them a bottle in exchange for two empties. When this did not succeed, one of them bitterly noted that of course each deputy needed a full case, because “after all, they have families and friends.” As soon as he arrived, the captain reminded me to be nervous by constructing the familiar, suspiciously hostile dynamic of Soviet authorities confronting a foreigner. He grilled me about the purpose of my visit and made me expose my film, but he then let me go immediately and did not try to extort a bribe. Impressed with this example of honest if inefficient law enforcement, I nevertheless no longer felt welcome in Transnistria, and I caught the first available bus back to Chisinau.
The bribe-taking occurs on the border, actually, in my experience. Although since that first visit, I've had friendly experiences on the PMR's borders as well as unpleasant ones. And the major updates to the 1999 account above, from what I observed last summer, are that they have redenominated the PMR ruble to a reasonable exchange rate, the area around the Suvorov statue has been nicely landscaped, and I wasn't stopped for taking pictures anywhere. Things in Tiraspol seemed marginally more prosperous, and the amount of time a foreigner is allowed to be in the PMR without registering with the authorities has been increased from three hours to 24 hours - I'll try to post some photos later on.

Monday, April 23, 2007

A tiny bit more on Transnistria

As an addendum to my previous post about the possibility of a Transnistria settlement, here's an article from last Thursday's edition of the Romanian newspaper Ziua. It contains a rather unflattering photo of one of the officials responsible for negotiating on the Russian side, Yuri Zubakov. He was formerly Russia's ambassador to Moldova, and according to the article was one of the authors of the 2003 Kozak Memorandum, which outlined a settlement proposal favorable to Transnistria and Russia and was ultimately rejected by Moldovan President Voronin.


Tiraspol, Moldova, Aug. 7, 2006.

R.I.P., B.N.Y.

I just heard on NPR that Boris Yeltsin has passed away.

Sunday, April 22, 2007

The Transnistrian conflict - is it really over?


Vladimir Socor had two articles in the Friday, April 13th (!) Eurasia Daily Monitor about a potential rush to a settlement of the long-unresolved secessionist conflict in Moldova. In the first article, "Voronin Pressured to Accept Russian Plan for Transnistria," he laid out some details of a settlement plan apparently negotiated directly between Moscow (by Security Council Deputy Secretary Yuri Zubakov) and Chisinau. Socor reported that Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin had been presenting the plan at policy conferences with a small number of top officials" where he "read out the salient points from a set of Russian-language documents."

Here's what Socor wrote on April 13 about how finalized the deal looked then:
Procedurally, it is envisaged that Russia and Moldova would first agree among themselves on how to proceed, whereupon they would officially inform the other members of the official negotiating format (the United States, European Union, OSCE, and Ukraine) and request their endorsement. In this way, the 5 + 2 format’s circumvention would be crowned with a fait accompli on Russian terms.
Socor concluded:
While Lavrov’s MFA handles the negotiations in the 5 + 2 format and has driven them into deadlock, Chisinau wishes to believe that Zubakov’s Security Council team is more flexible and less “dogmatic” than the Russian MFA.

Clearly, the Russian side does not negotiate in good faith through either of these two channels. Zubakov’s primary goal is apparently to misuse his channel in order to erode and degrade Chisinau’s package-deal proposal, adding conditions and procedures that would ultimately nullify its value.
In the second article, "Moscow Now Seeks to Tempt Voronin into Dissolving Parliament," Socor describes what might have to happen for the proposed settlement to be finalized and some of the consequences of moving forward with Russia's apparent plan:
The Russian side now seeks to tempt Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin into dissolving the parliament and changing or breaching the constitution for the sake of a settlement that seems illusory in any case.

The Communist Party controls 56 seats in the 101-seat parliament. This number falls short of the two-thirds majority necessary for changing the constitution. Dissolving the parliament in order to hold anticipated elections would also be an anti-constitutional move. Under Article 85 of the constitution, the parliament could only be dissolved if it fails to elect the head of state within three months, to confirm the government within three months, or to adopt legislation during a three-month period. None of these conditions obtain, however.

