Amazon Review - Why It Doesn't Matter What You Believe If It's Not True: Is There Absolute Truth? [Paperback]
Stephen McAndrew (Author)

The author sent this book to me to review. Here is my review. As always a "helpful" vote would be appreciated.

Stephen McAndrew's "Why it Doesn't Matter What You Believe if It's Not True" is a well-written, highly-informative, tightly-argued examination of the questions, "Are there good grounds to believe that there is an absolute moral truth?" and "Why do people think that moral truths are 'relative'?"

McAndrew structures his as a fairly slim (approximately 90 pages with end-notes) and highly accessible argument in favor of the proposition that moral truths are "real" and not simply things that exist by agreement, stipulation or fancy. McAndrew clearly states his propositions and, in a very lawyer-like manner, marshals the proofs for his thesis. Unlike a great many lawyers, however, he is gifted with a habit of graceful prose that made reading his book enjoyable.

McAndrew's basic argument is not going to be very surprising to those who are acquainted with the usual debates about the ontological status of moral truth. McAndrew's book, however, is worth reading for the perspective he brings on the argument, particularly his recounting of intellectual history. McAndrew locates the origin of the attitude that moral truths are only contingent in the Empiricist philosophical tradition. The Empiricists denied that anything could be known - or knowable - except that information that was derived from sense experience. This view led to a crisis in Empiricism, where Empiricist philosophers found themselves denying common sense knowledge such as the fact that things continue to exist even after we no longer see them. The Empiricist tendency led to Logical Positivism, whose practitioners stipulated out of human consideration anything that could not be measured, tested or falsified.

The culmination of what McAndrew views as a dysfunctional philosophy was Ludwig Wittgenstein. According to McAndrew, the later Wittgenstein sought to "solve" all philosophical problems by arguing for the proposition that the reality experienced by human beings was found in the language established by the community and communicated to the individual by modeling and reinforcement. It seems that Wittgenstein's view was pretty comprehensive; Wittgenstein argued that pain was only "painful" in that human beings had been taught by modeling and reinforcement of behavior that certain kinds of behavior would be rewarded if such behavior "appropriately" followed certain stimuli. So, children who stumbled and fell and cried would be comforted; hence, the children learned "pain."

Wittgenstein's argument stemmed from his "private language argument." To wit, the purpose of language is to communicate publicly, which means that no one has a reason for having a "private language," which means that everything we communicate publicly has to be a community activity. According to McAndrew this insight supported and resonated with the idea of moral relativity. Thus, if "pain" is "pain" because of a community definition, then morality - which is another public activity - would also be a product of community definition.

McAndrew succinctly and quickly establishes that this approach is self-defeating by appealing to the argument that even relativists make a truth claim that is not contingent on a community definition of what counts as "truth." Simply put, if there's no "there" there - if there is no truth in that truth claim - then it isn't worth even the time spent breathing out the nonsense syllables that make up "Wittgenstein's" claim.

McAndrew also follows another line of reasoning by appealing to the "human rights urge." McAndrew points out that human rights are widely accepted as a point of established fact in international law. Most people today accept the idea of human rights as something that cannot be questioned. But if such rights are only contingent and accidental, then they don't really exist in the way that even secular modernists - particularly secular modernists - claim they exist. This puts even secular modernists into the bind of giving up one the most cherished programs of their project, and lapsing into nihilism, or conceding what they know already, i.e. that there is a moral truth.

This is a very nice argument.

McAndrew also offers some insights into why the relativist project exists. His arguments here were thought provoking. After reading this part of his book, I came away wondering at the strange cognitive dissonance that pervades modern society. For example, we don't accept the claim that truth is relative to the community when it comes to science. No one will get much mileage claiming that "global warming" is true for Europeans but not true for China. But when it comes to moral truths, suddenly there is no truth.

Except, perhaps, for those truths enshrined by secular modernists in the U.N. Charter of Human Rights.

I found McAndrew's book to be well-worth reading. I recommend it without reservations.