To circumvent the constitutional safeguards, some inner-circle members are advising Voronin to dismiss the government and instruct the Communist parliamentary majority to refrain from confirming a new government or enacting legislation during three months. The president would then dissolve the parliament and see to the election of an obedient one. An almost seduced president seems at times to believe that it would be a matter of political will and a test of his team’s strength to proceed along this path, while presidential lawyers would find some appropriate formula for forcing anticipated elections.

Moscow’s proposals also run counter to Moldova’s law on citizenship, which does not permit citizens of another country to be elected to parliament or serve in government. Tiraspol’s nominees to those positions would almost certainly be citizens of Russia, with loyalties focused on that country, not Moldova.
In the week since these two articles appeared, there have been a number of reactions in print and around the internet discussing the possibility that settlement - on mostly Russian terms - may be at hand.

Moldovan journalist Dumitru Minzarari posted a translation of one of the Socor pieces ("Voronin Pressured") into Russian on April 16 with the following introductory comment:
Rumors about the "Zubakov plan" discussed in the article have been circulating in the Moldovan political elite for some time.
There are a couple of quite interesting comments at that post analyzing the situation and breaking down the existence of two plans - one, the "package deal," which official Chisinau may be prepared to implement; and the other, the "Zubakov Plan," which would seem to require many more concessions on the part of Moldova. Here's a machine translation.

Minzarari posted on the next day his
analysis of the situation surrounding the conflict resolution process during the week of April 6-11 - very interesting reading and serious analysis, although I'm afraid I don't have time to translate this one from Russian either and can only provide another machine translation (if anyone can recommend a better one, I'm all ears).

The post discusses some of the factors behind Russia's eagerness for a settlement, among them a goal of being known as a "stabilizing factor" in the CIS. That would certainly be a change. There are a couple of interesting comments at the post as well - check the machine translation if you don't know Russian but can decipher robot-English. In the second comment there, Minzarari concludes that "Chisinau uses the potential assistance of the West quite feebly. And not because they don't know how to use it - they don't want to."

The Economist's Edward Lucas posted
his evaluation of the proposed
settlement's prospects for success on April 19th:
It will be hard for outsiders to block the deal; they may not even bother to try. If they did, they might be called wreckers, given that both sides want it. Yet Mr Voronin's plan means that Russia has, for once, trumped the West.
Blogger Lucia Candu evaluated the situation from Moldova as follows:
This initiative is another "suprise-suprise!" action which is not being open to public debate. Until recently, available information seems to come from leaking unofficial sources. Politicians , experts and bloggers have already experessed their opionions on something that the wider public has not been properly informed about.
Kosmopolit has a negative take on the proposed settlement as well, and concludes, "All in all, a very “Russian” settlement plan…"

Jibs of
Steady State commented on that post with his take on Russia's ability to resolve this and other post-Soviet conflicts - on Russia's terms:
I had this gut feeling that when Russia wants, it can settle conflicts - at a high price for Moldova though. I am sure similarly Russia could resolve with a single swipe the South Ossetian conflict, maybe even Abkhazian (would be harder though).

As long as the deal takes the country back to USSR, it will work overnight.
He also posted his own reaction to the plan at Steady State.

In all, the modus operandi in secretly negotiating and hastily revealing this "deal" appears similar to the one used by Russia to try to force a settlement on its terms in 2003 with the Kozak Memorandum, which was also negotiated outside of the official process and would have resulted in a settlement advantageous to Russia.

The so-called Zubakov Plan, however, does not yet appear to be a fait accompli. A Moldovan parliamentary leader has spoken out against it, and it will be interesting to see the public reactions in Chisinau and the reactions of the other participants in the formal negotiating process in the coming days. Western reaction and public outrage helped to scuttle the Kozak Memorandum several years ago - we'll see what happens this time.

Not surprisingly, Socor's analysis is not optimistic:
[Voronin] and his team calculate that Putin could only deliver a settlement, however “imperfect,” to Moldova during the next few months, before the presidential election campaign enters its main phase in Russia. They are being led to believe by Zubakov and others that Putin craves the laurels of an international peacemaker as he exits from the presidency; and that he would be clement to Moldova on the terms of settlement, if Moldova facilitates such an exit for him.

Moldova is negotiating under multiple pressures, some generated by Russia and some self-generated. Moscow and Tiraspol are stonewalling the negotiations on Transnistria. Russia’s politically motivated embargo has pushed Moldova to the brink of recession; while Moldova’s own failure to attract investments and diversify its export market is aggravating the Russian embargo’s impact. The president and the Communist Party badly need to come up with some achievements to show in next year’s parliamentary election campaign. [...]

Thus, Voronin seems very keen on reaching a bilateral accommodation with the Kremlin, given the less than two years to go in his final presidential mandate. He is worried about his place in the country’s history, if he fails to effectively address the country’s main problems -- deep poverty and the Transnistria conflict -- toward the end of his eight-year presidency. Thus he seems tempted to stake on Putin for illusory solutions on both counts.

Tiraspol, Moldova (near the bus station), Aug. 7, 2006.

I've spent way too much time this weekend thinking about Transnistria, but somehow it's much more interesting than preparing for next week's classes and the exams soon to follow...

Friday, April 20, 2007

Comedy sketches

This is somewhat funny. Check the links at the bottom for more.

Protesting the protesters

Dmitri Simes has "The Real Story" about the protests last weekend. He criticizes the opposition figures who organized the protests (especially Limonov), but saves some of his harshest words for the western media:
It is perfectly appropriate, and indeed necessary, not to whitewash Russian domestic practices, as President George W. Bush once did. What is not appropriate, however, is to accuse Putin and his government of all kinds of terrible deeds—often providing highly misleading information in the process—just because he is supposed to be undemocratic. And that is clearly what happened with coverage of last weekend’s protests in much of the mainstream media in the United States. The Wall Street Journal editorial page—which believes that Vice President Dick Cheney is a wise statesman, John Bolton an effective diplomat and Paul Wolfowitz a model anti-corruption reformer—has predictably adopted the cause of their regular contributor, former chess champion Garry Kasparov, who was one of the leaders of the opposition marches. Mr. Kasparov was a great chess player. He is also a man of courage and determination. But anyone familiar with his career in politics, and as a matter of fact, in chess long before it, would know that he has a strong propensity for theatrics and artificial confrontation. Quoting Mr. Kasparov as a dispassionate commentator on his own struggle, as TheWall Street Journal editorial page did, is unpersuasive.

But, being persuasive is in the eyes of the beholder, and editorial pages by definition are entitled to their opinions. Not so the news pages. In the case of The Washington Post, news stories regarding the April 14 and 15 events in Moscow and St. Petersburg were written as if they were coordinated with the notoriously anti-Putin attitude of The Washington Post editorial page. In their April 18 article, "Kremlin Says Riot Police Overreacted", by Peter Finn, both the text and the photographs present a highly misleading picture. The photographs show Garry Kasparov appealing to the menacing-looking police officers. It also shows the police in anti-riot gear overwhelming a long-haired, bespectacled young man.
Russia Blog has a less measured but somewhat interesting piece by Sergei Roy critiquing the opposition - worth reading as a catalog of the facts and rumors which ensure that the leaders of "Another Russia" would be likely electoral failures if left to their own devices. Roy also makes the point that the US loses points with the Russian "street" by being seen to support Kasyanov et al.

While true in many respects, this misses an important point. Of course this is not a real, capable, popular opposition. Of course Putin is supported by the majority of Russians, with some justification given Russia's recent economic good fortune. But none of this means that people engaged in a protest action should be beaten and detained by the authorities - especially authorities who, at the lowest level of the chain of command, talk about their duty to enforce the law like this.

And the image of the US as being "behind" these protests is promoted more by the Kremlin than by anyone else. Aside from Gryzlov's comments, see, for example, the image in this post; and more shockingly, this glossy catalog of lies, deftly debunked by the Russian bloggers who posted it; not to mention the tempest in a teapot stirred up by Russian politicians over the recent State Dept. report.

There's an interesting range of views on last weekend's protests here - I was going to post excerpts, but don't have time. Though the new Russia-Profile-costs-money format means that after 30 days the material will be accessible only to people who pay for the archive.

Thursday, April 19, 2007

A Moldovan village on-line

Alexandru Culiuc has been blogging about the Webtop online awards competition in Moldova. I decided to check out the list of nominees and found one - Satul Tarnova, or Village of Tarnova, which has an outstanding website, especially for a hamlet of just 2105 people. What was remarkable about it to me was that the whole website exists in English as well as in Romanian, although the translation is better on some pages than others. To the site's organizers - well done!

I recommend the photo album, which includes this inspirational poster, presumably from the local school:

"If you know books, you have four eyes"
[Original image source]

An alternate translation - along with other Romanian proverbs - is here. Note the funny-looking hat, one of those "traditional" pieces of attire that shows up more in cartoons, books, and souvenirs than in real life.

Wednesday, April 18, 2007

Another quality American export

From the Vzglyad news website [my translation]:
Pamela Anderson to MC the MTV Russia Movie Awards
April 19, 2007, 01:40
Hollywood actress and model Pamela Anderson will host the MTV Russia Movie Awards ceremony.

The winners will be announced today in the Pushkinsky movie theater in Moscow. Pamela will be accompanied on stage by popular TV announcer Ivan Urgant.

As the organizers of the actress's trip to Russia told ITAR-TASS, she arrived in Moscow on Tuesday. This is her first visit to Russia, and Pamela wanted to get to know the city better. She has already had a chance to visit Red Square, to see the Church of Christ the Savior, and to go shopping. Pamela is being accompanied on her trip by her friend, stylist, make-up artist, and hairdresser, who will prepare the actress for her appearance on stage.

All Russian films released between 2006 and 2007 are eligible for the MTV Russia Movie Awards. The prizewinners are determined based on viewer voting and will be determined only during the awards show itself. [...]

The awards ceremony will be broadcast live not only on MTV [Russia], but also on the internet, where it will be broadcast live online for the first time.
Here's MTV Russia's announcement of the online broadcast; you'll be able to watch online here, apparently, and can also check out MTV's silly and unoriginal decision to use a bear as the mascot/symbol for the 2007 awards show. I'm curious as to how they're going to handle the translation and how scripted Ms. Anderson's remarks will be. Not curious enough to try to watch online, but if anyone does see this "шоу" I'd love to hear about it.

I can already imagine certain Russian bloggers talking about how this is a perfect example of the kind of dreck that America exports, and that anyone who supports Another Russia (or its liberal components, at least) is just supporting an onslaught of globalization-driven American crap and (as the more extreme ones will tell you whilst adjusting their tinfoil hats) the divvying up of Russia into American-run colonies. Xenophobic bunk, of course, but MTV Russia is definitely not hurting their case...

A comment turns into a post

Sean has a post about the Virginia Tech tragedy as seen through the eyes of Russian commentators. I was going to just post a long comment, but decided to put it here instead. Sean first feels the need to defend against "what others might think of the notion of the Russians judging us." Heck, we feel comfortable judging them all the time, so why shouldn't they have the right to judge us? Doesn't mean we necessarily have to listen...

Anyway, here's the meat of Sean's post:

What is the Russian media saying about Virginia Tech? Boris Kaimakov of RIA Novosti wrote that most Russian media outlets are pointing to the “unlimited arms trade in the United States” while more socially savvy commentators are pointing to the “ tremendous psychological pressure in the U.S. - and in all developed countries.” Interestingly, Kaimakov surveys the opinions of Russian bloggers on the issue. The entries he quotes present an interesting picture of America. In regard to one unidentified blogger, Kaimakov writes:

An urge to break the law is present in almost every subconscious mind. Reaction equals action, so the urge is at its strongest and ugliest in America, with its unquestioned supremacy of the law. Though the South Korean student killer's message has not been completely decoded yet, his sensational "Blame them, not me" shows what he thought of the American public. "America might have proclaimed freedoms, but its rules of the game are overly strict, and one feels it even as a toddler," is one remark from a Russian blog. Many blogs say innermost human emotions clash with political correctness to cause inevitable rampages - a view born of young anarchism and social protest. "They've robbed us of the right to anger," a Russian blogger quotes an American friend of his.

To others the massacre pointed directly to one of the harsh contradictions of American life. As a blogger named dr_fedor writes:

There is an alarming contradiction in American life. On the one hand, socialization, in its many forms, is a permanent and very aggressive demand. Political correctness is one of such forms. We Russians come down on it, though it is the least of all evils - if an evil at all. On the other hand, there is cutthroat competition. It is encouraged in every group while the community does not feel responsible enough for its individual members. What we have as the result is, first, huge problems bred by giving up coercive socialization and, second, doubtful emotional reward voluntary socialization brings. Some people protest, which is natural - and there is never a shortage of weapons. Then, the extent of one's madness alone determines the outcome.

Most Russian experts echoed their international counterparts. The root of American violence is proliferation of guns combined with mental illness.

"In my opinion, these repeated cases of completely unprovoked shootings in the United States reflect some sort of a systematic collapse of American legislation, particularly involving the right to own guns," said Sergei Oznobishchev, the director of the Russian institute for strategic evaluation and analysis. Adding, “American civilization is so ubiquitous and overwhelming that it simply depresses ordinary people," he said. "When combined with the constitutional right to bear arms conceived by the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution, the results can be disastrous.”

Viktor Kremenyuk, a deputy director of the Institute of U.S. Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences dismissed the notion that firearms were easily acquired in the US, but concurred with Oznobishchev psychological analysis. "Modern society has a lot of stresses and strains, and immature minds and souls often cannot bear up under them, and as a result breakdowns happen, followed by tragedy."

I have seen some even less charitable things on Russian blogs. And one incredulous comment asking (I'm paraphrasing) "what, they don't require a medical statement of sanity to buy a gun?" Which is quite a good question. Responding to it would first require explaining how in the U.S. this is a state-law issue, but that's tangential.

Sadly, it looks like no one in the U.S. is going to try to make something good come out of this tragedy by opening up a serious discussion about stronger gun control. One interesting angle to think about, though, is that one of the arguments against gun control, aside from the whole Constitutional issue, is the concept of not giving the government a monopoly on the use/instruments of force. Probably not so relevant nowadays, but it meant a lot to people back when we had just gotten out from under the Brits, and it's something to consider when thinking about the situation in Russia, where the government does seem have a monopoly on just about all instruments of both physical force and opinion-making.

Anyway, I agree with Sean that this is a particularly American sort of tragedy. What do I think of "Russians judging us" on these types of social tragedies? Not very much, to be honest. I am sure lots of people will use this as an excuse to point out how bad things in America are whenever Americans attempt (individually or on the level of official statements) to criticize anything in Russia. As a related example, I've already seen blog comments from people responding to criticism of the Moldovan public education system by talking about the sorry state of public education in the U.S., and of course this type of debate (A: "Russia is not a democracy" B: "The U.S. is not a democracy either" (then B uses arguments formulated and propounded by people taking advantage of free speech in America to bolster his point)) is common at English-language Russia blogs. Not the most constructive way to have a discussion, but it's something that I guess one comes to expect as an American. What bothers me much more is that Russian officials are already using this tragedy cynically to tell the U.S. to mind its own business with respect to human rights issues in Russia (see Gryzlov's remarks below). Classy.

But getting back to the point about not paying too much attention to Russian media commentators' take on what happens in the US - I saw an article from a Russian commentator (actually, writing for Novoe Russkoe Slovo here in the U.S.) recently talking about the Don Imus scandal that translated "nappy-headed" as something having to do with diapers - using, of course, the British translation for the word "nappy," missing completely the racial overtones of the word as used in the U.S., and shredding the article's credibility in one fell swoop. This particular article - headlined "American Ugliness" - was especially troubling because the guy was apparently writing it in the U.S. but couldn't be troubled to get the racial nuances of the story right. To me, it was a cautionary note to all who attempt to comment on the nuances of other cultures from afar (American pontificators on Russia included) - know what you're talking about, or keep your mouth shut.

Anyway, here's how the Washington Post reported Gryzlov's comments:
"This is a tragedy and we express our condolences," Boris Gryzlov, speaker of Russia's lower house of parliament, told journalists. Referring to a recent U.S. State Department report criticizing the Kremlin, he added, "The situation where a country dictates rules of behavior to other countries, but cannot keep its own people in order, does raise questions."

More post-Soviet abandonment

As a follow-up to this earlier post:

Abandoned (or at least heavily vandalized) Oka in St. Petersburg.
Note the misspelled graffiti - "F**k oof" - in the background.

And behind the car, some stray puppies.
Both photos from April 30, 2005.

Better (and more properly described as "abandoned") photos:

Abandoned biochemical laboratory, presumably somewhere in Russia. (at the LiveJournal ru_abandoned page).

Burned-out and abandoned Hotel Abkhazia in Sukhumi. One of the comments there:
They say that after the fire all of the walls cracked((. What a pity. They used to have such great ice cream there!

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

Journalists on the March

Lenta has a great roundup of Russian press coverage of the weekend's protests - and non-protests. The piece discusses coverage of the "Марш согласных" - which I guess could be translated as "March of Non-dissenters," or perhaps more accurately a "Sycophants' March" or "March of the Lemmings." Lenta's money quote (among others):
"The "Марш согласных" looked most respectable in Izvestia's reporting of events, which was consistent with the spirit and tone of Pravda's Soviet-era front pages."
Robert Amsterdam has a good post about journalists caught up in the action and getting beaten
along with the protesters and discusses what the authorities' motivations might have been for such a harsh crackdown.

Along with Amsterdam, Germany's Der Spiegel asks, "Just What Is Putin Afraid of, Exactly?" [via Russian Standard]

Russophile.com notices a distinct lack of US media coverage of the weekend's events. Big-time American blog the Volokh Conspiracy has a post about Kasparov getting arrested.

Monday, April 16, 2007

Fear of an Orange Planet?*

I don't want to beat the topic to death, especially when the protests were probably not a good barometer of public opinion and ultimately may be just a blip, but it was an interesting weekend. And I should preface these comments by saying that I don't think any kind of color revolution is likely in Russia - or even necessarily desirable (although, as Berezovsky tried to say recently, it's hard to imagine the regime giving up power any other way). But of course beating on protesters is not the best way to make sure people stay loyal to the regime. Even people who didn't sympathize with any of the eclectic group of groups protesting have to acknowledge that this was authoritarian overreach.

Anyway, regarding Saturday in Moscow, the general consensus seems to be that the story was not the turnout for the protests (which was low) but the excessive force deployed to prevent the protesters from enjoying their day in the sun. Russia Profile has a good piece on the protests and some original photos by their correspondent, who also shares this vignette:
As the speeches concluded and the police tensely watched the dispersing crowd, Andrei Illarionov and a group of sympathizers stopped just short of Chistye Prudy subway station. A former economic advisor to the Russian president who is now an adamant critic of the government, Illarionov started to harangue an officer standing in a ring of riot police. Pointing vituperatively to a booklet of the Russian Constitution, Illarionov explained how everyone involved in the operation had violated basic constitutional freedoms and will inevitably be held accountable. The officer stared glumly and shifted feet as the jeremiad went on, until the shuffling crowd enveloped them.
Illarionov can't even get arrested in Moscow! He should come back to DC. This was the lede from RP's piece - titled "Springtime for Putin":
Lockdown on Pushkin Square effectively started before dawn, and by the time Muscovites emerged on Saturday morning for the unsanctioned “Dissenters’ March,” phalanxes of security forces left little to chance. Beginning inside the nearby subway stations, and continuing through the underpasses and along the many approaches to the square, rings of riot police and law enforcement corps of every stripe filtered the procession, minimized mobility, and descended swiftly upon the more vocal protesters. The much-vaunted demonstration was over before it even started.
The NYT on the related happenings in St. Petersburg:
The marches have become a test both of the determination of the opposition and the willingness of the government to use force to suppress it, imbuing the marches with more weight in Russian politics than the small numbers of demonstrators imply.
All of the talk of reminded me of something from nearly two years ago - the excessive force deployed to guard against protests at the Khodorkovsky trial, whicn became a story of its own, separate from the trial. At the time, I posted a partial translation of a commentary from Ekho Moskvy on the situation:
But one question remains, and it's not an idle one. Guys, if this is just a regular criminal court proceeding, if this is a clear-cut case of fraud, then why are you making such a fuss about it? Why did you wave your nightsticks a week ago, why did you deploy three cordons of guards and all of those trucks? Are you expecting Shamil' Basayev and his posse? Why do your eyes start darting around when people ask simple questions? And for whom did you set out the so-called [anti-Khodorkovsky] "general public" like hedgerows, for Bush and Schroeder? And if you're so tough and sure of yourselves, really, why do your eyes keep darting around? The way you're doing it looks so petty and pitiful. You can see the threads sticking out. Like blue jeans made in Sovok.
The difference between then and now is that the authorities seem to be a bit more organized (according to RP, it was "coercively administered crowd control, orchestrated and implemented with sinister precision") - if no less heavy-handed - in keeping a lid on things nowadays. I guess that is another accomplishment of the last few years.

As for the answer to the question "why," I guess the authorities believe their own hype about foreign-sponsored NGO's working tirelessly to effect regime change. This (rather vaguely sourced - which "critics of the Kremlin and political analysts"?) comment from the NYT:
Critics of the Kremlin and political analysts said that the abundance of Interior Ministry troops on the streets over the weekend — and their use of force — reflected concern by Mr. Putin and his advisers that street protests could snowball ahead of parliamentary elections planned for the fall. They point to the large rallies in Ukraine that came to be known as the Orange Revolution, which forced a change of government in 2004.
The MT - one of whose journalists was detained - noted that it's hard to see how fear of the color orange could provoke such an extreme response to the "Dissenters' March" - noting that, given the unlikely political success of any of the "Other Russia" leaders, "it is difficult to see how Saturday's gathering posed such a threat" of a color revolution.

Tangentially related - Lenta.ru's photo collection from the DPNI/Congress of Russian Communities protest. An especially classic sign - reminding Chubais that he won't escape jail time and depicting him springing forth from a privatization voucher. The MT had a brief snapshot of the level of discourse at that event:
Hundreds attended a nationalist rally on Bolotnaya Ploshchad to hear Dmitry Rogozin criticize "a Russia run by Abramoviches," in reference to Russia's richest man, Roman Abramovich. Hundreds of police near Bolotnaya Ploshchad stood by quietly.

* With credit and apologies to Public Enemy.

More on the "Dissidents' March"

LJ user misslob has a great post with lots of photos and comments (in Russian). Via the Yandex "top blog posts" page.

[Update: More photos on fishki.net - slow-loading, but comical juxtapositions of OMON guys with Moscow street advertising. Via Apricot Flan]

[Upd 2: great arty photos of the march in Moscow from drugoi; a pdf book of photos from SPB by studio204 (via GVO).

Also, the original title of this post misidentified the march as one of "dissidents" - while that may apply to some of the participants, I guess the generally agreed-upon title (aside from clunky ones like "March of Those Who Do Not Agree") is "Dissenters' March" - I'm not correcting the title because that would change the hyperlink of the post]

[Upd 3: I just posted one of drugoi's photos at moscow graffiti with a translation of the text]

Sunday, April 15, 2007

While (some of) Moscow marched...

Lots of blogging about the various protests in Moscow on Saturday, for the time being mostly on Russian-language LiveJournal (some of the better material seems to be at Ilya Peresedov's blog). Robert Amsterdam's blog has strong coverage; Veronica has a few posts (this one has some particularly funny photos, nice comic relief from the day's dire tone) and a slew of original pictures; Whims of Fate has done a great job of aggregating photos (from SPB, too!) and links to a few of the Russian LJ commentaries. Lenta.ru had a pretty good roundup of the day's events (or so it seemed to me, but of course I didn't see the actual events - or protesters - being rounded up). But while some marched and were arrested, the target of much of the protesters' ire was enjoying the sweetest form of victory over his opponents - ignoring them as irrelevant and relaxing in his hometown with his favorite sport:
BBC Monitoring
President Putin attends mixed martial arts tournament in St Petersburg - TV
Excerpt from report by Russian NTV on 15 April

[Presenter] Russian wrestlers celebrated their triumph in St Petersburg's Ice Palace, where a mixed martial arts tournament took place under the slogan: Russia vs America. Conquering the Americans was to a large extent a matter of prestige. [Russian President] Vladimir Putin came to watch the tournament. Here is our correspondent Vladimir Kondratyev with the report.

[Correspondent] It is incorrect to say that these mixed martial arts have no rules. In these games it is against the rules to do anything that could directly damage your opponent's health, or goes against sports ethics. For example, one cannot elbow one's opponent, hit them in the upper stomach or the spine, pull their hair out, spit in their face and so on. The sportsmen with the most success in this tournament are sambo* and judo wrestlers, precisely the two kinds [of sport] President Putin used to practise. It is well-known that Putin became Leningrad's champion for sambo and judo more than once. And it is not surprising that the president came to attend the tournament entitled: Russia vs America.

The thousands of spectators in the packed hall of the Ice Palace couldn't believe their eyes when after the first honorary guest, Jean-Claude Van Damme, the [tournament's] host announced the arrival of the Russian president. The surprise was a first-rate success; even the press only found out about Putin's plans at the last minute. Soon, yet another high-ranking spectator arrived: former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Putin does not forget his friends, even when they are no longer in power. The organizers had planned for Putin to sit by the ring for a while - the price for seats in the stalls was R7,500 by the way - then to move him to a box of honour in the upper circle. The president declined however, and remained downstairs so as to get a better view of the wrestlers' actions. [Passage omitted: details of the tournament.]

Putin applauded the victory [by Russia's Feodor Yemelyanenko] standing up, along with all the others. The times when the Americans dominated in professional boxing and martial arts have become a thing of the past. "We must be known and reckoned with," Yemelyanenko announced after his victory, unaware that his words sounded like a political statement. But this is not politics, only sport. Putin embraced the hero, and closer to midnight invited him and his friends to a late tea at the Konstantinovskiy Palace.

[Putin, in Russian, with consecutive translation in English] Your kind of sport is very tough. But it is not void of nobility, of respect towards your opponent. It is of course a sport for courageous people.

[Correspondent] Putin's short visit to his native town must have been enjoyable. It gave him the chance to go back to his sporting past, to his youth, he walked along the Strelka [spit of St Petersburg's Vasilyevskiy Island], where he congratulated a newly-wedded couple, and Palace Square. Next on the agenda are entirely different types of battles: political ones, also along the lines of Russia vs America. But in those, unlike during the martial arts tournament, knockouts are counterproductive.

For some reason, I thought (among other things) of W clearing brush on his ranch. The link would seem to be willful obliviousness to criticism. Although Putin was not running from politics at all - in American political terms, he was "connecting with his base." Just think - while one of his political opponents was arrested and another was roughed up, VVP was chilling in Piter with his buddies Jean-Claude and Silvio**, along with his new America-beating pal Feodor Yemelyanenko. Sovereign democracy means never having to say you're sorry...

Actually, the most absurd part of this is Van Damme being there. I can just imagine the sambo- and judo-heads' reaction - "Berlusconi - eto ladno, a Van Damme - eto da..."

While writing this, I remembered that I once almost attended a martial arts tournament in SPB in 2002 or 2003 - a friend of mine had been involved with the sport in his youth and wanted to go for the sake of nostalgia. But we wound up meeting a friend of his in front of the arena and unsuccessfully trying to get in (as I recall), and then adjourning to a nearby "zakusochnaya" to practice a different ancient art.

* Note that "sambo" in Russia refers to a martial art invented during the Soviet era, not the racial term.
** For those of you interested in another Silvio (sort of like "another Russia," but not really), check here. I have a real soft spot for the Tales of Belkin.

[Update - Whims of Fate has a post - with RIAN photos - poking fun at Putin's weekend with Jean-Claude.]

[Update 2 - Lenta.ru's story about Putin's weekend in SPB - apparently he visited with Matvienko and discussed the important issue of soccer team Zenit's success and whether it is linked to VVP's attendance at their matches - Putin's modest answer: "
я здесь не при чем".]

[Update 3 - Robert Amsterdam reposts a Moscow Times editorial positing a Van Damme Trade Theory, as well as Putin's remarks from the judo tournament.]